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BASIC VALUES OF THE POPULATION: COMPARISON OF RUSSIANS WITH RESIDENTS OF THE OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

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Table of contents

Introduction

The relevance of the research topic is the significance of the problem of the association between phenomena, processes, and patterns that *are common* to many countries around the world and *specific* to Russia and its contribution to the development of Russian society. The importance of this problem is high especially due to the processes of rapid social change in recent decades and the need to identify ways to further development of the Russian society. The solution of this problem requires specific knowledge about the similarities and differences between the population of Russia and other countries of the world, and this knowledge is still very limited.

These considerations are fully applicable to the comparative study of Russians' *values*, which is the focus of this paper. To solve the above problem, we need to know the similarities and differences in values between Russians and residents of other countries, but there is a clear lack of comparative research in this area. Back in the early 1990s, Doktorov noted that Russian studies of values "are not sufficiently comparative" (1994). Since this statement, there have been a few studies which compared Russian values with the values of the populations of other countries, however most of the results are presented only in the vague form of averaged indicators across countries.

The purpose of the study is to identify similarities and differences between the basic values of the Russian population and the values of the population of other European countries.

The object of the study is the population of modern Russia and 30 other European countries[1] .

The subject of the study is the basic values of the population of Russia and thirty other European countries.

The objectives of the study are as follows:

1) Analyze local and international scientific literature devoted to the comparative study of basic values, including the values of Russians;

2) compare the basic values of Russians with the values of the population of the other European countries at the level of country averages in order to: a) identify the similarities and differences in basic values between the average Russian and the average representatives of the other European countries; b) identify the similarities and differences between the hierarchy of basic values of the average Russian and the value hierarchies of average representatives of the other countries;

3) compare the basic values of Russians with the values of the population of other European countries taking into account the within-country variation of values;

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[1] The paper uses the notion of "expanded Europe" to include Turkey and Israel.

4) to identify differences in basic values between Russia and the other European countries, remaining after the controlling for composition, that is, effects of the social and demographic differences between countries ("unbiased", or "adjusted");

5) compare the degree of effects of country and socio-demographic characteristics on basic values.

Theoretical and methodological foundations of the study

The theoretical prerequisites for the study are the works of classical sociologists (E. Durkheim, M. Weber, T. Parsons), who drew attention to values as an important phenomenon of social life, as well as specialists who created the conceptual framework for modern empirical and comparative studies of values (M. Rokeach , S. Schwartz, R. Inglehart).

Key concepts of the study. We understand the country values as the values of the entire population, in contrast to the ideological values shared by the elites and in various cultural products of their activities.

The traditional understanding of values was associated with morality and implied generally meaningful goals that embody the public good. Gradually, simultaneously with the change of scientific ideas about human, the meaning of the concept "value" expanded, and in the works of M. Rokeach and S. Schwartz, who created the most common methods for measuring values, there appeared individualized interpretations of this concept as the belief in *personal* importance of an object or phenomenon.

In this paper, we refer to individual values as an individual's beliefs in the importance (significance) of some object or phenomenon for them personally. These values act as standards against which an individual compares the real state of affairs. They also act as potential motivators of practical or verbal actions of an individual.

The notion of basic values emphasizes the end-goals and therefore generalized, abstract values of a person, which form the basis of the whole set of instrumental (operational, current, situational) values, to a greater extent determining the specific content of their activity.

Cross-country value similarities and differences were determined in two ways: by comparing aggregates (cross-country averages) and by comparing within-country distributions of values across countries.

The practical significance of the work is determined by the fact that Russian society and Russian citizens receive adequate information about the real differences and similarities between Russians and other Europeans. This information has been made available to the Russian expert community through our publications in scientific journals, and to the mass reader through publications in popular print and electronic media. This information increases the level of public

awareness, which affects the development of more effective collective and individual decisions, promotes contacts and mutual understanding at the level of individuals, organizations and countries.

Chapter 1. Comparative empirical research on values: an analytical review

The number of studies on basic values is difficult to assess reliably - there are probably thousands of publications on this topic, so in this review we will limit ourselves to a brief overview of the most significant stages in the development of the concept of values, and when describing empirical studies we will narrow the angle of the review even more, leaving only comparative (cross-cultural) studies of basic values and closely related phenomena, as well as those studies that concerned the study of Russians' values.

1.1. Various approaches to defining the concept of "values" in sociology

The concept of "values" has a very long history, and arises within the framework of philosophical thought and the notion of some good. V. K. Shokhin traces its history from ancient Greek and ancient philosophy (Shokhin, 2006). Discussions of the good, ethics, aesthetics or economics are present in almost all philosophers and are referred by historians to the history of "values". A more focused discussion of values begins in the late 19th century, when a special discipline dealing with the problems of values appears in philosophy, which received, thanks to P. Lapie called "axiology" (Lapie, 1902). By the beginning of the 20th century, interdisciplinary differences in the understanding of the English term "values" or German "wert" had emerged. In economics, thanks mainly to K. Marx, "value" represents mostly a market value or a cost (Chekhovsky, 2008). In sociology, the same word is used with emphasis on subjective importance. Some authors, in order to distinguish the meanings of this word, add connotations to it - for example, they often mention "cultural", "moral", or "basic" values. Today, the meaning of the word "value" as a market value, as a basic value, or as some sort of a good is determined by the disciplinary affiliation of the work with economics, sociology, philosophy (axiology), or psychology. Without dwelling on the philosophical and economic traditions of value studies, let us go straight to the sociological/social psychological one.

Historians suggest looking for the origins of the sociological understanding of the term "values" in the works of W. Dilthey, who proposed to distinguish sciences into "explaining" and "interpretive" according to their subject - the former study nature (natural sciences), and the latter study people who have a spirit and are able to realize and understand what happens to them and around them (humanitarian sciences). The latter are distinguished by the fact that the researcher is a part of the object of their study and is able to "understand" them, i.e. by accepting the assumption of similarity of their mental organization and other people, to get involved in their experiences, to empathize. H. Rickert, one of the key representatives of the Baden school of neo-Kantians based his theory on Kant's doctrine of cognition with the help of "pure reason" as mental construction of

simplified models of reality. Rickert claimed that cognition and science in particular can not only generalize (simplifying), but also find unique characteristics of objects. On this basis, he distinguished between generalizing and individualizing sciences: the former consider objects and phenomena as "nature", the latter as "culture". The methods of the generalizing sciences were described in detail by Kant, so Rickert turned to the methodology of the "culture" sciences about individuals, where the main method was "attribution to a value". The explanation of the phenomena in the individualizing sciences takes place through the understanding of people, through what may have seemed important for people, i.e., through "attribution to a value". Everything that can be attributed to value, that is, everything that is given meaning, significance, everything that is not an objective characteristic but is attributed to an object by human, is "valued", or is culture. Thus, instead of searching for universal laws of nature, the individualizing sciences look for individual meanings of various objects, which, having acquired such meaning, become culture. These ideas were developed and transformed by M. Weber, for whom sociology referred rather to generalizing sciences, but used "individualizing" methods for this purpose (Batygin & Podvoisky, 2007). In other words, Weber applied "interpreting" to study human values, but saw them as concrete motivators of behavior and, simplifying and schematizing them to "ideal types", studied them in the framework of "generalizing" sciences. The understanding/intterpreting method (or attribution to value) here is only needed so that the researcher explaining, say, a behavior of an individual, puts into it the same meaning as the individual themselves. Weber also singles out one of the four types of social action on this basis, namely value-based action, which is action undertaken for the sake of a particular value actualized at a given moment. Using the concept of values, Weber carried out his famous work "Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism," in which he reconstructed the motivations of people in a historical context, using the method of understanding or "attribution to a value".

1.1.1 The Concept of Values in Structural Functionalism

M. Weber identified a special value-rational type of social action; E. Durkheim developed the concept of "collective consciousness", close to the concept of values; V. Pareto - the concept of "residues". All of them were characterized by supra-individuality, stability in time, and motivational force in relation to the actions of an individual. The similarity of the concepts described by Weber, Durkheim, and Pareto was noted by T. Parsons and implemented in the concept of values, which are central in structural functionalism – values carry out the connection between the social system and the individual system.

Parsons attaches great importance to this notion and argues that without shared values, society and any social life in general would hardly be possible because 1) values have an incentive

power, 2) sanctions can be imposed on violators of values, and also because 3) values are transmitted to the next generations through the mechanism of socialization. These three properties, according to the author, ensure the stable existence of society (Spates, 1983).

Parsons gathered representatives of various disciplines around him and together with them developed a "general theory of social action" with values at its core (Parsons & Shils, 1951). One of the members of this team, C. Kluckhohn, gave a definition of values that has long since become the key to most studies of this problem. **Values**, according to Kluckhohn, are "A conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means and ends of action" (Kluckhohn, 1951, p 395). Without values, individuals would not know what they want and need from other individuals in a personal and emotional sense, nor would they be able to make sense of it for themselves: there would be no necessary measure of order and no common purpose. Values are normative components of culture but are not norms, they are normative patterns of the highest degree of generality (Parsons, 1989), they are so generic that they are not tied to situations and functions, that is, they are trans-situational and functional (Parsons, 1961), so it is norms, not values, that *determine* what "to do" and what "not to do". The values of an individual or social object that are interrelated and organized into a system are called **value orientations** (Parsons & Shils, 1951, p. 49).

Parsons and Shils proposed five basic dilemmas that all people at all times have to face. The choices in these dilemmas shape an individual's pattern of behavior, which in turn shapes behavior. The choices in these five dilemmas are made according to the individual's value orientations, which also help to make sense of the situation and give meaning to the individual's actions. These five dichotomies are also called *pattern variables* (because the choices in them form a "profile" or *pattern* of behavior). The dilemmas are divided into individual and group dilemmas, with the first three organized around motivational issues and the last two organized around "normative patterns of interpersonal relationships." These five dichotomies are: affectivity - neutrality, self-orientation - collective-orientation, universalism - particularism, ascription - achievement (and its refinement of "inherent quality - external manifestation of quality"), specificity - diffuseness (Parsons & Shils, 2001, p. 76-77).

Parsons saw the institutionalization of value orientations in the social system as the best way to improve the functioning of society. Clearly articulated, values finally take the lead in the social system, "aligning" various deviations in value orientations. Institutionalized values lead to a clearer functioning of the social system, to less conflict, to smooth existence of society. A similar process at the person level system is "internalization" and means full acceptance of the values of a higher-order system (i.e., group or society as a whole).

A significant contribution to the development of the concept of values in the theory of functionalism was made by the famous study of Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961). They argued that values are cognizable, their number is limited, and they are organized in a hierarchical order. Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck formulated five key questions whose answers precede (and define) all other aspects of culture, including value orientations. These five questions covered attitudes toward nature (dominance, harmony, subordination), ideas about one's nature from birth (evil, good, mixed, neutral) and one's ability to change throughout life course, temporal orientation (past, present, future), motivation for behavior (being, being-in-the-making, becoming) and attitudes toward others (hierarchical, equitable, individualistic). All of Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's ideas listed above have proved extremely useful for the further development of values research, and some 'issues' are also used by contemporary scholars (Schwartz, Trompenaars, a number of environmental values specialists).

The main criticism of the concept of values in the theory of functionalism was that the latter remained a theory without sufficient empirical confirmation. The central role of values was asserted a priori, all empirical research was built according to this belief, aimed not at verification, but at confirmation of postulates of the theory and actually was reduced to specification of characteristics of these a priori constructions. Values in this theory became so abstract that even if one wanted to verify their existence and their role in society (and thus operationalize and identify them), it would be extremely difficult (Spates, 1983).

Although functionalism has been central to values research since the early 1950s, there have been a number of value researchers outside this group. For instance, Inkeles (1969, 1996) studied "national character", Allport and colleagues (Allport *et al.,* 1961) constructed six types of personal orientation in their study of values. Mukherjee (1946) believed, like Parsons, that values define, maintain, and regulate social structure, but argued that they can arise both within an individual and within the culture as a whole and thus act both 'top-down' and 'bottom-up'. Becker (1950) in his study of values as 'any objects of any need' preceded Inglehart's research (1997) by observing that in traditional societies the need (and therefore value) for security is high, while in 'secular' societies the need for novelty is high. Charles Morris (1956) was convinced that if the number of situations in which values are manifested is limited, then the number of values is also limited. On this basis he distinguished thirteen "ways to live" and discussed three dispositions or "basic components of human personality": Dionysian, Promethean, and Buddhist. One of the most famous studies of that time was McClelland's (1961) work on achievement motivation, which was also in the general line of values research. Melvin Kohn (1977) employed an empirical approach and created instruments for studying values through numerous pretests; he found a link between

the values of autonomy and belonging to a higher class. There have been many other studies of values as well (see Spates, 1983, Rohan, 2000. Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004).

1.1.2 The concept of values in the Rokeach studies

By the early 1970s, the criticism of the functionalist approach to values had expanded so much that multiple alternatives appeared. At this time the works of Inglehart, Feather, Schwartz appeared and attracted attention. But the main event of this time in the study of values was the publication of **Milton Rokeach 's** research.

Rokeach, as a psychologist, studied values in an effort to understand individual behavior rather than to reveal the mechanisms of the social system - as Parsons did. Therefore, Rokeach 's conception of values is much more explicit and relates more to the subjective world of the individual. Thus, while Kluckhohn's definition of values emphasized their relationship to *objective action*, Rokeach emphasizes their relationship to *the subjective meaning* of action (Rohan, 2000).

First of all, Rokeach distinguished between attitudes and values. Prior to him, these concepts often referred to the same phenomena. For example, Allport and colleagues (1961), used the word "attitude" to refer to both specific judgments and abstract judgments that can be labeled "values". In contrary, Rokeach argued that, first, attitudes deal with concrete situations and objects, while values are more generalized entities, so there are more attitudes than values. Secondly, values, unlike attitudes, act as standards or criteria, regulating both attitudes themselves and actions, comparisons, evaluations; they legitimize the person and the people around them. Finally, the essence of a value is a preference for a certain mode of action or a certain end-state, while an attitude is a ready-made indication of how one should act in a given situation or with a given object (Rokeach, 1974). The formal definitions of the former and the latter are as follows:

Attitude is "a relatively enduring organization of beliefs around an object or situation predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner", whereas value is an "enduring belief that a particular mode of conduct or that a particular end-state of existence is personally and socially preferable to alternative modes of conduct or end-states of existence" (Rokeach, 1969).

The meaning of values is that they act as standards or criteria that tell us how to behave or what to want, what attitudes to maintain, what behavior to consider as justified, legitimate, what moral judgement to make, how to compare oneself with others (what criteria to use), what values and attitudes of others to influence: "If you claim to have 'value' and don't want anyone else in the world to have it too, chances are it's not value" (ibid.). In contrast to the notion that values are latent variables, Rokeach considered them to be conscious (or at least he worked with the conscious part of values).

Rokeach divideed values into instrumental and terminal, emphasizing that the former are preferred modes/styles/modes of behavior, and the latter are preferred (ideal) end states of existence. At the same time, some values are a priori assigned to terminal values, while others are assigned to instrumental values.

By a value system he did not simply mean the relationships between values (as Parsons did) but a hierarchical ordering of values according to their degree of importance, a ranking of values on a continuum of importance (ibid.). There are often situations in which values are in conflict (e.g., "one should be honest" and "one should be kind"), so the value system represents a learned system of rules for choosing and resolving conflicts - between two or more modes of action or end-states (Ibid.).

Since attitudes are tied to specific objects and situations, their total number is very large but limited, and the number of individual values as more general entities is quite observable. Furthermore, values are conscious. Therefore, Rokeach considered it possible to capture all existing values, for which he developed a technique that has become widely known (described in more detail in section 1.2), claiming to capture all existing values. Using multiple pretests and validity checks, Rokeach identified 18 instrumental and 18 terminal values, and claimed that all values cannot be reduced to a smaller number. Using his methodology, Rokeach conducted a study on an American sample, which he considered as further validation of his theory.

Since his entire theory of values was closely related to empirical research and the instrument of values measurement, this in a sense forced Rokeach to clearly distinguish and define the concept of values. In addition to the mentioned differentiation of values and attitudes, Rokeach also points out the distinction between the concept of values and needs, and values and personality traits. Needs are related to values, but they are biological in nature: "values articulate needs in a socially acceptable way, e.g. the need for sex can be culturally reformulated as the value of love" (Rokeach, 1973).

Rokeach marked the development of an empirical approach as opposed to functionalist theory, sparking a new wave of interest in the concept - Spates points out that between 1972 (i.e. after the publication of the first Rokeach results) and 1982, over 400 publications on values appeared in the sociological and psychological literature. Although Rokeach's approach was generally supported by surveys, some postulates remained *a priori*. First of all, his division into instrumental and terminal values has been criticized. Gorsuch (1970) points out that this division is not fully justified: any value which is not the ultimate value could be considered an instrumental value" (p.139). According to critics, whether a value is instrumental or terminal is not determined by its content, but by its degree of importance to the individual. Rokeach agreed with this criticism, but did not make changes to his theory, stating that "it is more convenient". Other critics, in

particular Schwartz (1974), questioned the thesis that the list of 36 values is exhaustive and believe that this assumption, unsupported, can lead to false conclusions, especially since the methodology uses a ranking method that is so dependent on the composition of the proposed list of values.

In general, the role of Rokeach in the study of values is huge because he was able to describe this initially ill-defined notion quite clearly, give it a clear definition and separate it from related phenomena. The ensuing stream of criticism paved the way for the emergence of value theories based on empirical research, the need for which Spates emphasized in 1983.

1.1.3 The concept of values in the approaches of G. Hofstede and R. Inglehart

While studying organizational culture as part of his work in the US corporation, Hofstede (1980. 2001) discovered dimensions of culture that were expressed through work-related values. Hofstede took an intermediate position between Kluckhohn and Rokeach in his definition of values: he sees values as a broad tendency to prefer certain states of affairs over others (Hofstede, 2001). He also shares the view that values are relatively non-specific, that is, they are abstract and cross-situational. Values are characteristics with two poles: evil-good, dirty-clean, dangerous-safe, etc. Values form at an early age, so they are irrational, but at the same time they determine people's ideas of rationality; values form systems or hierarchies and may conflict with each other; values can be activated by external events and influence behavior, acting as an intermediary between external stimuli and the desire to respond. A person's values have different strengths and orientations (positive or negative). Social desirability, which inevitably appears in the measurement of values, should not be excluded, it too represents a separate type of values, but it should be separated from individual internal values. In Hofstede's terms this is the separation of the *desired* from the *desirable*. These two types of values have different connections to behavior; the norms derived from the *desired* values are statistical indicators, i.e., existing among the population, whereas the norms of the *desirable* are more like ideological postulates.

Values are held by individuals as well as groups, and culture predisposes groups to adopt certain values. Cultures differ from each other by cultural values, and organizations within the same culture differ by so-called "practices". Hofstede sees values as a key concept for studying cultural/country differences and therefore studies them mainly at the country level, finding numerous correlations between the five dimensions of values he derives and various country characteristics.

The World Values Survey initiated by Ronald Inglehart is based on representative samples and (together with the European Values Study, which is almost identical in content) has been going on for almost 30 years. Noting that values are very stable at the cultural level and finding support for his "silent revolution" hypothesis, Inglehart concluded that values can be a reliable indicator

of culture - both as an explanatory and an explanatory variable (Inglehart, 1990). It is culture that interests Inglehart, and for him values are indicators, therefore he defines culture in terms of values (and not vice versa) as a system of attitudes, values and information, widely shared within a society and transmitted from generation to generation. By culture he means the subjective aspect of the institutions of society: the beliefs, values, knowledge and skills which have been internalized by the people of a given society, complementing external systems of reinforcement and mutual exchange. Inglehart analyzed the extent to which subjective cultural orientations are related to external social institutions (1997, p. 15). Inglehart and Welzel's theory of human development argues that the cultural shift occurs only after a certain level of economic development is achieved, and democratization happens when cultural and economic factors are combined. The cultural shift found by Inglehart is the non-linear change in the values he derived and the switch from materialistic to post-materialistic values after economic modernization. Although an entire theory is built around values, little attention was paid to values themselves. For example, in Inglehart's last five books (Inglehart, 1990. 1997; Abramson, Inglehart, 1995; Norris, Inglehart, 2004; Inglehart, Welzel, 2005) we could not find a formal definition of values – the authors limited themselves to referring to questionnaires and algorithms for constructing value indices.

1.1.4 The concept of values in Schwartz's theory

Shalom Schwartz continued the tradition of empirically based theories established by the early 1980s and created his own theory of values, tested and refined using data from large cross-cultural surveys. In an effort to find a universal structure of values, he managed to combine in his theory the advantages of most value theories. Thus, his instrument was a modified Rokeach methodology, the most popular, but modified to accommodate its criticisms. He used well-reasoned matching samples and multiple cross-cultural validity checks. As a result of the multivariate statistical analysis, he obtained a universal structure of values and value dimensions that correlate with the available measurements of Rokeach, Hofstede, and Inglehart. His definition of values consists of six parts, five of which are drawn from previous theories. Finally, he developed two levels of measurement within a single theory: cultural and individual, with different sets of value dimensions used for each of these levels.

In an attempt to bring together all that was common in the definitions of values before him, Schwartz gave a comprehensive definition:

(1) Values are beliefs linked inextricably to affect.

(2) Values refer to desirable goals that motivate action.

(3) Values transcend specific actions and situations.

(4) Values serve as standards or criteria.

(5) Values are ordered by importance relative to one another. People"s values form an ordered system of value priorities that characterize them as individuals.

(6) The relative importance of multiple values guides action (this is because any attitude or behavior typically has implications for more than one values, and only the relative importance of different values can guide behavior in one direction or another) (Schwartz, 2007).

More briefly, values are desired goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in people's lives. The type of motivational goal that a given value expresses acts as a criterion for separating one value from another.

Schwartz believes that most researchers did not succeed in keeping all six points in their research, the biggest problem being the principle of cross-situational nature of values, which everyone believes but fails to observe. For example, Inglehart uses situation-specific statements when deriving postmaterialist values; others try to circumvent the problem of cross-situational feature by generalizing statements about different situations. Another problem is that most studies did not measure importance, but used opinions, agreement, or approval, after which the researcher indirectly attempted to infer values. Finally, most researchers had only focused on a part of the universe of values - even Rokeach, who was aiming to capture the entire diversity of values, did not include the values of tradition and power in his list. Therefore, most of the proposed dimensions of values could not claim to be universal and thus not even called "basic human values" because the latter should cover at least the majority of personal values and should have a similar structure in all cultures (i.e., be present, albeit to a different extent, in all cultures).

For Schwartz, values have two sources: basic human needs and social experience. Basic values express, in the form of conscious goals, three universal imperatives of human existence with which all individuals and societies have to deal. These are the needs of the individual as a biological organism (1), the requirements arising from the need for coordinated interaction between people (2) and the needs of human groups for survival and well-being (3). (Schwartz, 1992; 2005). Shared social experiences (such as economic depression) also influence people's values, but at a different level - that of an entire culture or society. Based on the three requirements of human existence, Schwartz derived ten individual values at the individual level and seven values at the cultural level. Using an expanded and modified Rokeach questionnaire, he conducted surveys in dozens of countries, which resulted in a refined list of individual values, their content and structure.

Schwartz sometimes used a different name for the individual values – latent motivational types, which emphasize their indirect association with behavior because values predetermine

actions to the extent that they are relevant in a given context (that is, the probability of their activation is high) and as important to the acting subject (Schwartz, 2007).

Schwartz criticized Rokeach for his division of values into terminal and instrumental values. Through empirical testing in different countries, they found that where all values were formulated as terminal (in Finland and Hong Kong), they received the same ratings as other values (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990). In addition, further research (Schwartz, 1992) has shown that the distinction between terminal and instrumental values comes down only to the form of the words offered for evaluation: the former are nouns, and the latter are adjectives. Schwartz dismissed such distinctions as irrelevant, claiming that it is not about the form of the question but about the content of each value, and therefore linking some values exclusively to instrumental or terminal values seems incorrect; so the only difference between them is the degree of importance of a given value.

By and large, Schwartz added little to the existing theoretical development of the concept of values – but he collected all the substantial ideas scattered through the scientific literature over 30 years, updated and supplemented the Rokeach instrument to take most of the criticisms into account, and tested these generalizations empirically, resulting in a universal theory of basic basic human values.

The vagueness of the concept of "values", which has been noted by all researchers from Kluckhohn in 1951 to Schwartz in 1992 and the authors of the reviews in 2003, still seems to be a serious problem, so the Schwartz definition, which unites many preceding ones, is by far the most adequate and recognized, representing a compromise that makes it possible to treat the term "values" as a scientific concept.

Since the emergence of the concept of values in sociology, there has been a transition from values-objects (by Thomas and Znaniecki) to values-attitudes (by Allport), values-perceptions (by Kluckhohn), values-beliefs (by Rokeach). Today, the concept of values has turned into a broad construct with many sub-constructs, such as work values or environmental values. The concept of basic human values is an integrating concept that sets goals for all these subspecies.

1.2 Empirical comparative studies of values

In this section we will describe various comparative empirical studies of values and closely related phenomena, i.e., studies focused on the empirical investigation of cultural and/or country differences. Each subsection follows the same order - first we describe features of the theoretical and methodological approach, second, value dimensions (parameters) and methodology of empirical research are described, third, the specific location of cultural/country groups in these coordinates, regularities of their location as well as correlates of value coordinates, and, finally, the position of Russia in these dimensions (if it was included in the study) is described.

It should be noted that country and culture are by no means always identical. In accordance with the topic of the research, we are primarily interested in cross-country differences in values. Almost all the studies described below are devoted to intercultural comparisons, but they actually compare the populations of different countries. In some cases, the authors separated the concepts of culture and country, but even in these cases they described predominantly between-country differences. How correct it is and how much country and culture coincide is an empirical question. As we have shown by comparing Russian-speaking and titular populations in different countries, in four out of five cases country turned out to be a more important factor in determining the respondent's values than his/her language (Rudnev, 2009). In other words, very often "country" and "culture" do not coincide, but the choice between them for the analysis of basic values depends on the research objectives and ideally should be tested empirically. Overall, the difference between country and culture exists and it is important to take it into account.

1.2.1 Early anthropologists

The comparative study of values was preceded by numerous ethnographic, anthropological, and socio-psychological works that focused primarily on theory development and were based on desk research, and empirically recorded only some features of individual representatives of cultures. Wilhelm Wundt in his Folk Psychology (1900-1920. in Russian - Vundt, 2002) was one of the first to attempt discussion of the individuals from different cultures from a scientific point of view. It was followed by the first empirical studies, such as the five-volume "The Polish Peasant in Europe and America" by W. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, based on the analysis of personal correspondence, using the biographical method and in which the concept of values was widely used for the first time. Attempts to "understand other cultures" - first of all Native American cultures - became trendy in the 30s in the United States, gradually beginning to acquire scientific status. F. Boas conducted studies of Native American tribes, making a significant contribution to the methodology of field research. Boas was an extreme skeptic with regard to the anthropological research methods that existed at the time, and had much stricter requirements for the quality of the information obtained, as well as developing the idea that each culture is unique and should be studied using its own special method (later this view was called "emic approach"); he was also one of the first to divide "individual" and "folk psychology", that is individual and group levels of cultural (later - values) analysis. Boas's follower Ruth Benedict in her book "Patterns of Culture" developed a theory according to which cultures differ from each other by a "central theme" around which the other elements of culture are built. On the basis of her study of several Native American tribes she distinguished two such themes: Apollonian and Dionysian (Lurie, 1998). In another book, "The Chrysanthemum and the Sword", commissioned by the

American government during the war with Japan, she compared American culture to Japanese culture, highlighting specific Japanese qualities. This study was desk-based but produced a number of important findings that were later confirmed (e.g., in the Chinese Values Survey): one was the division into a "culture of guilt" and a "culture of shame," the other was the discovery of a "gyri" ethic (i.e., the desire "not to lose your face") (Govorunov, 2009). A. Kardiner shifted the emphasis from culture to the psychological characteristics of its members and developed the concept of "basic personality structure" (Lurie, 1998). R. Linton, and later C. DuBois develop the notion of cultural characteristics as properties of the psyche *of a modal* member of a given culture. Linton, through the definition of culture as a set of assimilated behavior of individuals, came to the concept of values as a central element in this "assimilation" (Ibid.). J. Gorer in his study of the Russians uses psychoanalysis and put forward a concept later called "diaper determinism" (Klein, 2005). Dozens of other researchers have also tried to understand the causes of cultural differences and have proposed many different hypotheses, but not many have sought to test their hypotheses on substantial empirical material. Let us focus here only on those who managed to test their hypotheses empirically.

1.2.2 National character studies (from A. Inkeles to R. McCrae)

One of the most important forerunners of cross-cultural studies of values is national character studies, in particular those conducted by Inkeles and Levinson (Inkeles & Levinson, 1954; Inkeles, 1996). These researchers were not interested in values *per se*, but rather, like early anthropologists, were interested in the characteristics of different cultures in general, and they were particularly interested in the concept of national character, which is widely used in popular media and ideological rhetoric. They set out to uncover the essence of this concept and test its existence on empirical material. Since "character" was often associated with personal psychological characteristics, we can talk about "national character" only in terms of statistical trends, that is, the psychological type prevalent in a given nation (culture). Inkeles and Levinson used Cora DuBois's theory of modal personality to denote a statistical tendency. On this basis, they understood national character as relatively durable personality characteristics and patterns that are modal among adult members of society, which is a hypothetical entity that may or may not exist (Inkeles, 1996, p. 17).

This approach is fundamentally different from the functionalists, as it assumes the presence of specific types of individuals in society, whereas functionalists emphasized the needs of the social system, which forms for itself the necessary character of the members of a given society. According to Inkeles, study of institutions, rituals, and folklore, characteristic of the functionalist school, reflects not so much the character as the ideas of individuals. The author draws attention to the fact that many ethnographers considered one type of personality as the basic

and the others as deviant, although it should be taken into account that a culture may have several modal personalities, or not have a national character *at all.*

Having studied in detail the empirical studies of cultural traits from 1935 to 1965, Inkeles came to the conclusion that the main problem of such studies (note that it is still relevant today!) is the lack of a clear established analytical framework, that is, a universal system of concepts and descriptive variables that makes it possible to describe and compare modal personalities. To address this problem, he develops his own research program consisting of interviewing large samples of some culture using a battery of psychological techniques such as the Thematic Apperceptive Test, the Rorschach Test, unfinished sentences and projective questions. These tests were conducted on three samples: American, German and Russian.

The Russian sample consisted of three thousand respondents who had entered the United States for various reasons during World War II, of whom 51 were selected for an in-depth clinical study - Russians "by nationality," similar in age. Their results were compared with a comparable sample of Americans. So, the portrait of the modal personality of the Russian turned out to be as follows.

Strongly expressed needs of belonging (affiliation), lack of need for achievement. Compared to Americans, Russians had much less developed defense mechanisms that allow them to manage their affects. Some of the most important psychological traits of Russians are wariness, suspiciousness, and distrust. When testing Ruth Benedict's proposed division into guilt and shame cultures, no differences were found between Russians and Americans. Instead, it was noted that Russians feel both guilt and shame when they violate norms of interpersonal interaction, such as trust, honesty, and loyalty to a friend, while Americans feel the same when they violate "public" norms, such as ethics or good manners. Russians viewed authority figures with more fear and less optimism. They tended to see people as a sum of inner qualities, the essence of who they are, while Americans focused more on their behavior.

Inkeles interpreted the obtained characteristics in terms of the modal personality of Soviet culture, accepting the rather strong assumption that the fifty migrants employed for the study represented entire Soviet culture. Based on this, a number of assumptions had been made about the relationship of the psychological traits of Soviet modal personality and the characteristics of the Stalinist regime, communism, and the social structure of Soviet society. He pointed out that despite the small sample size the results obtained were similar to the traditional historical and literary character of the Russian person and notes that such a character of people was most likely one of the cultural and psychological preconditions for the emergence of the Soviet type society.

Despite Inkeles' broad research agenda, he concludes that with the current state of research methods, one cannot speak of any "nation" having a national character (Inkeles, Levinson, 1969; Inkeles, 1996).

Inkeles' study has become a model for many studies of national character and national stereotypes. Duijker and Frijda (1960) reviewed over a thousand papers on these topics and concluded that none of them were sufficiently empirically validated, none were based on representative samples, none used standardized instruments (ibid., p. 21). However, these shortcomings do not diminish the great importance of these studies as attempts to separate stereotypes and myths from facts. This research trend made sense not only as a ground for development of modern cross-cultural research methodology, but also had a great public resonance - centuries-old stereotypes and prejudices (racial, religious, national) were tested by scientific methods. In our opinion, this role of cross-cultural research remains relevant to this day.

Studies of personality traits had continued. In the last decade, this direction was developed - at a new methodological level - in the research of Robert McCrae, who employed for this purpose the five-factor personality model "Big five"- the most popular personality trait theory today. Using the NEO-PI-R instrument, Terracciano with coauthors conducted a survey of small samples in 49 countries (Terracciano *et al.*, 2005). To test the existence of national character, they created a special questionnaire reflecting the same five personality factors but asking participant to assess a typical representative of the culture, for example, if is it typical for a Russian person to be anxious, nervous and agitated or calm, relaxed and balanced (Ibid., p. 97). Correlations between personality traits of the respondents and assessments of a typical cultural representative (at the individual level) were significant only in four out of the 49 countries, and in Russia the correlation was the greatest in absolute value and negative in sign. In other words, in Russia the divergence between the stereotype of a Russian and the personality traits of specific individuals was the greatest among the representatives of the 49 countries. Only in several countries, such as Poland and Japan, personality traits corresponded to the recorded stereotypes. At the ecological level of aggregated data by countries, correlations did not exceed 0.3, which led to the conclusion that psychological features of representatives of different countries did not correspond to the existing stereotypes. A key element of McCrae and colleagues' research is their belief in the existence of "national" personality traits, which they defined through indicators of the five-factor model average across countries, relating them to geographical location rather than culture (Allik & McCrae, 2004). Russians, falling between Spaniards, Belgians, and Portuguese in cluster analysis and multidimensional scaling, are characterized by medium-high levels of *Neuroticism*, medium levels of *Extroversion*, *Openness*, and *Conscientiousness, and* the lowest level of *Agreeableness* among 36 countries (McCrae & Allik, 2002:112).

Criticism of the McCrae studies were many. First, criticism of the five-factor model used in these surveys; second, criticism of the procedure of averaging the psychological traits of individuals at the country level; and third, criticism of insufficient representativeness - the samples in each country did not exceed 200-300 people, usually students of one university.

If we turn to the NEO-PI-R questionnaire, which they used in the studies, it turns out that it is similar to the questionnaires aimed at measuring values in many ways. For example, both the Rokeach questionnaire and the NEO-PI-R have an indicator with the general meaning of "cleanliness", and at the level of indicators they differ only in the scales: when researchers are interested in values, they ask about *importance* of cleanliness to the respondent, and when studying traits, they focus on *how* clean *participants consider themselves*. That is, at the indicator level, the boundary between values and traits runs where the desire for a particular trait is separated from the perception of having that trait. In this regard, one interesting and promising area of research could be the empirical comparison of personality traits and basic values of individuals - including in different countries.

1.2.3 The Harvard Five Cultures Study (F. Kluckhohn and F. Strodtbeck)

Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtbeck are associated with the emergence of a systematic cross-cultural study of values. In their 1961 book "Variations in Value Orientations" (Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, 1961) they presented the results of a value survey conducted by interviewing five cultures from the southern United States - Navajo and Zuni Indians, Mexican Americans, Texan settlers, and Mormons. The survey was conducted within the framework of the Harvard Comparative Values Study initiated by Clyde Kluckhohn and Talcott Parsons, which largely determined its theoretical basis.

Based on C. Kluckhohn's definition of values ("a representation of the desirable... which influences the choice of modes, means and outcomes of action"—Kluckhohn, 1951, my italicizing) and using functionalist theory, they viewed values as reasons for choices in situations that provide such choices. And value orientations are the result of people's solutions to specific issues.[2] The authors tried to find such questions (as well as possible answers to them) that all people in different cultures have to solve.

The authors made a number of assumptions: there is a finite number of principle questions that all people have to solve at all times; there is only a finite number of answers to these questions, hence the combination of question and answer is a particular variable that takes a finite number of values. Finally, all solutions to all such questions are represented in all societies at all times, but

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[2] Note that in modern literature, the terms "values" and "value orientations" are used almost synonymously.

the distributions of different response patterns to these questions vary from society to society. The pattern of a person's answers to such questions constitutes the content of his/her value orientations.

Based on these assumptions, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck identified five questions and a series of answers that all humans have to address: How do we relate to nature? What is the innate nature of human beings? What is the temporal focus of human life? How do we relate to other people? What is the primary motivation for human behavior in society?

In addition to questions, they also postulate a list of possible answers to these questions, resulting in 5 value dimensions, each of which embodies a particular value orientation:

1. Relations of human and natural environment (mastery, harmony, submission);

2. Human nature from birth (evil, good, mixed, neutral), as well as their ability to change during their life or lack of this ability. That is, there are six options: evil and can change, evil and cannot change, good and can change, etc.

3. Temporal orientation (past, present, future);

4. Motive for behaving (being, being-in-becoming, achieving (doing));

5. Relating to other people (hierarchical, as equals, individualistic).

They also proposed but did not use further a concept of personal space (small, medium, large). Having considered the parameter "human nature from birth" too abstract and difficult for operationalization and for understanding by uneducated people, they abandoned it as well. The study of both parameters continued in the works of their followers (Hills, 1998, Maznevski *et al.*, 2002).

Based on these ideas, the authors developed an instrument representing a set of life situations in which a person finds themselves. For example, to capture attitudes towards nature, participants were asked to rank a set of items according to the degree of agreement with them ("the way you feel", "best idea"):

When I get sick I believe

a) doctors will be able to find a way to cure it (Mastery)

b) I should live properly so I don't get sick (Harmony)

c) I cannot do much about it and just have to accept it (Subjugation)

By interviewing several dozen people from different cultures but living in the same environment and in the same era, they compared their value orientations, compiled their profiles, and used some stats to test the differences in these profiles.

The Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck study played an important role as one of the first empirical approaches to the study of values. According to critics, the project "did not succeed in synthesizing different approaches, neither did it produce its own, nor did it contribute (in any evident way) to existing value theory" (Powers, 2000). But for its time, the project proved to be the brightest and

most significant contribution to research trying to unravel the phenomenon of values. This approach has developed among anthropologists (e.g. Russo, 1992, Hills, 1980) and among international management specialists (Kohls, 1981; Gallagher, 2001; Maznevski *et al.* , 2002; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998).

M. Maznevski *et al (*2002) developed a formalized questionnaire based on six dimensions of values and conducted a small survey in five countries (USA, Canada, Mexico, Netherlands, and Taiwan). Despite the declared six dimensions, respondents from different countries were described along 16 dimensions. Although this approach was developed exclusively for applied research, it is of interest as an alternative way of developing values study, and one of its attractive features is the large number of dimensions.

1.2.4 Applied approach to the study of values (F. Trompenaars)

Trompenaars, as well as Mazniewski mentioned above, in the 1990s developed an applied method for studying values based on one of the old approaches: he found the basis for his values measurements in Parsons' five "pattern variables" as well as in two dimensions of Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998).

Trompenaars was interested in the possible influence of cross-cultural differences on business organization and the practical consequences that arise from it: how a manager should behave in a particular country (Trompenaars & Wooliams, 2003), what are the market characteristics, and how to adjust the marketing strategy according to cultural specifics (Trompenaars & Wooliams, 2002). His theoretical framework was built this idea, and they also saw values through this prism: a person's ideas about what is preferred or desired which are shared with other members of society (Trompenaars & Wooliams, 2003).

Trompenaars claimed seven dimensions of values, yet there was empirical support for only three dimensions (Smith, Dugan, & Trompenaars, 1996): Conservatism/Egalitarianism, Soft Involvement/Utilitarian Involvement, and the third dimension could not be interpreted.

Hofstede (1996) tested Trompenaars' measures and found that only two dimensions could be called valid, and both were highly correlated with Hofstede's measure of individualism[3] .

The instrument capturing these seven dimensions is uneven - in some cases a standard Likert agreement-disagreement scale is used, in others it is a situation description for decision, in others it is a forced choice from a pair of statements, and sometimes a semi-projective test (for details see Trompenaars, Wooliams, 2003, p. 82, Trompenaars, Hampden-Turner, 1998, p. 129).

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[3] Hofstede ironically calls his critique of Trompenaars' approach "On the Waves of Commerce: Testing Trompenaars' 'model' of cultural difference" (Hofstede, 1996), playing on the title of Trompenaars' program book "On the Waves of Culture".

Trompenaars conducted surveys in more than 50 countries (other sources say more than 100 countries), the respondents were managers from different countries, purposefully interviewed or trained in cross-cultural communication.

In the Trompenaars dimensions, Russians tend toward the pole of particularism (personal motives as opposed to universal standards), the outer-directed (avoiding responsibility), the synchronic pole in the dimension synchronic/sequential (propensity to do several things simultaneously), the " ascription" pole on the ascription/achievement continuum, and also have high values of affective vs. neutrality (propensity to hide emotions). Russians are not distinguished by such parameters as individualism/communitarianism and specificity/diffusion. In orientation towards time, Russians prefer the past, which is more important to them than the future, as well as a short-term perspective.

There are also many other applied approaches to the study of values, e.g. Maznevski *et al.*, 2002, RISC (Doktorov, 1994), GLOBE (House, Javidan, Dorfman, 2001, Grachev, 1999), INRA (Dubin, 1995), ROPER (Golov, 1997). These studies are based on the assumption that values are good indicators of cultural specificities, and knowledge of the latter is necessary for the development of marketing strategies, intercultural interaction of managers and for taking into account the specifics of business development in different countries. What all these studies have in common is that indicators and methodology for obtaining values measurements and specific data on them were not disclosed, so it is not possible to fully test their meaning, making sure the methodology is reliable (a necessary requirement for the possibility of falsification according to K. Popper), quality of samples and compare the results obtained with the results of other studies.

1.2.5 Cultural Syndromes in the Triandis Studies

Harry Triandis has worked in various areas of cross-cultural research and is considered one of the founders of cross-cultural psychology. One of his main areas of focus was his research on the measurement of individualism-collectivism across cultures (Triandis, 1995). Beginning by treating this characteristic of culture as relatively particular, Triandis later began to treat it as an essential component of "subjective culture". He borrowed the notion of "subjective culture" from Simmel (Simmel, 1997). Subjective culture is defined by Triandis as the shared beliefs, attitudes, norms, roles and values present among people who speak a particular language, live in a particular historical period in a particular geographic region. These elements are transmitted from generation to generation (Triandis, 1995, p. 6). He was not so much concerned with finding patterns and parameters of cultural differences, as with describing stable combinations of cultural features, or *cultural syndromes*. The latter is a system of elements of a subjective culture (i.e., norms, values, etc.) organized around a theme (a), whose intercultural variation is greater than intracultural

variation (b), is related to geographic location (c) (Triandis, 1993). The themes around which elements of subjective culture can be organized are inexhaustible: they are complexity, "tightness" of social ties, vertical or horizontal orientation, activity/passivity, and so on. Each of these themes forms a cultural syndrome, their number is also unlimited (Triandis, 2002). Triandis paid most attention to one of them: individualism/collectivism.

He defines collectivism as a social pattern consisting of closely related individuals who see themselves as parts of one or more collectives (family, peers, clan, nation); are primarily motivated by the norms and responsibilities imposed on them by these collectives; want to give priority to the goals of the collective over their own goals; and emphasize their affiliation with members of that collective (Ibid, p. 3).

Later collectivism was divided into horizontal and vertical. Horizontal collectivism implies the merger of an individual and a group, and equality of the group members. Vertical collectivism emphasizes inequality within the group, which is taken for granted by its members, this pattern is characterized by sacrifice and "serving" (Singelis, Triandis, 1995, p. 245).

Individualism is a social pattern consisting of loosely connected individuals who see themselves as independent of collectives; are primarily motivated by their own priorities, needs, rights, and contracts with others; prioritize personal goals over those of the collective; and emphasize a rational calculation of the advantages and disadvantages of cooperating with others (Triandis, 1995, p. 3).

Horizontal individualism implies individual autonomy but emphasizes the equality of all individuals, whereas vertical individualism emphasizes inequality, with competition as a central theme (Singelis *et al.,* 1995, p. 245).

There are many characteristics of collectivist and individualist cultures that distinguish the former from the latter. For example, attitudes towards outgroups in collectivist cultures (which, according to Triandis, include Russia) are very different from attitudes towards ingroups, for which the boundary is clear. There is a negative attitude towards outgroup members because most individuals are members of one (or a small number) of ingroups. In individualist cultures ingroup and outgroup attitudes are treated almost identically because every individual is a member of multiple ingroups and is not rigidly bound to any one ingroup.

Triandis makes an important point on the historical perspective of individualism/collectivism. In primitive societies, there is proto-individualism because resources are so scarce that no single group can fully provide the needs of the individual, hence weak communication between individuals and difficulties in communication. Collectivism emerges in traditional society, as one group (or a small number of them) provides the individual with all the necessary resources, demanding loyalty and refusal of personal goals in return. Collective work is

ensured by membership in the group, which provides sufficient benefits. Finally, in the next stage, neo-individualism emerges in the developed industrial society, based on abundance of resources: an individual can pursue their own goals without showing unconditional loyalty for any group, individuals can provide themselves with resources, only nominally participating in various groups (Triandis *et al.,* 1988).

The definitions given above are characteristics of cultures and communities. The orientations *of individuals* have different labels: "idiocentrism" (individualistic orientation) and "allocentrism" (collectivistic orientation). Allocentric individuals value cooperation, equality, honesty, and they report stronger and better social support; idiocentric individuals value comfort, competition, pleasure, and social acceptance, and they have higher levels of achievement motivation, alienation, anomie, and loneliness (Triandis et al., 1986). Allocentric and idiocentric individuals exist in both collectivistic and individualistic societies, but in collectivistic societies, allocentric individuals are a majority and in individualist societies, idiocentric individuals are a majority (Triandis, 1995, p. 5). Accordingly, allocentric individuals feel better in collectivist societies and are better at communicating with their peers than idiocentrics, and the same tendency is true for idiocentric individuals.

Most of Triandis' ideas were tested on samples from a small number of countries, which does not allow sufficient confirmation of his ideas. Partly through surveys, partly through proxy evidence, he classified Russia as a typically collectivist country (together with Brazil, India, China, and Japan). Although Triandis did not specifically focused on values and did not conduct extensive cross-cultural research on values, his ideas proved very fruitful.

1.2.6. Milton Rokeach's Approach to the Study of Values and its developments

Rokeach was one of the first scholars to conduct a study of human values using formalized questionnaires on a representative samples. While Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck were anthropologists and were interested in cultural patterns, Rokeach was interested in the relationship between values on the one hand and social and behavioral variables on the other. He was one of the first (Rohan, 2000) to find gender, race, electoral characteristics of groups of people who shared different values.

First of all, Rokeach was able to develop a very parsimonious instrument applicable in mass surveys (the procedure took only 15-20 minutes – Rokeach, 1974). Obviously, the formalized Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck interview, asking for solutions to various life situations, would have been extremely difficult to use in survey research, especially if this part was supplemented by a number of other questions. Rokeach, on the other hand, made the instrument in the format of a standard questionnaire, the use of which made it possible to study values and their correlates as

simple sociological attributes, that is, at the individual level (a), using statistical methods (b), and most importantly making it possible to test various hypotheses about the role of values in their relation to any other socio-demographic or psychological variables (c).

The instrument consists of two sets of 18 cards, each of which is asked to be arranged "arrange them in order of their importance to YOU, as guiding principle in YOUR life" from most important (top) to least important (bottom) – (Rokeach, 1974). One set of cards are *instrumental* values expressed as adjectives with explanations in parentheses, the other are *terminal* values expressed as nouns with explanations, e.g., "AN EXCITING LIFE (a stimulating, active life)" (Rokeach, 1969). Based on the results of the card layout, each value was assigned a rank.

Criticism of the survey procedure has focused on the method of ranking values, which causes artificial interdependence of values and is highly dependent on a particular set of values (for example, if one value from a list is changed, then the ranks of many others are also changed). Despite the importance of ranking as consistent with Rokeach's notion of a hierarchy of values, most followers of this approach have abandoned this procedure in favor of assessing each value individually (i.e., rating, see for example Munson and Posner, 1980).

Rokeach's assumption that his list of values is exhaustive and necessary (i.e., cannot be reduced to fewer values – Rokeach, 1974) has been criticized too. Further research in the framework of this approach is related to the expansion of the list of values. Ng and colleagues (1982) suggested adding to the list several values reflecting South Asian realities, such as power, and justice. Lee (1991) conducted a Rokeach study in South Korea, and also studied values in Korean school textbooks. Lee found that Confucian collectivist values such as filial piety, harmony and unity with others, cooperation, and flexibility were lacking in the methodology. He also suggested that thrift, initiative, and aggressiveness should be added to the list of values. Schwartz and Bilsky expanded the list to more than fifty values (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990).

The Rokeach methodology was tested and validated only in the United States and was in fact an emic instrument, i.e. suitable for measurement in only one culture (see Berry, 1969), and its application in other countries required modifications.

In the United States, the Rokeach theory and methodology worked quite successfully and demonstrated validity. Using this technique, surveys were carried out in the US in 1969 and 1971 on representative samples that showed consistency in the results and documented the "core values of Americans": peace, freedom, family, honesty, work and responsibility, a negative attitude toward hedonism, low importance of aesthetic values, intelligence and status (Rokeach, 1974).

Rokeach also showed that values differ between different social and demographic groups: men and women, hippies and non-hippies, police officers and unemployed African Americans, successful and unsuccessful students, religious and non-religious individuals. He described in

detail the connections of values to electoral choices, arguing that each party carried on certain values in its program, and it is these values, not specific candidates or specific programs, that people vote for. The ideas of American Republicans relate to the values of freedom and Democrats to the values of equality, particularly emphasizing the conceptual and statistical inconsistency of the values of equality and freedom, which usually go together in different ideological programs. Rokeach finds it possible to use values as indicators of quality of life and proposes to investigate them in different countries in this regard (Rokeach, 1970).

Theoretically, Rokeach proposed two dimensions to describe the value system: personal - social values; moral - competence values. However, data from the USA and Australia have not confirmed the existence of these dimensions (Smith & Schwartz, 1996; Feather, 1975). M. H. Bond obtained similar value parameters based on cross-cultural studies, but after addition of specifically "Chinese" values in the list, this structure changed (Bond, 1988). Later on, these two parameters were demonstrated to exist, but it was based on a different theory and a significantly modified methodology (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990).

Ng and colleagues (Ng *et al.,* 1982, Allen *et al.,* 2007) conducted a study using the Rokeach methodology in nine countries in South Asia, using a 9-point Likert scale instead of ranking and expanding the list of values. This resulted in four dimensions that were highly correlated with the Hofstede dimensions as well as the Schwartz dimensions (see below). In addition, significant correlations were found with various characteristics of the countries under study - primarily with their economic well-being.

For understandable reasons, Russia (then the Soviet Union) could not be included in empirical comparative studies of that time, but Russian sociologists translated and modified the Rokeach instrument and used it to conduct a survey on a sample of Leningrad engineers. Yadov and his colleagues (1979) demonstrated similarity between the "core values of Americans" described by Rokeach and the values of Soviet engineers - for both groups, the most important values were peace, family and work, and the least priority - hedonism and sensual pleasures.

1.2.7. Study of managers' work values according to Hofstede's methodology

Hofstede has conducted one of the three largest comparative studies of values. In the field of organizational psychology, he conducted a successful survey of managers from 64 countries that included, among other things, questions on values. The survey was attempted twice, from 1968 to 1972 and over 116,000 respondents were interviewed. In the course of analyzing the data, the dimensions of values were discovered, and their existence substantiated. At first, Hofstede identified four dimensions of values, then, following the Chinese Values Survey, a fifth dimension

was added (CCC, 1987; Hofstede & Bond, 1988), in 2008 two more dimensions of values emerged under the influence of M. Minkov's research (Minkov, 2007).

The original survey did not intend to measure values, the questionnaire included very heterogeneous questions. After the initial study, there were almost continuous replications of this study in different countries, and Hofstede continued to refine his questionnaire. Over a period of three decades, five different versions of the questionnaire emerged - initially they only dealt with work values and could only be used among employees, but by 1994 the questionnaire had become universal (Hofstede, 2008).

Hofstede was actually the first researcher who empirically derived value *dimensions* (i.e., continuous scales), as others had them either in a theoretical form - as with Rokeach - or as discrete scales - as with Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck. This is a fundamental methodological advance that has allowed Hofstede and others to place countries and cultures on a continuum of each of the value dimensions, which allows capturing more detailed value differences than in any discrete typology. The seven parameters, as we have already noted, differ in origin but are included by Hofstede in one framework. Table 1.1 lists these parameters.

Table 1.1. Hofstede dimensions (compiled from *Hofstede, 2001, 2008*)

Dimension name	Parameter content
Power distance	Inequality defined and endorsed "from below
Uncertainty avoidance	Discomfort with unstructured situations, desire for stability, absolute truth
Individualism	Degree to which individuals are autonomous from the group
Masculinity	Strong gender role division, aggressiveness and competitiveness
Long-term orientation	Future-oriented (saving, futures, savings)
Indulgence/restraint	Hedonism, consumption, sensual looseness as opposed to restraint
Monumentalism	Pride and own immutability as opposed to flexibility and modesty

The value indicators were formed at the country level in different ways: two (*individualism* and *masculinity*) were based on factor analysis, two were "discrete" – the average values on different scales were combined with the percentage of respondents who chose a particular response option[4]. The meaning of each dimension is not derived from its indicators, it is often supplemented, if not drawn from correlates of this dimension and attributed to it "from outside". Despite this ambiguous approach, Hofstede examines each dimension in great detail, compares it to dozens of other country indicators, discovers possible reasons for high and low values of the dimension, and describes the consequences in various areas, from the specifics of the family institution to political systems.

In 1986, M. H. Bond and a group of Chinese scholars from the Chinese Culture Connection conducted a survey in 22 countries on all continents. The questionnaire was written in Chinese, from which it was translated into other languages, and its content was formed based on interviewing Chinese philosophers, who were asked to name "10 fundamental and basic values of Chinese people" (CCC, 1987). The questionnaire consisted of 40 phrases; respondents rated a degree of its importance on a 9-point scale. The data were then standardized and subjected to factor analysis, which yielded four factors, three of which correlated highly with Hofstede's dimensions, and one, "Confucian Labor Dynamism", correlated with none of them, but correlated highly with economic development of the country. On this basis, Hofstede included this dimension in his questionnaire and, based on a survey of students, found that this dimension exists not only in

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[4] For example, the Power Distance Index is a combination of the average value on a five-point scale of fear of superiors among non-managers, the percentage (by country) of those who think their supervisor is autocratic or paternalistic and the proportion of those who would not prefer a "consulting" boss. The results of these combinations were then rescaled to a 100-point scale (according to the empirical range), so that each country got its own value on this scale.

"Confucian" cultures, but also in Western cultures, where it went unnoticed. Therefore, the new - fifth - dimension was called "long-term orientation" (Hofstede & Bond, 1988). In addition, the search for a new dimension was also conducted in South-East Asian countries (this refers to the survey described above by Ng et al. using the Rokeach methodology), but it was not fruitful. Hofstede also tested the hypothesis of the existence of an "African" dimension of values, but by repeating the experience of Chinese scholars and interviewing Africans using an instrument developed by Africans themselves, he found only factors that correlated highly with the dimensions Hofstede had already discovered (Hofstede, 2001).

Hofstede's approach continues to be updated with new dimensions today. In 2007, M. Minkov (Minkov, 2007) conducted a re-analysis of the World Values Survey, through which he identified three value dimensions, two of which only weakly correlated with Hofstede's dimensions and were therefore included in a new version of his cultural coordinate system (Hofstede, 2008).

Hofstede did not conduct a survey in Russia similar to those in other countries, but nevertheless derived estimates of Russia in four dimensions, based in part on a small survey of students (Bollinger, 1988). Russia differs from most countries in the world in having a high *Power Distance*, which emphasizes the hierarchical nature of institutions and the vertical nature of ties (in the terms of empirical indicators, preference of authoritarian over liberal bosses and/or fear of superiors), on this indicator Russia is next to such countries as Venezuela, Romania, the Philippines, and Guatemala. Russia has high scores of the *Uncertainty Avoidance* indicator, which is expressed primarily in conformity and conservatism, and is explained by a reaction to rapid social change in recent years (operationally, it is an orientation towards compliance with rules, calm and stability at work); in this indicator Russia ranks next to Guatemala, Uruguay, El Salvador, and Belgium. Russia has below average score on *Masculinity*, which is reflected in a relatively low level of value of professional achievement and orientation towards a friendly team and a comfortable workplace; on this indicator Russia is close to Portugal, Guatemala, Thailand, and Uruguay. A low score *of Individualism* means loyalty to a patronizing corporation that gives peace of mind at the expense of various freedoms, and here Russians are next to Turkey, Brazil, Jamaica, and Iran (Hofstede, 2001, p. 502). Aware of the uncertainties of Russia's scores, Hofstede notes: "It should be obvious that in terms of mental programming, Eastern Europe is not a homogeneous category," and continues, "the Communist era has been remarkably ineffective in changing mental programs; old ways of thinking, feeling, and behaving are being revived. Dostoevsky and Tolstoy are still, in my conviction, the best guides for those trying to understand the Russian mind" (Hofstede, 1996, p. 15).

Independently of Hofstede, Russian researchers conducted several surveys of different small samples using his instruments and interpreted the data using his value dimensions (Bollinger, 1988; Naumov, 1996; Danilova & Tararukhina, 2003; Latova & Latov, 2007) and all obtained very different data (Table 1.2).

Bollinger (Bollinger, 1988) interviewed students, Danilova and Tararukhina (2003) described the results of a survey of workers of machine-building factory, Naumov (1996, Naumov & Puffer, 2000) described the results of a survey of teachers and students of Russian business schools, the studies of Latov and Latova presented data from different regions and sample types. None of the samples in the mentioned studies were tested for comparability with Hofstede's samples, and therefore it is rather difficult to compare the corresponding results[5].

Dubitskaya and Tararukhina (1998) showed value differences between employees of different organizations within Russia actually compared organizations using country-level dimensions. Latov and Latova (2006) compared regions of Russia and thus abandoned Hofstede's assumption of country as a unit of analysis. Among Russian studies within the framework of Hofstede's approach, there were no such studies based on a survey of office workers of a large corporation, suitable for comparison with the other Hofstede's data.

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[5] "When we compare the cultural aspects of countries, we should try to compare such categories [socio-demographic composition]; obviously, it makes no sense to compare nurses from Spain with police officers from Sweden" (Hofstede, 2001, p. 23).

Table 1.2. Data from Russian surveys using the Hofstede methodology (100-point scales)

	Power distance	Indivi-dualism	Masculi-nity	Un-certainty avoidance	Long-term orientation
Hofstede data (Hofstede, 2001:502)[6]	**93**	**39**	**36**	**95**	-
Employees of mechanical engineering plants (Danilova & Tararukhina, 2003) N=518	28	55	2	121	42
Business school students and teachers (Naumov, 1996), N=250	40	41	55	68	59
Students (Latova & Latov, 2007), N=195	50	67	60	75	45

A direct continuation of Hofstede's approach was the GLOBE project[7] led by R.J. House. The authors of this project, aimed at studying management worldwide, used a theory that integrated various popular approaches: the Hofstede approach itself, McClelland's theory of achievement motivation, Lord and Maher's implicit leadership theory and others. As a result, the authors identified nine dimensions of culture (see Appendix, Table 1). One of the main goals of the project was to examine the impact of culture on managers' behavior and beliefs (Javidan & House, 2001).

The questionnaire consisted of a series of abstract statements, each of which was formulated in four ways: as it is and as it should be in relation to society as a whole and in relation to the organization in which the respondent works. The culture dimensions stood on questions about society as a whole, with 'as is' being an indicator of *practices* and 'as should be' being an indicator of *values*. One of the main results was the negative correlation between "practices" and "values".

This project surveyed middle and senior managers in three industries: telecommunications, finance and banking, and food processing in 53 countries (Grachev, 1999). In Russia, 450 managers were surveyed during 1996-1998 (Grachev & Bobina, 2006).

Russia, according to GLOBE measurements, is among the groups of countries where the practices *of Gender Egalitarianism, In-Group Collectivism* and *Power Distance* are very widespread, while the practices *of Future Orientation* and *Uncertainty Avoidance* have a low prevalence. *At the same time,* in Russia the importance (relative to other countries) of

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[6] Data for the *Masculinity* Index come (with modifications) from a study of 70 students at Ivanovo University in 1989 (Hofstede, Kolman, Nicolescu, & Pajumaa, 1996:201), and for the other indices from Bollinger (1988) and Bradly's unpublished work (1994), with adjustments for particular sampling and descriptive information (Hofstede, 2001:502). For more details on the Russian research on Hofstede's methodology, see Latov and Latova, 2006.

[7] GLOBE - Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness Project.

Uncertainty Avoidance is high and the importance of *Institutional Collectivism* and *Results Orientation* is extremely low. The largest divergence between practices and values (or between "as is" and "as should be") is along two lines: *Uncertainty Avoidance*, *Results Orientation*, *Future Orientation* and *Humanistic Orientation* are less common but more valued; such "cultural aspects" as *Power Distance* and *Self-confidence* in Social Relations are more common but less valued (according to Grachev *et al.*, 2007). Russia most often falls into the same groups as countries such as Guatemala, Hungary, Bolivia, Greece, Iran, Namibia, Turkey, Mexico, Italy and others on these dimensions.

"Integrated theory" of this project included Hofstede's five dimensions, but their operationalization in the project was highly abstract, so the meaning of these dimensions was also somewhat different. Hofstede criticizes almost all key points of both the theory itself and its application (Hofstede, 2006). The results of this survey, in his view, strongly diverge from the theory on which they were based – factor analysis of the aggregated responses to the questions showed that they do not integrate into the a priori set theoretical constructs proposed by the authors of the project. If we put aside theoretical problems, however, this project turned out, in Hofstede's opinion, to be quite successful and professionally executed (Ibid.).

1.2.8. Social axioms of M. H. Bond and K. Leung

The study of "social axioms" by Bond and Leung does not, according to the authors, deal with values. Based on the fact that the concept of values is used in very different sense and a variety of cross-cultural studies, Leung proposed to expand the range of concepts aimed at studying cultural differences and suggests the concept of "social axioms" (Leung, Bond *et al.,* 2002).

Social axioms are generalized beliefs (perceptions) about oneself, the social and physical environment, or the spiritual world, in the form of statements about the relationship between two entities and concepts (Leung, Bond, 2004). Social axioms, therefore, are cognitive rather than value-based phenomena, but closely related to values.

Leung conducted a survey of students from 41 cultures. The questionnaire used in the study included 60 axiomatic statements, such as "Religion helps people escape from reality," and they were asked to rate them on a 5-point Likert scale. As a result, five types of social axioms were found at the individual level: *cynicism* (negative view of human nature), *social complexity* (belief in multiple ways to achieve the same outcome); *reward for application* (general belief that effort will lead to positive results); *religiosity* (belief in the reality of God or some higher power) and *fate control* (belief that destiny can be influenced) - (Leung, Bond, 2004)[8] .

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[8] Further, the authors demonstrate the correlation of these dimensions with the basic values measured by Schwartz's methodology: " Cynicism" correlated with "Self-Enhancement " values, "Reward for application" with "Conservation" and "Self-Transcendence" values, "social complexity" with "Self-Transcendence", "Religiousness"

A factor analysis was conducted on the aggregated results across countries, which yielded two cultural dimensions of the axioms: *Dynamic Externality* and *Social Cynicism*. *Dynamic externality* involves contrasting religiosity, belief in justice and Self-Transcendence at one pole with atheism and rationality at the other[9] . *Social Cynicism* is about power and authority combined with egocentrism and is almost exactly the same as the individual *Cynicism* factor. The authors demonstrate the connection of the two axes with multiple dimensions of values and other phenomena, with socio-economic country indicators and conclude that "social cynicism" correlates with a very small number of previously known indicators, and thus expands the range of meaningful cultural dimensions (Bond, Leung et al., 2004a).

Russia is very close to the middle of the range on the *Dynamic Externalities* axis, as are Venezuela, Singapore, Taiwan, and Korea, while on the *Social Cynicism* axis it ranks medium-high, about the same as Lebanon, Latvia, Belgium or Hong Kong. On both of these axes combined, Russia falls into a cluster with very different countries, and its closest neighbor is Hong Kong. The authors do not explain this clustering, but Lebedeva and Tatarko (2007) suggested that "Orthodox countries" (Greece, Romania, and Russia) were not in this cluster by accident, but this does not explain the presence of such distant from Orthodoxy countries as Lebanon, China, Peru, and Korea.

1.2.9 World Values Study and R. Inglehart's research

Political scientist Ronald Inglehart, using the data of the European Values Survey and the World Values Survey initiated by him, which have been going on for almost 30 years and have covered hundreds of thousands of respondents in dozens of countries, has demonstrated the connection between the prevalence of certain values among the population and the level of society modernization, its economic development and democratization. Inglehart, using a questionnaire recording dozens of various attitudes, norms, and values, has developed several conceptual approaches to explain the relationship between cultural, political, and economic variables. The first approach included development of a "silent revolution" theory and derivation of Materialistic/Postmaterialistic value dimension (Inglehart, 1977; 1990). The second approach proposed the concept of Modernization/Postmodernization (Inglehart, 1997) and the third suggested the theory of "human development" (Welzel, Inglehart, & Klingemann, 2003; Welzel, & Inglehart, 2005).

Materialistic/post-materialistic values

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with positively "Conservation " and negatively with "Self-Enhancement", and "Fate Control" was weakly and positively related to "Conservation " (Bond, Leung et al., 2004b).

[9] This dimension correlates highly with R. Inglehart's Traditional-Secular-Rational Values axis (Inglehart, 1997, Bond, Leung et al., 2004a)

In his seminal book, "The Silent Revolution" (Inglehart, 1977), Inglehart outlined key hypotheses, which were then confirmed in mass surveys around the world. Inglehart argues that the change in human values in a historical perspective is non-linear – industrialization is accompanied by a rejection of traditional authorities such as religion and family, and authority is shifted to secular entities such as the institutions of state and science, the values of material well-being and security are increased - such values Inglehart labeled "materialism". At the next stage, which is called the "silent revolution", society achieves higher wealth, which causes a shift in value priorities towards values of individualization – the rejection of authority, increasing focus on self-expression, on quality of life, that is, a shift towards "postmaterialist" values. Inglehart demonstrated the association between the prevalence of postmaterialistic values in society and active political behavior and liberal attitudes (Inglehart, 1990). And the spread of active political participation and liberal ideas in the masses leads to higher levels of democratization. Thus, economic development, giving satisfaction of basic needs (according to A. Maslow), in one way or another, leads to a value shift at the mass level, which, in turn, entails democratization. Artificial measures designed to halt the value shift and subsequent democratization (necessary to follow economic development) slow down the economic growth, leaving the country among economic outsiders, as it happened to the Soviet Union. Therefore, "economic modernization does not make political liberalization inevitable, but it does make it increasingly difficult to avoid" (Inglehart, 1990. p. 429). This phrase was written with caution in 1990. but the further history of the Soviet Union showed the correctness of this conclusion.

According to Inglehart, the value shift from materialistic to postmaterialistic values occurs *through the change of generations* – new values appear in the generation that grew up under the conditions of guaranteed material security. This generation receives a fundamentally different socialization than the previous one – it does not emphasize the values of survival and achievement, and its focus is on their own feelings and wishes, on the basis of which emerges the will for self-expression, a higher quality of life, hedonism. The current level of well-being is also reflected in the commitment to postmaterialism (Ibid., p. 430).

The values of materialism/postmaterialism are measured using three questions[10], each of which asks the respondent to choose from four items "the most important goals our country should achieve in the next 10 years": in each question the first and the second most important goal is chosen. Based on answers to these questions, five categories of respondents were identified, ranging from 1 – complete materialists, to 5 – complete postmaterialists[11]. Most of the key

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[10] Initially, there was (and sometimes later used) a 4-item index based on a single question that yielded a three-item categorization of Materialist, Mixed, Postmaterialist (Inglehart, 1990. 1997).

[11] The following were used as indicators of postmaterialistic values: a) preference for social inclusion or improvement of the appearance of cities over achieving a high level of economic development or ensuring high

conclusions were based on these five categories, which has attracted the most criticism. Some critics argued for the methodological and substantive superiority of "dimensions" (as continuous variables) over classifications or "categories" (see, e.g., Hofstede, 1981). Second, they questioned both the wording of the items, referring to the country's rather than personal goals, and the arbitrary and poorly justified selection of indicators. In particular, critics have found a link between some indicators and the level of support for a particular government (Klein, 1995, Clarke *et al.*, 1999, Davis & Davenport, 1999, Hansen & Tol, 2003).

Modernization/postmodernization

In the next stage, Inglehart began to describe his ideas about the relationship of economic, cultural and political variables in terms of modernization theory (Inglehart, 1997). The process of modernization does not only mean intensive economic development and industrialization, but also includes social processes that accompany and are in many ways a consequence of economic development. The two main vectors of these processes are secularization and bureaucratization. The first one relates to the development of scientific outlook on the world, rejection of religious authorities and people's self-confidence, since in a society with industrialized economy rational action leads to desired results (much more often than in traditional society). Parallel to this is bureaucratization, the process of the emergence and multiplication of secular organizations adhering to certain rules, aiming to achieve external goals, recruiting their members impersonally, based on their achievements (Ibid., p. 73). This is preceded by the destruction of the belief in the inheritance of power. Social prestige and socio-economic functions move away from the family and the church to the state and the law. The secular state in the form of various political institutions replaces Theos and family, a rigid hierarchical structure is built up, the possibility of vertical movement in which, together with belief in one's own ability, is reflected in the growing achievement motivation. In this phase of social development, materialistic values are strengthened. However, these processes are non-linear, they develop and intensify only until a generation grows up in relative economic security and then there is a postmodernization shift, that is, a shift towards the weakening of any authority, more attention to the quality of life of the individual and postmaterialist values. The combination of a lack of authority and high individualism (emphasizing autonomy and responsibility) naturally generates a desire to participate in government decisions and motivates the development of democracy. Individual motivation also changes – there is a desire for self-expression, for example, professional choice now emphasizes the quality of experience rather than salary, interest in activity; opportunity to contribute to the

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defense capacity of the country; b) preference of the possibility to influence government decisions or protect freedom of speech over fighting growing price or maintaining order in the nation; c) preference of the society, in which ideas are valued above money or movement from impersonal to more humane society over stable economy and fighting against crime.

environment, both natural and social, holds a high value. Since Inglehart takes the assumption that there is a universal pattern of economic development in relation to culture, economic trends are capable of predicting certain societal changes. For example, in those societies that have recently undergone the postmodernization shift, one can expect the democratization of political institutions.

To measure modernization/postmodernization[12] Inglehart developed better and more methodologically sophisticated scale rather than classifying respondents into materialists and postmaterialists. These are two parameters derived from a country-level factor analysis that included 44 different indicators. Some of these indicators were responses to the original questionnaire questions, while others were ready-made indices (such as motivation for achievement or postmaterialism).

The first dimension, namely Traditional - Secular-Rational Authority (in some sources Rational-legal), describes orientations towards traditional authorities, conformism, and religiosity as opposed to achievement motivation, independence, thrift, tolerance, that is, it describes *modernization* shifts in authority – from religion to political institutions.

Survival – Self-Expression dimension reflects a linear process from traditional society to postmodern society and is primarily related to increasing well-being[13] .

In the space of these two dimensions, Inglehart arranged the averages across countries and obtained his widely known "world map", the location of countries in which was explained by a complex of different variables, such as a country's economic development (rich/poor countries), historical affiliation to one of the religious traditions or philosophies (Protestant, Catholic, Confucian), experience with communism (ex-communist vs all the others) and continental location (Latin America, Africa, South Asia).

In Inglehart's theoretical scheme, economic development leads to shifts in culture - first to modernization, then to postmodernization, while cultural change leads to modification in political institutions. At the same time, the reverse impact of culture on economy is also possible. The two dimensions of culture have many correlates with other subjective variables and independent economic indicators. A weakness of this approach is the assumption of a single development pattern for *all* countries. Apart from the fact that there are many exceptions to these patterns (e.g., the oil-extracting Arabic countries), these patterns are derived from the cross-sectional studies,

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[12] Inglehart did not use one name for these "syndromes" - in some sources he discussed modern/postmodern values, in others of modern/postmodern cultures, in others – of modern/postmodern societies, and yet in others he used these words as nouns (modernization/postmodernization), apparently implying the condition of both values, culture, and society combined.

[13] Low happiness, outgroup denial, belief that women need children and children need parents, the value of money and hard work received the least stress; high life and health satisfaction, good mood, postmaterialistic values, tolerance of homosexual as neighbors, trust in others, concern for friends, and others had the highest factor loadings (Inglehart, 1997:82).

while tracing the dynamics of value change demonstrated the absence of a single pattern, although it can be explained in the context of each individual country. In Russia, for example, the shift in values between 1990 and 1995 in the direction of survival values related to economic problems fit into the general pattern, whereas the shift towards traditional values and lowering of the secular-rational values between 2000 and 2006 did not because during these years Russia had rapid economic growth. A detailed tracing of the dynamics in other countries also does not show a uniform trend[14] .

Two main disadvantages of these value dimensions are following.. First, in order to include more countries, the list of indicators on which these dimensions were based, originally comprising 44 items, was severely narrowed, first to 22 and then to 10. In doing so, the author did not change the names of the axes nor their interpretation. Second, these measurements were derived from aggregated country data only, which indicates on potential macro-micro inconsistency.

Human development theory

Building on the idea of "human choice" as the ultimate goal of social progress (Anand & Sen, 2000), Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann (2001; 2003; Welzel & Inglehart, 2005; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005) have developed a theory of "human development" that includes three components that ensure "human choice": socioeconomic development, growth of emancipatory values, and functional democracy. Socio-economic development (urbanization, social mobility, and division of labor) provides individuals with individual resources that are objective means to exercise free choice. Emancipatory values provide motivation of choice, i.e. desire to choose[15] . Working democracy embodies the institutionalization of "human choice", providing it both at the level of norms and at the level of real action. The first component provides the ability to choose, the second component provides the motivation to choose, and the third component guarantees the right of free choice. Human development of societies means the expansion of human choice at the mass level (Welzel *et al.,* 2001, p. 346).

These components of societal change are connected with the two causal linkages: means-motives and motives-laws.

The *means-motives* link implies that people's motivation depends on their capabilities, or, in terms of the emancipation theory, socioeconomic development conditions emancipatory values. This process is based on the mechanism of aspiration adjustment, which allows people to adapt to

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[14] The author of this paper independently traced the dynamics of values in the UK, Estonia, Ukraine and China based on values in the two value dimensions and economic growth data (World Bank, 1990. 1995, 2000).

[15] By "emancipatory values" the authors mean what were previously called "values of self-expression" as opposed to "survival" values, among the indicators: tolerance of homosexuals and HIV-positive people in the neighborhood, signing political petitions, postmaterialistic values (short version), trust in people, high life satisfaction (Welzel et al., 2003, p. 56)

reality, solve the most urgent problems, and avoid trying to achieve unachievable. Limiting one's capabilities reduces one's aspirations, especially higher-order aspirations, such as self-expression (the latter is inherent in each person by virtue of being self-aware). Lack of resources leads to the struggle for survival, to the association in collectives, to the loss of trust in others. Welzel was able to demonstrate this link at the individual level.

The *motive-law* link means that the emergence of emancipatory values at the mass level leads to the democratization of political institutions, since emancipated life includes activities, both personal and public, that require a legal space based on working rights to freedom. In the case of an authoritarian regime, the elite may resist for a while, but governance becomes highly inefficient and costly, and eventually it either begins reforms or is overthrown by dissidents. Corruption reduces, both under pressure from the people with emancipatory values and under the influence of the elites themselves. Yet the institutionalized rights *per se* (i.e. without an economic base), do not lead to emancipatory values (for example, a history of post-colonial India), while emancipatory values can exist without institutionalization of rights (as in communist-oppressed Czechoslovakia). It was possible to demonstrate these links only at the country level.

Theory has also systematized the use of individual and country levels of analysis and corresponding reasoning; a recent article used a statistical method that accounts for variance at both of these levels, namely multilevel regression analysis (Welzel, 2007).

If the ideas of Inglehart and his colleagues can be empirically supported is still an open question, since most of the reported correlations are unable to establish a clear causal relationship, and, as already mentioned, the real dynamics of values over time does not clearly support a single development pattern across all countries.

Russians in Inglehart's dimensions

Inglehart writes that the entire Soviet system was effective only for a certain stage of socio-economic development - for industrialization and modernization, and this task was solved by the Soviet system. But at the next stage, when a generation grew up with economic security, there were impulses to change the regime. This did not happen immediately as elites sought to maintain their influence; under such conditions the economic and social systems became increasingly inefficient, leading to the collapse of 1991 (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005:215). Based on very large intergenerational differences in the expression of postmaterialist values among Russians (stronger only in South Korea), Inglehart in 1990 expected an accelerated replacement of materialist values by postmaterialist values (Inglehart, 1990), but much of this was not borne out by survey data. By the time the Soviet system collapsed, the prevalence of postmaterialist values in Russia was very modest compared to other countries; moreover, it is quite difficult to assess *the growth in the*

prevalence of postmaterialist values in the USSR. The assumption of a rapid shift of Russians' values towards post-materialism in the 1990s is also not supported. As Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show, the fifteen-year dynamics of Russia did not increase the prevalence of postmaterialist values, nor did secular-rational and self-expression values. There is no smooth replacement of one value generation by another in Russia, but rather a reaction to the immediate economic and political situation in the country[16] .

Figure 2.1. Position and dynamics of Russia in the context of the other countries of the world. Dots represent individual factor means (from factor analysis at the aggregate level) according to WVS, 1990-2006. The number next to the name of the country denotes the wave of the study. The graph includes countries that participated in the last round as well as Zimbabwe and Venezuela.

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[16] At the same time, when discussing the connection between values and economic development, Inglehart makes an important exception - the Middle East states form their prosperity by selling resources, and in fact, they have no economic growth, they only consume the products of the Western economy, and GDP in this case cannot serve as a reliable indicator of economic growth (Inglehart, 1990. p. 45). Probably, in Russia, the lack of growth of postmaterialist values is explained by the actual absence of economic growth masked by the growing oil prices.

Figure 2.2. Dynamics of materialist/postmaterialist in Russia according to the World Values Survey (in % of respondents)

1.2.10. Studies of Basic Values by S. H. Schwartz

Schwartz's values research aimed to test his theory of universal basic values, which meant finding the maximum number of values (or motivational types) recognizable in all cultures and in stable relationships with each other (Schwartz, 1992).

As the aim was to cover all existing human values, more than 50 values were included in the questionnaire and researchers in each country were asked to add to them those they felt were missing and/or culturally specific to that country. As the aim was to achieve universality and recognizability of values across all cultures, the number of countries surveyed increased steadily (from 20 in 1992 to 74 by 2006) and the theory evolved in line with the new data.

Schwartz made comparisons at the two fundamentally different levels: cultural and individual, and each of these levels was allocated its own dimensions of values, as cultures differ from each other in some respects, whereas individuals differ in other dimensions. This is an important methodological innovation that other researchers did not fully embody: Rokeach did not separate these levels at all, Hofstede worked almost exclusively at the level of countries, Inglehart and colleagues used the same value dimensions for both levels and gave them a clear separation only in recent years.

Schwartz argues that it was the *personal priorities* of respondents rather than cultural ideals (norms) that were studied in his survey for two reasons: low consensus within culturally homogenous groups (if their answers were a reflection of normative ideals, they should be very similar); second, he found associations with a range of individual characteristics such as gender, age, education level, electoral behavior, religiosity, etc. - both on the pooled data and within groups. At the same time, according to Schwartz, averaged values of respondents of one cultural

group also make sense. They reflect values that have been formed by members of the group under similar conditions of socialization, under the influence of the same social institutions, the same media, and so on. These averaged values can be considered as values of the culture as a whole (Schwartz, 2008, p. 12).

Survey and methodology

The methodology of Schwartz value surveys was a modification of the Rokeach methodology. First, Schwartz expanded the list of values by adding values related to power and authority, autonomy, hedonism, and others. Each value was reflected in several indicators (at different times Schwartz claimed there were 8, 11, or 10 of them), which increased the reliability of the measurements. Second, instead of ranking, which was used by Rokeach and often criticized, Schwartz used ratings of each individual value (rating instead of ranking). Moreover, instead of using a standard Likert scale, the survey employed a special asymmetric scale, which is well suited for cross-cultural measurement of values, as it allows recording of "negative values", that is, a rejection of values disliked by a given respondent (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990).

The questionnaire consisted of two lists of words, each of which was rated by respondents in terms of importance "as a guiding principle in my life" on a following scale: "-1 - contrary to my values, "0 - not important, "3 - important, "6 - very important" and "7 – the most important. However, "-1" was offered only once in each list. The first list included a set of abstract concepts with explanations in brackets, for example: "FREEDOM (freedom of action and thought)". The second list consisted of "behaviors that may be important to you," such as: "INDEPENDENT (self-reliant, self-sufficient)". The order of words in the lists was the same in all countries. The division into the two lists was not meaningful, arising from Rokeach's division of values into terminal and instrumental, and was intended to make the respondent's job easier.

Samples of respondents from different countries consisted mainly of schoolteachers and university students. Teachers, according to Schwartz, are one of the main translators of values, and students, as educated and economically active people, constitute the future driving force of society. Besides, most samples were potentially comparable because their matching composition - by age, education, for teachers - by profession - was very similar in different cultures. Sample sizes varied considerably from a few dozen (Costa Rica, students, 2003) to a few thousand people (Israel, adolescents, 1994).

Value dimensions at the individual level

Schwartz expected to discover some value categories even before the interviews, they were hypothetical, and their number and content were refined based on the results of the interviews. Guttman's Least Space Method (a type of multidimensional scaling) was used to discover these individual values, which provided a visual representation of the relationships between individual

value preferences (Schwartz, 1992). The unit of analysis was the ratings of each of the 56 statements by respondents from different countries of the same sample type (e.g., students only or teachers only). As a result, 10 domains were identified in the value space, in which the same values consistently fell, both in the analysis of the pooled data, and in the analysis of respondents within samples. In addition, two value axes were also identified. These are higher-order value dimensions, more general and even greater stable across samples. Thus, 10 types of basic human values (or, according to Schwartz, "latent motivational types")[17] and two value axes (higher-order value dimensions) were identified:

- *POWER: Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources*
- *ACHIEVEMENT: Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards*
- *HEDONISM: Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself*
- *STIMULATION: Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life*
- *SELF-DIRECTION: Independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring*
- *UNIVERSALISM: Understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature*
- *BENEVOLENCE: Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact*
- *TRADITION: Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self*
- *CONFORMITY: Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms*
- *SECURITY: Safety, harmony and stability of society, of relationships, and of self* (Schwartz, 2007).

Ten values have stable interrelations. To represent these relationships, Schwartz developed his well-known circular representation which we call the Schwartz Circle, shown in Figure 2.3. The closer two values are located in this circle, the stronger their correlation is; values located in opposite sectors have negative correlations. *Conformity* and *Tradition* are located in the same sector because they have similar relationships to the other values and are also closely related to each other. However, it should be kept in mind that the 56 statements that were analyzed are classified into the 10 values rather conventionally and such classification is one of many possible

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[17] Spirituality, initially included among individual-level values, was subsequently excluded because, first, it implied reflection on life itself, which most people do not do in their everyday life, and thus does not serve as a guiding principle of life; second, in different cultures it is represented by different values: connection with the divine, unity with nature, altruism, detachment from the material, knowledge of self, etc. (Schwartz, 1992).

ways of summarizing value universe; the circular shape of the value scheme itself symbolizes the underlying continuum of personal values (Schwartz, 1992).

The correlations between the ten values can be reduced to more abstract indices, two pairs of value categories. The categories within each pair correlate negatively with each other and thus form two bipolar value dimensions.

The first value axis combines the values *of Self-Direction*, *Stimulation,* and *Hedonism* at one pole[18] and the values of *Security*, *Tradition* and *Conformity* at the other; Schwartz called it *Openness to Change–Conservation.* This axis describes the extent to which people are motivated to follow their mental and emotional impulses in unpredictable directions – as opposed to the motivation to maintain the *status quo,* as well as the certainty in relationships with people close to them, institutions and traditions (Schwartz, 1992).

The second value axis combines the values *of Universalism* and *Benevolence* at one pole and *Power* and *Achievement at* the other and is called *Self-Transcendence – Self-Enhancement.* This dimension describes values that motivate people to put their own interests first (even at the cost of other people's interests) - as opposed to values that motivate people to be beyond selfish aspirations, to be concerned about the well-being of others, close ones and strangers, as well as for nature (Ibid.).

In dozens of studies and articles, Schwartz and his colleagues have shown numerous associations of these value types with different socio-demographic characteristics of individuals, different social attitudes, behaviors, and with other dimensions of values.

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[18] In Schwartz's Circle, the value *of* Hedonism has blurry boundaries because, this value type was equally likely to be classified as both "Openness to Change" and "Self-Enhancement". However, in recent years, based on research in an increasing number of countries, Hedonism has increasingly been categorized as part of "Openness to Change".

Figure 2.3 Schwartz Circle illustrating the relationships between the ten value types (Source: Schwartz, 1992)

Cultural value dimensions

The value indices at the cultural level were constructed according to the same technique as the value indices at the individual level, exception the units here were the mean indicators for each of the samples. Note that in most countries, multiple samples were surveyed. Based on the average values of the 56 items of the questionnaire across 236 samples, a multidimensional scaling (SSA) was carried out, which resulted in the identification of seven domains and three higher-order value axes in the resulting value space (Schwartz, 2008):

Embeddedness – Autonomy. Contrasts the value of the individual as a member of the group with the self-worth of the individual. Autonomy is of two kinds: intellectual, which means attention to personal knowledge of the world, and affective, which means attention to one's own feelings, emotions, sensations.

Egalitarianism – Hierarchy. This axis contrasts two types of inclusion in society: horizontal and vertical. Equality implies the superiority of horizontal connections, the recognition of other people as equals, the value of social justice, responsibility, honesty. Hierarchy, on the other hand, means a high value of vertical social ties, motivating people to subordinate and dominate.

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Harmony – Mastery. The third axis describes the relationship with the environment, both social and physical: one pole emphasizes harmonious coexistence with the people around, motivating people to accept their environment as it is, at the other pole is importance ability to change everything and self-sufficiency, which motivate people to challenge and manage the reality around them.

It should be noted that both the specific content and the general meaning of value dimensions at the level of cultures (samples) are fundamentally different from those at the level of individuals. The dimensions at these two levels are independent of each other; the relationships between the 56 items at the individual and at the cultural levels are substantially different. For example, the values of modesty and power over people at the individual level are negatively correlated because the pursuit of power excludes modesty. At the cultural level, they are positively correlated because in societies in which social hierarchy is accepted and approved, the values of both modesty and power over people are more strongly expressed than in all other societies. This is because members of that society are, on the one hand, more accepting of power over themselves than members of other societies, and on the other hand, they are more willing to dominate over others (Schwartz, 2008).

Russians in Schwartz's dimensions

In one study, Schwartz and Bardi (1997) estimated the values of Russians based on a sample of teachers of slightly more than 200 people, using indicators of cultural values. Among the 20 European countries, together with post-socialist countries Russia had extremely high values of *Hierarchy* and *Conservatism* (early label of *Embeddedness*) and significantly lower values of *Egalitarianism*, *Mastery*, *Intellectual* and *Affective Autonomy* than the rest of Europe. Schwartz calls this syndrome "adaptation to the communist rule," and it is most pronounced in the former Soviet countries, moderately so in the socialist countries of Europe that were not part of the USSR, and, accordingly, not at all pronounced in the countries of Western Europe. In other words, the severity of this syndrome depends on the presence and duration of the communist regime in the country in the past. Schwartz demonstrated that the differences between the three groups of countries are best explained by this syndrome, even better than the differences in economic conditions of life (level of GDP per capita). The emergence of such values is explained by the life conditions in a totalitarian society, to which people had to adapt for several decades, developing special skills, attitudes, and values, that would enable them to live in these conditions and to compensate the deprivation of many needs. The paternalism characteristic of the Soviet system and the use of secret informants by special services caused a distrust in peers, produced a high value of *Hierarchy* values (and a correspondingly low value of *Egalitarianism*); the suppression

of personality and autonomy caused a high degree of conformity in people, and because the regime was very keen to preserve itself, it set people up for values of preserving the existing order of things, in Schwartz terms, for *Conservatism* and a correspondingly low value *of Intellectual* and *Affective Autonomy (*ibid).

A number of Russian researchers have also studied values using Schwartz value dimensions. Table 1.3 lists the main studies; it shows that the samples were very small in size, varied in composition; the surveys were conducted in different parts of the country (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Penza, Vologda, etc.) and at different times (from 1993 to 2005). Not surprisingly, the results of these surveys as indicated by the value indices (both individual and cultural levels) are not always consistent with each other.

N.M.Lebedeva conducted the most systematic research; her data were collected on samples that are large enough to be comparable with those of Schwartz.

Lebedeva and Tatarko (2007) compared the values of students and teachers in terms of cultural dimensions, noting that Russian students were more similar in their values to their respective groups in Western Europe than teachers. They also compared the average values of both samples (students and teachers) with the average values of Chinese and Swiss samples, noting that in some values (*Embeddedness, Hierarchy, Harmony*) Russia is similar to China, and in others (*Egalitarianism* and *Autonomy*) to Switzerland (Lebedeva, Tatarko, 2007, p. 233).

They also traced the temporal dynamics of values from 1999 to 2005. They noted that during this period, "in Russia, both 'collectivist' and 'individualist' blocks are intensifying...i.e. both 'Asian' and 'European' trends" and conclude that "perhaps...the change in values is connected with different value priorities of different social strata...or perhaps it is a manifestation of incomplete correspondence between the methodology for grouping values proposed by Schwartz and Russian mentality" (Ibid.). In relation to the latter, the authors used Schwartz's methodology to develop a "culturally specific approach to the study of the values of Russians", and followed their research within this framework (ibid., Ch 6).

One of the productive directions of this research is the search for correlates of values (ibid., p. 235), but unfortunately it was conducted in terms of *cultural* values - but at the *individual* level.

Table 1.3. Studies of Russians' Values Using the Schwartz Values Questionnaire

Type of sample	Sample size	Year	Principle Researchers
Teachers at pedagogical colleges (St. Petersburg)	86	1993	*Michael McCarrey*
Students at the Pedagogical School (St. Petersburg)	63	1993	*Michael McCarrey*
Teachers (Moscow)	194	1995	*A. Levinson, I. Dubov, L. Smirnov*
Representative sample for Moscow	188	1995	*A. Levinson, I. Dubov, L. Smirnov*
Educators (Siberia)	383	1996	*Pat Giurgevich*
Teenagers (Moscow)	284	1999	*G. M. Andreeva, E.M. Dubovskaya, O.A. Tikhomandritskaya, I.K. Bezmenova*
Teenagers (Vologda)	192	2002	*Svetlana Roettges*
Teachers (Penza, St. Petersburg)	87	1999	*N. M. Lebedeva*
Students (Penza, St. Petersburg, Moscow)	242	1999	*N. M. Lebedeva*
Students (Penza, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Balashov)	527	2005	*N. M. Lebedeva*
Students (Penza, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Balashov)	376	2005	*N. M. Lebedeva*

1.3 Russian Values Studies

Among Russian studies of values there are almost no comparative studies, which are of primary interest for this paper. Therefore, of the numerous value studies, let us consider only some of the most extensive ones. The importance of these studies increases when considered in the context of the differences between emic and etic studies (Berry, 1969; Triandis, 1983). Studies, which use a standard tool in all countries or cultures (they were discussed in the previous section), belong to the category of ethical studies, and those, which use culturally specific tools (due to the specificity of the studied phenomena) are united by the emic approach, in which the comparison of cultures is not at the level of specific indicators, but at the level of the results of analysis of these indicators in each culture separately, that is at the level of common meanings. From this point of view, we can consider Russian studies of values, which are not comparative in nature, as part of broader emic studies. In addition, the domestic studies provide information about the internal structure of the values of the Russians.

1.3.1 V.A. Yadov's Dispositional Theory

In the Soviet years, the situation with values research was not easy, since the "wrong" result from an ideological point of view could lead to various undesirable consequences for scientists or

simply not to be published (see, e.g., Lapin, 2009). One of the most important fundamental studies was the project led by V.A. Yadov (Yadov *et al.*, 1979). Based on a survey of 1100 Leningrad engineers, the authors developed and then adjusted a dispositional personality concept designed to predict social behavior. The dispositional structure is "predispositions to perceive and evaluate conditions of activity, as well as to act in these conditions in a certain way that are incorporated in social experience", or a system of different subjective phenomena that determines an individual's readiness for a certain type of behavior in certain conditions. The dispositional structure includes four levels, the first of which is "elementary fixed attitudes" that are embodied when an individual faces a specific situation. The second level is a system of less specific social attitudes or "predispositions to perceive, evaluate and behave in relation to specific social objects, situations, [and] their properties" that are formed based on the evaluation of social objects (actions) and situations (modes of action). The third and fourth levels of dispositions form the general orientation of interests and – at the top level – value orientations. After the empirical study, interests took the highest position and values took the subordinate position (Ibid., p. 61). Value orientations were considered to be "elements of social consciousness and culture, serving normative functions in relation to the individual", they are "goals and means of life activity" and "meet the highest needs for self-development and self-expression". The general orientation of interests ("predisposition to identification" with certain spheres of social life) is the most stable level of dispositions. Dispositions have three components: cognitive, emotional, and behavioral.

A person's actual behavior is led by the dispositional system as a whole rather than by its individual levels. Nevertheless, different levels contribute differently to behavioral guidance: for example, value orientations and a general orientation of interests are responsible for self-regulation of individual behavior in general, that is, for control over generalized social attitudes. Values describe an individual's wishes, while situation-specific attitudes regulate behavior in specific situations, which is not necessarily consistent with higher-order social attitudes, values, and interests, and thus ensure the individual's adaptability to the varying circumstances.

The authors were interested in the values of individuals related to work and leisure as spheres of social interaction. To measure values, a modified Rokeach methodology was used, in which more than a third of the values were replaced "taking into account the experience of Soviet research" and also taking into account the objectives of a specific study focused on dispositions to independence and creativity (they removed "salvation", "love", and "happiness" and added "interesting work", "strong will", and "creativity"). In the value list, the adjectives, which represented instrumental values in Rokeach list, were replaced with nouns. The results of the study showed that the most and least important values (as opposed to average values) and terminal values (as opposed to instrumental values) had greater stability. Engineers considered "general good

situation in the country", "happy family life", "interesting work", and "health" to be the most important, the rejected values included "high ambitions" and "life full of pleasures". Based on the ranks of different values, the authors identified different clusters ("taxa") of individuals with similar preferences: there were groups with "clear" and "unclear" value orientations, "clear" group was divided into work- and family and leisure-oriented, which was evidence of the subordination of values to common interests in the dispositional structure. In addition, they investigated correlations of value orientations with social attitudes and actual behavior. One of the main conclusions of the study was a support for the fruitfulness of the dispositional concept of personality and the meaningfulness of its further use in sociological research.

1.3.4 "Our Values Today" Study by N.I. Lapin

In 1990. an extensive study of Russians' values under the leadership of N.I. Lapin began, and it still continues. The author defined values as "generalized goals and means of their achievement that act as fundamental norms" ("...of people's activities" added later – Lapin, 2003). The main function of values is to consolidate society.

The study "Our Values Today" takes a number of assumptions, for example, that there are "two or three dozen values. They are formed ... by age of 18-20 and then remain quite stable, undergoing significant changes only in crisis periods of human life and its social environment". It is assumed that values are divided into "core", "reserve", and "periphery", into terminal and instrumental, as well as into four "subsystems": vital, interactionist, socialization, and sense-of-basic human values (Lapin, 1994). Assuming that there are 14 values in total, they are sufficiently described by 22 paired judgments.[19] A measurement instrument included 44 statements, for each of which the respondent had to rate their agreement on an 11-point scale.[20] According to the results of several waves of surveys (in 1990. 1994, 1998, and 2002) representing the Russian population, a high degree of stability of the majority of values was revealed despite the social changes and reforms taking place in Russia. The first positions (the values with which more than 57% of respondents agree, i.e. give them a score from 9 to 11) are the "integrating core", it is formed by the values of order, family, and communication; the second place (45-57% of respondents agree) is called the "reserve", it includes the values of "morality", "freedom", and "life". Over the years, the number of values passing the 45% threshold grows, from which the author can concluded that the values of Russians are pluralizing and liberalizing. The "opposing differential" and the "conflicting

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[19] In justifying this particular number of value terms, the author referred to "a number of experiments" (Lapin, 1996, p.51) and "laborious work on the operationalization of value concepts... and reverse generalization procedure" (ibid., p.53), and to the fact that "the reliability of the technique is confirmed by its use by other Russian sociologists and the correspondence of the results obtained with data from several international studies" (Lapin, 2003).

[20] Apparently, this was the instrument used, although the questionnaire cited in one of the publications (Lapin, 1993, p. 195) includes a question involving the ranking of 14 value words.

periphery" of values are also distinguished based on the approval of the statements of 30-45% of respondents and less than 30% of respondents. Each of these levels of popularity of values performs, according to the authors, its own functions - the most popular integrate society, slightly less popular perform the role of a reserve, to which people turn for new priorities "if, for example, the old ones have become unavailable" (Lapin, 1996, p. 138), even less popular values perform the same function as the opposition in politics and, finally, the least popular values ("conflictogenic periphery") are the values of "power" and "freedom", the opposition of which contains "the sharpest conflict in the socio-cultural basis of the power-regulating function of society" (ibid, p.139).

There was some heterogeneity of the population in terms of values. The search for groups supporting different values was dismissed as a "naive delusion", instead a factor analysis of values was carried out. The increase in the number of factors in the factor analysis of two-wave data was interpreted as a pluralization of values (Lapin, 1996). Various classifications of the 14 values in question are made and meaningful conclusions are drawn through the dynamics of the obtained value groups, mainly about liberalization and pluralization of Russians' values as a reaction to reforms and crises, while preserving a stable "core" of the most important ones.

1.3.2. Values Studies conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM)

In 1993, a group of researchers from the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) conducted one of the first studies of Russians' basic values (Dubov, Oslon, & Smirnov, 1994; 2002).

The authors believe that compiling an initial list of values presented to the respondent is the most important stage of values research and make significant efforts to do so. Dubov and colleagues criticized Schwartz, Rokeach, and other value researchers for the fact that their theories, while claiming to describe the entire universe of basic values, do not provide evidence of the representativeness of the selected lists of values.[21]

The basis for their own list was Ozhegov's Dictionary of the Russian language, from which the four experts selected words according to the criteria of relatedness to "the future desired by most normal people in our country" and to "a good, happy life" (1), a sufficiently high level of abstractness (2), and generality ("supra-group character") (3). A total of 232 value terms coincided across all the experts. This list and an extra ten words added from the political vocabulary were tested on 30 examinees, who were asked to group words that were similar in meaning. As a result of the grouping analysis and due to the applied research objectives (characterization of the

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[21] It is worth noting that this is not quite true in regard to Schwartz's research: he justified the sufficiency of his list of values by the fact that researchers in each country were asked to include special, locally specific values, which in their opinion were missing from the list, and subsequent analysis of data showed that all "additional" values were included in the proposed ten value indices and closely corresponded to their meaning.

population's political orientations), a list of 38 words representing 30 clusters and 11 higher-order classes were obtained. This list was then presented to respondents from a representative sample in Russia (2,500 people, as well as 1,000 managers at various levels) with the instruction to choose "nine words that, from your point of view, best express your idea of a good, happy life, the revival of Russia".

As a result, the authors obtained value hierarchies based on the shares of respondents who chose the appropriate word – the higher the share, the higher the value's place in the hierarchy. Values such as peace, lawfulness, security, family, stability, work, justice, prosperity, order, and power came first. Researchers then compared value hierarchies across socio-demographic groups. For example, men differed from women in the higher importance of lawfulness, security, and order (46%, second place for men and 41%, fourth place for women), and lower importance of labor (39%, 5th place for men and 45%, 2nd place for women), as well as "family, wealth" (40%, 4th place and 44%, 3rd place, respectively).

In the question proposed by the authors, the two grounds "good, happy life" and "revival of Russia" are mixed. In addition, the question itself already contains the value of "revival of Russia", which the respondent may not share or disagree with. The two reasons for the choice of words may have been reflected in the answers of the respondents: some were guided by the first part, others by the second, or by both. The list of values developed by the authors is of great interest (if we do not take into account the words that were included from the political vocabulary). However, this list is based and applicable so far only to the population of Russia, and besides, not all the stages of its compilation were sufficiently substantiated.[22] Differences between socio-demographic groups are expressed in differences between the ranks of certain values, but the statistical significance of these differences was not assessed.

Several other significant works by Russian authors on the values of the Russians were based on the analysis of the data from this study.

I. M. Klyamkin and B. G. Kapustin (1994) theoretically distinguish three basic (ideal) types of value consciousness of the Russians. The traditionally Soviet type was a special kind of "advanced individualism of a personal-consumerist rather than producing type" that developed in the late Brezhnev era, when all people were equal against the center of power and distribution of benefits. Collectivism here was expressed in the form of an equalizing organization of atomized individuals. The second type is illiberal individualism, in which includes freedom, as freedom from the law, i.e., freedom not limited by the need to respect the rights and freedoms of others; it is essentially

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[22] When talking about the necessity of matching the list with the definition of values, the authors are guided by criteria that are violated by including a number of political values and excluding values that are not included in any "class" but passed all the selection criteria. It is also not explained why respondents were asked to choose 9 values rather than, say, 5 or 20.

a modification of the traditionally Soviet type, in which the equalizing components were completely displaced by the consumerist ones. And the third is the liberal type with two subtypes: economic-liberal, characterized by respect for the principle of private property necessarily coupled with human rights and freedoms, and social-liberal, characterized by the priority of freedom over all other values, even over value of private property. Analyzing the FOM survey data, the authors traced the prevalence of values that corresponded to the liberal type in different socio-professional groups, finding the most liberal values among entrepreneurs and farmers, with a limitation that their "liberalism" may be only a reaction to rapid social changes and in future may prove to be "illiberal individualism".

The authors compared the values of those who consciously designated their views as liberal with all other respondents, and it turns out that "liberals" are characterized by a higher actualization of the values of professionalism, freedom, property, and spirituality ("duhovnost"). At the same time, the share of these "liberals" who chose democracy as an important value does not differ from the share among non-liberals. They emphasize an excessive ideologization of liberals, and this is further complicated by the "tending towards the national-ethnic idea". The authors conclude that no significant changes in the prevalence of liberal ideas have occurred: representatives of the "old elites" hold on to the old values, the newly emerged entrepreneurs and farmers are concerned only with the right to property and demonstrate "illiberal individualism", and everyone else is an idealist who believes in "democracy" as a symbol of a bright future. In addition, there is the important conclusion that the "Soviet type" of consciousness is characterized by competition in consumption rather than production; that "liberals" are characterized by an excessive ideologizing that is not connected with the protection of real interests of real people. The conclusion that the words "equality", "democracy", "tolerance", etc. are perceived as ideological declarations rather than real concepts is, in our view, extremely important.

The authors have constructed a very interesting typology of value profiles but have not made sufficient effort to substantiate it empirically; the empirical data are used rather as illustrations to theoretical ideas. In addition, the authors ignored the measurement instrument used to collect the data: respondents were able to select only nine values out of 38. Therefore, phrases such as "almost zero importance of tolerance [among liberals]" did not take into account the fact that it may have been superseded not only by political terms, but also – and even more likely – by personal goals such as "love", "career", and "home".

At the next stage of the study (1994), the FOM researchers tackled specific research tasks to clarify the political orientations of the population, compiling two lists: 22 word-labels designed to become the "core" of value clusters (question: "Which of the following words best explain your idea of a decent, happy life?", any number of words could be chosen) and 37 value-conditions and

value-qualities designed to beef up these word-labels (question: "Which of the listed values do you personally consider to be the best for you?"). There was very little methodological similarity between the first and second stages of the study: the question about values was posed differently, the list of values was divided into two parts and overlapped only slightly with the list of the first stage, the criteria for making the list were changed in the second stage (due to which the second list included many political terms). Nevertheless, Klyamkin (2003) compared the data from these two stages and drew a conclusion about the dynamics of values, noting, in particular, the increasing importance of the "property" value.

The most interesting thing about this second stage of the research is that the updated questionnaire made it possible to find out which values from the list the respondents consider traditional Russian, Soviet and Western, i.e. to capture stereotypes. Thus, out of those values that respondents named as important for themselves, they referred "patience", "hospitality", "faith in God", "unselfishness", "charity", "sense of duty", "self-sacrifice" to traditional Russian ones; to Soviet ones: "atheism", "enthusiasm", "struggle", "sense of duty", "patience", "guarantees of individual social rights", "work discipline" and "supremacy of state interests over individual interests"; and the Western values included "business", "professionalism", "enterprise", "security of private property", "freedom of belief", "wealth", and "profitability of labor". At the same time, the most important values for the respondents, such as "personal dignity" and "justice" were not attributed to any of these groups, which, according to the authors, pointed to the feeling that post-Soviet people had fallen out of history.

V.P. Goryainov (1996, 1997b) analyzed tables from Klyamkin's work, in which the shares of people who chose each of 59 values in each socio-professional group were presented. As a result, "consolidating" social groups were identified – that is, those that expressed the values most common to Russians and around which society might, respectively, unite. The most consolidating groups were workers, state employees, and entrepreneurs; the most "deconsolidating" were the unemployed and retirees.

In another paper (Goryainov, 1997a), the author distinguished values and divided them into "central", "intermediate", and "peripheral", referring, respectively, to the most, medium, and the least popular in *all* socio-professional groups of values. According to the functional feature, Goryainov identified six types of values, three of which were "consolidating"[23] (their distribution is similar to normal) and three are differentiating (distribution with two or more peaks, i.e. low distribution of values in some groups and high in others). Each of the value types was also divided into active and passive according to the strength of their consolidating or differentiating influence.

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[23] The same name, "consolidating", was used to denote both the functional type of values and the population group performing the same function.

In each type, central, intermediate, and peripheral values were also distinguished. The "central values" of the actively integrating type included "family", "human rights", "freedom", "spirituality", "humanism", "diligence", "professionalism"; the central "values" of the actively differentiating type included "security", "personal dignity", "justice", "education", "hospitality", "money" and "order".

Lapkin and Pantin (1998) pointed out that Goryainov's main method - analysis of distributions by socio-professional groups is incorrect, since the sample does not represent the Russian population (farmers, managers, etc. were over-represented), and pointed out the inaccuracy of Goryainov's calculations (ibid., pp. 5-7).

V.V. Lapkin and V.I. Pantin (1998; 1999; Pantin & Lapkin, 2000) continued this study, generally confirming Goryainov's conclusions and supplementing them with their finding that valure differentiation takes place mainly between large groups devoid of power and "elite-forming" groups, with the latter sharing more "Western" values. The authors describe only five values that actively differentiate society: democracy, justice, money, equality, and patience. Further, by identifying connections between different values, the authors conclude that there is a rejection of typically Soviet values and a very cautious acceptance of Western values, while "de-ideologized values" such as "family" and "decency", as well as pragmatic values are most relevant for the post-Soviet person.

Lapkin and Pantin then organized the results of various FOM surveys into a coherent sequence, distinguishing between 1991-1994, when there was the greatest diverge between elites and masses, 1994-1997, characterized by divergence among elites themselves, and a period after 1997, marked by increasing authoritarian "sentiment"; all three periods led in 1999 to a situation of "considerable value disunity among Russians" (Pantin & Lapkin, 1999). The authors regretfully conclude that at the time of the study there was no single value system common to all Russians, values were contradictory and differed across different groups. In further works, these authors analyzed political values using proxy sources, without analysis of the specific data (Lapkin & Pantin, 2000).

In 2002 FOM conducted two surveys (unrelated to those described above) examining values (Klimova & Galitsky, 2002, Galitsky & Klimova, 2002). Respondents were asked to choose "from the listed words [those] that mean the concepts most important to you". The list consisted of two and a half dozen values, the criteria for its compilation were not specified in the publications, but one gets the impression that political terms were overrepresented. In addition to a substantive study, the authors also conducted a kind of a methodological experiment: in one of the surveys, the number of words that the respondent could choose was limited, while in the other, it was not. As a result, the absence of restrictions on the number of choices turned out to be preferable.

The main content of this work was the aggregation of values into groups. For this purpose, a complex ad hoc procedure involving several stages was used. First, four factors were obtained, then individual factor scores were used to obtain six clusters ("forces", "prosperous", "deprived", "patriots", "consumerist", and "lawful"), and then "cores" of these clusters were identified, that is, the most typical combinations of word-values for each of them. Some clusters yielded two cores, which were treated as value subtypes. The analysis focused on the stages of value aggregation. These data provide rich ground for reasoning about the links and meanings of individual values and for further study of the socio-demographic composition of clusters.

1.3.3 The Tomsk Initiative study

In 2001, a team of authors led by A.V. Ryabov and E.Sh. Kurbangaleeva carried out the project "Tomsk Initiative", which included a large-scale study of values and social attitudes of Tomsk region residents (Basic Values of Russians, 2003). The methodology of this research was largely laid down in the 1993 FOM project (Dubov *et al.,* 2002), but was substantially developed and extended. Basic values are defined as "fairly abstractly expressed perceptions of *what* is the most desirable and emotionally attractive... or... emotionally attractive... mode of *behavior* or mode of action". A list of "anti-values" was also added, and, in addition, the significance of various values "for Russia as a whole" was analyzed separately.

The procedure of compiling a list of values and anti-values included the following stages: expert selection of value terms; grouping of words by a small sample of respondents; selection of terms "representing" the obtained groups of values. The survey procedure was as follows: the respondent was asked to choose nine words "the most significant for you personally" and nine words from another list "most unacceptable, rejected, annoying to you personally" (it was also proposed to make a similar choice in relation to "Russia as a whole"). Based on this instrument, four samples of 1,500 inhabitants of the Tomsk region were interviewed in 2001.

The results of the analysis the authors computed the distribution of the value choices and anti-values by samples in general and by separate socio-demographic groups, electoral groups, groups with different types of socio-political attitudes ("mental types"), with active and passive worldview, with different levels of "mythologizing consciousness", etc. The authors reported many conclusions, including:

- There are different types of achievement values: goal-oriented, leading to results, and conservation-oriented; it is the latter type that prevails in the studied region;
- There is a "superindividualization" of Russian mass consciousness;
- The value properties of Russians lead to a wait-and-see attitude towards the transition period;

- The national-ethnic basis is not consolidating;
- A special "neoconservative" kind of relationship with the authorities has emerged based on the values of the Russians.

Analysis of the relationship between values and behavior led to an obvious conclusion about the ambiguity of this relationship. As part of the project, but using a different instrument, Vinarsky and Hodonov (ibid., pp.113-156) studied political values and found more liberal values among younger generations, in less mythologized groups, among respondents who felt close to entrepreneurs and among those who denied being "alien" to Europeans; a number of types of Russian liberalism were also identified.

In regard to family and labor values, the authors conclude that the value model of the Soviet nuclear family was breaking down among the new generations of Russians, changing towards either more "traditional" or more "liberal". A general conclusion was also made about the lack of "market economy values" among Russians. The study of free verbal connotations in regard to word-labels gave a detailed picture of the semantic (and symbolic) content of various word-values. In other sections of this paper, the relationship of values to contemporary Russian myths and perceptions of different "graphemes" was also investigated.

In general, this study was a very comprehensive analysis of various aspects of values and related phenomena. Despite the title of the study was "Basic Values of Russians" it only used a survey of the population of a single region.

1.3.5 Other Values Studies

Researchers from the *Levada Center* have published a series of papers examining the values of Russians. B.V. Dubin analyzed the results of responses of people in 36 countries to the question about "qualities of children that... seem to you the most important" in 36 countries, including Russia, obtained in the 1995 INRA study (Dubin, 1995). The author concluded that there was a low level of response activity in Russia compared to other countries (and a decrease from 1989), as well as a small spread in popularity between the most and the least popular children's qualities. Analyzing the hierarchy of these qualities, the author noted that "[compared to Russians] for respondents in the world the importance of good manners, sense of responsibility, tolerance, and respect in relationships is much higher; instead Russian respondents give higher importance to social skills and hard work ".

L. Gudkov did a meta-analysis of multiple surveys, from which he drew conclusions about the emergence of neoconservatism among the Russians (1997) on the basis of "negative mobilization" and "value decline" (i.e., an increase in irritation and fatigue, and emerging unity of citizens on

this basis into a "nihilistic consensus" as opposed to constructive values) and concludes that there is "no clear value position" (2005).

A. A. Golov based on the value modules of an international marketing survey, compared the values of the population of Russia and the United States (Golov, 1997). In another paper, he turned to the values of friendship and noted a discrepancy between the respondents' behavior and the expression of this value (Golov, 1995). Yet another study (Golov & Grazhdankin 2001) drew some interesting conclusions about the "life principles" of different social groups of Russians, placing these groups in the context of two value dimensions, namely "local – universal" and "egocentrism – theocentrism".

M. S. Ordzhonikidze analyzed the socio-political values of Russians (2007). D. V. Sapunkov (1999) derived value dimensions based on factor analysis, which coincided with Schwartz's higher-order dimensions, and identified four categories of respondents' orientations on this basis: Consumers, Achievers, Creators, and Savers. N. Zorkaya and N. Duk (2003) analyzed the values of Russian youth.

In 2006 the Institute for Comparative Social Research (Andreenkova, 2007) repeated on a representative Russian sample a nationwide survey conducted in 1986 (initial survey was conducted under the supervision of I.T. Levykin). They demonstrated changes in a number of human values. Firstly, over 20 years the value of "family" and "marriage" decreased, and instead "financial well-being" and "everyday comfort" took the first place. Second, the value of "interesting work" became less pronounced relative to other values and the value of labor had almost completely disappeared – apparently, the only use of labor for Russians was now its financial rewards. Among the criteria of social status, Russians began to value material security much higher, and the importance of "respect of others," on the contrary, dropped by 20%. Thirdly, among the factors of life success, "diligence" that was previously considered universal was replaced by "education"; the importance of "honesty", "decency", "mutual help", "responsibility", "unselfishness" decreased, and the importance of "fortune", various "connections" and support of relatives, as well as such qualities as leadership, ambition, and talent increased.

Comparing "goals and aspirations" of Russian and Polish students, T. Zaritsky (2006) concluded that for Russians "great wealth and privileges", "high status", "bright, full of impressions life" were more important, and "public benefits" and what people call "realization of certain values" are less important.

A series of phenomena close to values was studied by A.G. Zdravomyslov (1998). For example, in the study of young people the preferences of "moral and psychological qualities" were

studied; among the suggested ones the most popular were "intelligence", "kindness", and "humor", and the least popular were "beauty", "originality", and "strength".

There is also a large number of diverse studies focusing on certain types of values (labor, military, religious, etc.), on certain social groups (young people, regions, students, etc.). In this vein, V.S. Magun (1995) studied labor values in Russia and many other countries using World Values Survey data. He came to conclusion that instrumental attitudes to labour strengthened as did value of salary (both in absolute scale and compared to other countries). L. Zubova (1998) studied labor values of scientific workers; S. Solovyov (1996) studied values of military service among army recruits; V. E. Boykov (2004) describes sociopolitical attitudes defined by him as values; P. A. Mikheev (2005) described the dynamics of human values of rural youth; E. S. Elbakyan and S. V. Medvedko (2001) focused on the connection of religious values and sociopolitical attitudes; A.S.Antipova (2007) on Islamic values in connection with the adoption of "secular" orientations; V.V.Gavrilyuk and N.A.Trikoz (2002) described intergenerational gaps using a survey of the school students and their parents and N.Lapin's methodology; L.Z.Safiullina and N.V.Zotkin (2007) tried to find differences between conscious and unconscious values based on the Rokeach and Lusher methods.

Andreenkova (1994) used the data of the World Values Survey and compared the values of Russians with the values of the population of several dozen other countries, noting the high frequency of materialism (according to Inglehart indices). The author also compared two value indices of her own, capturing materialism/postmaterialism and authoritarian/liberal values, noting that while Russians are ahead of all other countries on the first dimension (i.e. they are most focused on economic security as opposed to "environmental" values), on the second index they fall close to countries such as Denmark and Sweden, that is they demonstrate a fairly high level of liberal values. There is also a negative correlation between the expression of post-materialistic values and age and level of education, as well as a lack of connection with social class and income level, refuting Inglehart's conclusions in the latter point.

B.Z. Doktorov (1994) was one of the first in Russia to publish the results of comparative studies of "socio-cultural space" obtained within the framework of the Research Institute for Social Change (RISC). The main result of this international research was a socio-cultural map, the location of countries on which "allows us to judge the degree of proximity of value structures of consciousness of representatives of different communities". In this socio-cultural space, Russia was located close to Italy, France, and Czechoslovakia. According to the RISC methodology, the entire population of Europe was divided into 10 socio-cultural groups by 10% in each, and the difference in the sizes of these groups in different countries is regarded as the characteristics of the population of this country. In Russia in 1991-1992 group 2 "energetic and following their

understanding of duty" (orderly professionals) and group 4 "collectivists, adherents of established norms" (conservative, ideological) were increased, and 7 "self-oriented and impulsive seekers" (young nonconformists), 9 "withdrawn to own problems" and 10 "lonely and poor" (total concentration on material problems) were decreased. The other groups were represented in Russia to the same extent as in Europe as a whole, from which the conclusion is made that Russians "are characterized, on the one hand, by a high level of collectivism and a focus on fulfilling social norms... and, on the other hand, they are less characterized by a wish to break away from their environment than Europeans are." The author also developed his own classification of socio-cultural groups, which further emphasized the collectivistic features of Russians. It is also noted that while most European countries in the 1990s were characterized by a convergence of values, that is, their unification, this trend did not apply to the Russian population, according to the author's hypothesis.

In this study, indicators and methodology of construction of value parameters were not disclosed, so it is not possible to fully understand the meaning of these axes, to make sure the methodology is reliable (a necessary requirement for the possibility of falsification according to Popper), as well as to compare the results obtained here with the results of other studies.

Systematic research led by M.K. Gorshkov and N.E. Tikhonova focused on the study of various social processes and phenomena - such as modernization, poverty, identity - and actively used the concept of values in this context (see, for example, "Russian identity in the sociological dimension", 2008; Tikhonova, 2008a; 2008b; 2009). In the recent publications, values had also begun to be considered in a comparative perspective: data from Russian surveys were compared with the results of the World Values Survey, with some WVS questions being included in the Russian questionnaire and thus enabling the study of values measured by an "international standard". The authors made a number of important conclusions, first, about the specificity of the values of the Russians relative to the population of other countries in the world, for example, about the external locus of control of the Russians, the low importance of tolerance, and high important of hard work and perseverance (relative to other countries of the world). Second, they described the heterogeneity of the Russian population in terms of their values. In particular, there are differences in values among different age, educational, and professional groups. The general conclusion is that, despite a more "modernized" worldview of young people, "automatically, as generations change... the socio-cultural modernization of Russia will not be completed", because even among Russian youth there are too few (compared with other countries) "modernists". Special attention was paid to the values of democracy (Tikhonova, 2008a).

1.4. Hypotheses of the current study

There is a number of overlapping and complementary conclusions about the values of the Russians, which allow us to compile a general profile of the values of the Russian population.

On the one hand, Russians are characterized by a more pronounced orientation towards close relationships with the social environment (Inkeles), a desire to belong to a guarding corporation that provides security (Hofstede), belonging to a collective (Schwartz), a desire for certainty and stability (Hofstede), characterized by external locus of control and greater value of ascription at the expense of achievement (Trompenaars). On the other hand, Russians are characterized by a high level of distrust of others (Inkeles, McCrae), high authority of the state and rationality (Inglehart), predominance of the importance of personal motives over public ones (Trompenaars), high hierarchy of relationships (Hofstede, Schwartz, GLOBE). This set of features of Russians can be characterized as "vertical collectivism" (in the terms of H. Triandis), which is characterized by closer relations within the ingroup and heightened hostility towards all outgroups, whereby the ingroup is very large and inequality is taken for granted by its members and relations within group are very close and complicated. To achieve something in such a "big family" means to occupy a higher position in the hierarchy, to squeeze others, to rely on personal ties and to be more emotionally controlled, to declare loyalty and honesty (as opposed to tolerance and politeness, which are perceived as hypocrisy). Those who occupy higher positions in this hierarchy are disliked (Inkeles) and feared (Hofstede) but seek to attain a high-status position in their ingroup through connections and "clan" relations. The scarcity of resources in such a situation exacerbates this hierarchy and the struggle for power (which alone possesses resources) - the necessity of this position is reflected in the high prevalence of Power Distance *practices* and extremely low *value* of Power Distance (according to GLOBE). This is the shortest portrait of Russians based on the overlapping descriptions in different approaches.

Based on the characteristics of Russians' basic values reported in the existing research, as well as using the results of our study of the Ukrainian's values (Magun & Rudnev, 2007), we can expect that:

H1. Compared to the population of most European countries, Russians attach greater importance to the values of material well-being and security.

Various studies did not consider Russian values as a unique phenomenon and very different countries fell into the same value "clusters" together with Russia, often these are postsocialist countries or Eastern European countries, based on which we formulate the following hypothesis.

H2. The population of Russia is similar in its basic values to the population of other postsocialist European countries.

According to the conclusions of a number of domestic researchers, Russia's population is fragmented in terms of values, on the basis of which the third hypothesis emerged.

H3. The population of Russia, like the population of other European countries, is heterogeneous in its basic values - there is a value majority and value minorities.

The aim of the study, reflected in its title, is to identify similarities and differences between the basic values of the Russian population and the values of the population of other European countries. A number of shortcomings of the described studies of values, including both their theoretical background and methodology and strategies for the analysis of basic values, set the following objectives:

1) Analyze domestic and foreign scientific literature on the comparative study of basic values, including the values of Russians;

2) compare the basic values of Russians with the values of the population of other European countries at the level of country averages in order to: (a) identify the similarities and nature of differences in basic values between the average Russian and the average representatives of other European countries; (b) identify the similarities and differences between the hierarchy of basic values of the average Russian and the value hierarchies of average representatives of other countries;

3) compare the basic values of Russians with the values of the population of other European countries, taking into account the within-country variance of values;

4) identify differences in basic values between Russia and the other European countries, controlling for influences from the differences in the social composition of the population of different countries (they are also called "unbiased", or "adjusted");

5) compare the degree of influence of country affiliation and socio-demographic characteristics on basic values.

Chapter 2: Research Methods

2.1 Methodological and empirical basis of the study

Choice of theoretical approach. In the previous sections we have shown that the most methodologically sound approach to the study of values in a comparative perspective is the approach of Schwartz, because it is (a) based on theory (rather than derived from specific data), (b) confirmed and adjusted by a broad cross-cultural study, (c) takes into account the most modern requirements for this kind of research (for example, value parameters are distinguished at two levels – country and individual). The main disadvantage of this approach is that it is validated only on small samples of specific groups (teachers and students), but the only alternative to it – the R.Inglehart's approach based on representative samples - turns out to be even more problematic because of the low reliability of the value dimensions and their narrow focus. Schwartz, on the other hand, provides a strong argument that his theory covers the entire range of values recognized by people in different cultures. It follows that the use of this theory in cross-cultural research (provided values are used as indicators of cultural differences) can lead to the most complete description of cultural differences. As the latter is one of the key tasks of this work, preference was given to Schwartz's approach.

Selection of the dataset. Currently, there are three international datasets that have information collected using Schwartz instruments and include data on Russia.

First, it is the Schwartz Values Survey (SVS), which includes data from 74 countries, student and teacher samples (about 200 respondents each in every country) as well as other populations. It is based on Schwartz's original methodology of rating 56 values in two lists on a nine-point scale (see previous section). The main advantage of this dataset is that it is based on the original and sufficiently detailed methodology, allowing for a high degree of reliability in capturing ten clearly separated values at the individual level and seven at the cultural level. The main disadvantage of this array is that it is based on small and specific samples, which leads to unrepresentativeness of the data. As we have shown above, the data collected on different specific samples according to Schwartz's methodology in Russia diverged greatly, which indicates the dependence of the research results on the specificity of the sample. Consequently, such samples cannot reflect the values of the country's entire population.

Another international data set containing information on values measured by the Schwartz methodology is the European Social Survey (ESS). The values module of this survey questionnaire includes a shortened version of the Portrait Questionnaire. This array has a number of advantages: the research is conducted every two years, starting in 2002 (4 waves have already been conducted), the study is based on representative samples and includes, besides the values part, tens of modules

focused on various aspects from the subjective well-being to the electoral behavior. There are, however, disadvantages: the range of countries where the study was conducted is limited to Europe, and the Portrait Questionnaire does not coincide with the original methodology; due to the parsimonious nature of the questionnaire, there are problems with the measurement of all ten values.

The third data set is the Schwartz module in the fifth round of the World Values Survey (WVS), its questionnaire included an even shorter version of the Portrait Questionnaire. The advantages of this data are clear – the large range of countries from different continents (more than 40 worldwide); the representative samples; the ability to compare with Inglehart's value dimensions at the individual level; and the inclusion of Schwartz's value dimensions in the broader context of value measurement. The crucial weakness of these data is that the 10-item shortened version of the Portrait Questionnaire barely measures one or two integral dimensions of values and also has significant cross-country comparability issues.

So, there are three arrays, SVS has very specific samples and hardly allows to judge the specificity of the population of the whole country, but has a very precise instrument; WVS has representative samples in many countries, but has a very crude instrument hardly allowing to reveal cross-country differences. The ESS data, on the other hand, represent a compromise, covering a large number of European countries with representative samples and including an instrument that allows – with a sufficient degree of reliability – to measure differences between countries and individuals on individual values. In this regard, the main data set on which most comparisons will be made will be the ESS dataset.

European Social Survey has been carried out every two years since 2002, immediately after collection and cleaning the data are made publicly available, allowing researchers to investigate the latest sociological material. ESS is based on representative samples, between 1,500 and 3,000 respondents are interviewed in each of the European countries. It includes 20-25 countries, with each new wave including more countries. Moreover, ESS is one of the most methodologically sophisticated cross-cultural surveys to the moment. It is a vivid example of an *etic* approach to cross-cultural research; its team seeks to use universal categories comparable across different countries and cultures. Specific work within methodological research is undertaken to improve the comparability of data obtained through the ESS, including: controlling for a rigorous *etic* approach to questionnaire design, controlling for back translation of the questionnaire, and post hoc tests (i.e. those undertaken after data collection) such as cognitive tests for cross-cultural understanding of the same questions (Saris, 2008), tests for equivalence by structural equation modeling methods such as multiple group confirmatory factor analysis (Davidov, 2008), and many more (see Jowell

et al., 2007). ESS was awarded the Descartes Prize in 2005 for the high quality of the data provided, the first social science project in the history of this prize.

Sampling. The total sample of each wave is more than 40.000 respondents. In countries that have a nationwide registry of its residents, a simple random sample has been drown, so that any resident of the country had an equal chance to become a respondent. In other countries that do not have a unified register of residents (such as Russia), random selection was made at the macro, and then at the micro level consecutively (Jowell *et al.,* 2007). In Russia, the sample was constructed in several stages. In the first stage, voting regional units were randomly selected in each of the 11 macro-regions. In the second stage, a list of households was compiled on the basis of voter lists, and from these, specific households were randomly selected. The interviewer received questionnaires with the prescribed address, and the choice of one household member to be interviewed was made by means of random numbers. The survey used a face-to-face interviewing technique, which is the best for long interviews, although it is also the most expensive. Up to five interviewer visits were undertaken to interview an absent or refusing respondent. Deviations from the ideal randomness of the respondent's participation in the sample were corrected using a special sampling weight.

The bulk of the analysis in our paper is based on data from the 3rd round of the European Social Survey conducted in 2006 in 25 European countries, including Russia. To maximize the number of countries used in the analysis, data from other rounds was added – for those countries that did not participate in round 3. Round 1 had a sample for Israel; round 2 included samples for Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Turkey, and the Czech Republic. This "mixing" of data from different time points is acceptable because, first, according to Schwartz, values change extremely slowly, and, second, data from those countries that participated in all three waves of the ESS confirm the high stability of the values measurements in this project. As a result of the described extension, the total sample of the study included 59,100 respondents in 31 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and the UK. In Russia, the sample size was 2,437. Sample sizes in each of the countries are shown in Appendix, Table 3. Samples were random, stratified random, or clustered stratified random, each resident of the ESS member states over 15 years of age had an equal chance of being sampled, if this principle was violated, it was adjusted by using a design weight.

Data weighting. Two weights were used in the ESS: one to correct for the design effect and one to correct for the size of the country's population (Ganninger, 2007).

In some countries, ensuring equal chances of each resident to be included in the sample could not be ensured, hence some samples over- or under-represent residents of certain areas or localities. The design effect weight is a normalized inversion of the probability of a given respondent being included in the sample, and corrects for the 'non-randomness' of that person being included in the sample. This weight is used in all calculations based on ESS data. Design effect weights were not available at the time of data calculation for Romania and Latvia included in the ESS, so this correction was not carried out for respondents from these countries. The European Social Survey's study of the effect of weights correcting for country sample biases due to unreached respondents showed that over-weighting tends not to affect the results of data analysis too significantly (see Vehovar & Zupanic, 2007; Billiet, 2007).

European countries vary greatly in the size of their populations, while the sample sizes in each country do not vary that much. In order to get reliable data for, say, Eastern Europe as a whole, it is necessary to adjust the contribution of each country's population to the overall indicator – because the samples are similar in size, Slovakia and Russia, for example, will give the same contribution, which does not correspond to reality, as Russia's population is several times larger than Slovakia's. To correct for population size, a special weight is introduced in the ESS and is used when calculating a single score for two or more countries (including Europe as a whole).

The Schwartz Portrait Value Questionnaire. In the ESS basic human values are measured using a shortened version of the *Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ)*. The Portrait Value Questionnaire was developed as an alternative value measurement tool firstly as evidence of the independence of Schwartz's theory from a particular instrument and its ability to measure these values has been confirmed – even in samples where the original Schwartz instrument (SVS) "failed". This was due to the less abstract wording of this questionnaire (Schwartz *et al.*, 2001). The Rokeach and Schwartz instruments, which are lists of words and phrases with specification, have been criticized repeatedly for their abstractness, with critics noting that ordinary people rarely think in such abstract terms. The portrait questionnaire, on the other hand, came closer to the respondent's understanding, and Schwartz noted that even the least educated and culturally "distant" from the Western prototype, such as Ugandan adolescent girls, did not have any difficulty completing it (Ibid.). The use of indirect wordings derived directly from the meaning of the 10 basic values (rather than from the previous questionnaire) showed that the theory was dealing with values not necessarily understood by the respondent. Finally, despite the use of the new instrument, the structure (both the classification of items into types of values and the interrelationship of values) remained the same and became even clearer - that is, as predicted by the theory. The last conclusion points to the independence of Schwartz's derived structure of basic values from the way it was measured.

The portrait questionnaire is a set of 21 value portraits of people; the respondent was asked to rate the portraits in terms of its similarity to them on a 6-point scale ranging from "Very much like me" to "Not at all like me", which was then converted to a numerical scale. The instructions were as follows:

"Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you."

Schwartz argues that comparing others to oneself (rather than oneself to others) fixes the respondent's attention on the value characteristics of others (rather than one's own qualities), forcing one to look at oneself from the outside, which is the reason for such wording (Schwartz *et al.,* 2001). Here is an example of a value portrait:

"*It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that might endanger his safety."* (Aimed at measuring value of Safety)[24] .

The portrait questionnaire was created and designed to measure the importance of 10 individual basic values. It measures 9 values using two value portraits each, while the value of *Universalism* is measured using three portraits as it is the most complex construct (Ibid.).

2.2 Value indices

Our study is built on the analysis of three types of value indices, which are aggregates of the same respondents' answers, but have different levels of generalization: they are baseline indices, value indices, and higher-order value dimensions.

Raw scores ("first level" indices). The simplest way to use the available data is to compare the distributions of respondents' raw assessments of the 21 value portraits. Each of the value portraits carries a characteristic of a particular value, and its evaluation by the respondent indicates the importance of this value for them. Assuming the continuity of the scale (recall that a 6-point interval scale was used), or more precisely, the equality of the intervals between the points on the scale, we calculated the average of each of the value portraits across different groups (for example, among genders) and compared them to each other. By applying a centering procedure to these values to remove the effects of response style (see below), these values can be used to meaningfully enrich the main analysis, as at this level we have non-aggregated, baseline information about values. Hereafter, we will refer to these indicators as *raw scores*.

Value indices ("second level" indices). The portrait questionnaire, as we have already mentioned, is designed to capture ten basic values, but even Schwartz himself pointed out that 21 portraits are insufficient for that. Two or three portraits are insufficient to clearly measure an individual value, so that reliability scores in different samples turn out to be quite low (Schwartz,

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[24] A complete list of value portraits is provided in Appendix, Table 2.

2002). Schwartz, as well as critics of the Portrait Questionnaire and its application in the ESS (Davidov, 2008; Saris, 2008), saw a solution to this problem in enlarging the number of value indicators and reducing the number of countries in which comparisons are undertaken. Only in this way, according to Davidov, can comparability of value index can be ensured, guaranteeing the reliability of their measurement.

The value indices were calculated as the average of the ratings of several value portraits given by the respondent; then a correction was made for the average level of responses. There is a particular individual tendency among different cultures to work with a particular scale, a particular response style. In Greece and Turkey, for example, respondents are more likely to note their similarity to others, while those in Sweden, Norway, and Iceland are more likely to note their dissimilarity *to all* of the portraits. These features of the scale can give false information about values, so Schwartz suggested correcting for this response style with a centering procedure. Centering is the subtraction of the average of all ratings for a given respondent from their scores on the value indices. This helps to circumvent the tendency of different respondents to respond in only one part of the scale. So, the index value is the centered average of the scores of several value portraits.

Because values are measured in the questionnaire on a 6-point ordinal scale and then averages are calculated from this data - that is, the variables are treated as if they were interval - the problem of moving from an ordinal to an interval scale arises. Schwartz did not see this as a problem, and the centering procedure does not suggest options to solve this problem. Also, unfortunately, no special tests have been undertaken to show the equality of "distances" between the various items on the scale. Since this cannot be proven at this stage, we accept the assumption of an interval level of this essentially ordinal scale.

Let us determine the optimal number of value indices that can be used for the analysis of cultural differences. On the one hand, we are interested in the largest number of indices possible for a more comprehensive coverage of cultural differences, on the other hand, there are limitations associated with the insufficiency of 21 assessments to highlight all 10 value indicators and related comparability problems. E. Davidov identified from 5 to 8 different values in different countries of the three rounds of the ESS (Davidov, Schmidt, & Schwartz, 2008; Davidov, 2008a; Davidov, 2008b), but stopped at seven for a number of countries from Round 3, including Russia. Saris excluded the values of Tradition and Power from the analysis and transformed Universalism into Justice, thus deviating from Schwartz theory. Based on the first-round ESS data, Schwartz argued for 7 to 10 different values. The above-mentioned authors pointed to an overlap of closely related values which confirms Schwartz's theory. That said, Schwartz argues that "Ideally, a structural analysis such as those reported here [multidimensional scaling] should be undertaken with the data

from any new sample before constructing indexes for each value type. This would reveal the actual value types implicitly distinguished in the sample and the specific values that constitute them, " (Schwartz, 1992, p. 57). Following this advice, Figure 2.1 shows the results of multivariate scaling (PROXSCAL algorithm in SPSS) of the initial estimates of value portraits in the ESS data.[25] It can be seen that, as in the abovementioned papers, items that are most often mixed belong to (a) *Tradition* and *Conformity*, (b) *Power* and *Achievement*, (c) *Universalism* and *Benevolence, (d) Hedonism* and *Stimulation*. Therefore, we combined the initial items belonging to the first three value pairs into three general value indicators, which will be named, respectively: *Conformity-Tradition*, *Self-Enhancement*, *Self-Transcendence*.

Figure 2.1. Results of multidimensional scaling (PROXSCAL) of 21 initial items. Areas in this space are drawn based on the space construction algorithm – in the form of rays from zero coordinates.

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[25] The approximation quality metrics in this case are high (Normalized Raw Stress, NRS=0.006, DAF=0.994, Tuker's CC=0.997) and the model is thus generally acceptable.

Cronbach's alpha reliability (internal consistency) coefficients of indices are shown in Table 2.1. Combining *Tradition* and *Conformity, as* well as *Universalism* and *Benevolence*, which had low reliability indices separately, resulted in reliable aggregated indices. In the *Power* and *Achievement* pair, the first index had extremely low reliability, the second - quite high, but when they are combined, reliability increased even more. Due to the fact that it is highly undesirable to use an indicator with a reliability level less than 0.5 and due to the fact that the initial items of these indicators were mixed together in the multidimensional scaling space, combining this pair into one indicator seemed acceptable.

As for the last pair of values, *Hedonism* and *Stimulation*, they had high reliability coefficients separately (0.70 and 0.63, respectively), despite the mixed location of their items in the space of multidimensional scaling (Figure 2.1). Therefore, combining the pair of indicators *Hedonism* and *Stimulation* was not necessary.

Let us also note a low level of reliability for the *Self-Direction* index. However, its association with similar values was not likely because of the significantly different meaning of this value and in accordance with the meaning – a separate area in the value space (Figure 2.1). Therefore, we will use this index separately, but we will pay special attention to the analysis of its constituent baseline indicators.

Table 2.1. Reliability (internal consistency) indices of the seven value indices used and six indices that were not included in the analysis

	Cronbach's Alpha	Number of starting points
Conformity-Tradition	**0.65**	**4**
Self-Enhancement (Power + Achievement)	**0.73**	**4**
Self-Transcendence (Universalism + Benevolence)	**0.72**	**5**
Hedonism	**0.70**	**2**
Stimulation	**0.63**	**2**
Self-Direction	**0.46**	**2**
Security	**0.61**	**2**
Tradition	*0.39*	*2*
Conformity	*0.55*	*2*
Power	*0.45*	*2*
Achievement	*0.72*	*2*
Universalism	*0.58*	*3*
Benevolence	*0.59*	*2*

Calculated on samples of 55,137 to 56,125 respondents, depending on the indicator, sample sizes vary due to missing values.

So, we will use a value model that includes seven observed basic values that can be captured by the available tool. Let us denote the meaning of the new value indices.

Two of them reflect the poles of one of the axes of value, according to Schwartz's theory: *Self-Transcendence*, which emphasizes focus on others and overcoming one's own egoistic wishes, is opposed to the value of *Self-Enhancement*, which brings one's own well-being to the fore.

Tradition and *Conformity* have never been clearly separated (in Schwartz's circle they are in the same sector), and their separation was due to the theoretical postulate about the difference in their motivational goals, which, however, has not been confirmed empirically. *Conformity-Tradition* values emphasize the importance of social rules and norms and the insignificance of an individual's desires and motivations.

In what follows, to avoid confusion with value dimensions and raw scores, we will refer to the seven value indices described in this subsection *as value indices.*

Higher-order value dimensions (indices of the "third level"). A number of modern methodologists discuss two types of indices: *formative*, i.e. formed a priori, and *reflective* indicators reflecting the structure of specific empirical data, and derived directly from the existing data set. In the case of formative indicators, specific empirical data are used to calculate indices according to ready-made formulas; empirical data are only "signals" included in the theoretical model, confirming or refuting hypotheses about the relationships of theoretical constructs with external variables. In the case of reflective indicators, theory is also used to develop empirical measurements, but the empirical data collected are treated as "tabula rasa". In other words, this approach does not assume that a priori indicators capture precisely the content areas that have been attributed to them by the researcher but leaves this question open and suggests testing it empirically. Both approaches and both types of indicators have a number of advantages and disadvantages, which are widely debated (e.g., Howell et al., 2007), but it is generally agreed that in an ideal situation these indicators should coincide, while in a real situation both types of indices are preferable.

In defining the optimal number of values in the previous subsection, we applied a mixed approach – on the one hand, we tried to preserve the theoretical structure and the maximum number of value indicators, on the other hand, adjusted this structure to the specific empirical data. In deriving the value axes, we will apply this approach directly.

Schwartz, describing higher-order values proposed to calculate them also as four aggregated value indices (Self-Enhancement, Conservation, Self-Transcendence, Openness to Change) and then - to obtain dimensions - subtract values for some categories from others (Self-Enhancement minus Self-Transcendence, Conservation minus Openness to Change). Such

indicators are formative, and it is not known whether they exist in the ESS data. Let us derive reflective indicators to check the validity of using formative ones and compare them with each other.

As can be seen from Figure 2.1, the overall configuration of the raw scores indicates the existence of two value axes in our data - the values of *Security* and *Conformity-Tradition* are opposed to the values of *Self-Direction*, *Stimulation,* and *Hedonism*, and *Self-Enhancement* is opposed to *Self-Transcendence.* We conducted a factor analysis to clarify this structure. We took 21 uncentered raw scores as indicator variables and found three factors describing 45.0% of the variance by the principal component method (without rotation). A matrix of factor loadings is shown in Appendix, Table 4. All items had high loadings on the first factor which represents response style. It is also confirmed by high correlation of individual values for this factor with the individual mean for all responses (which was used in the centering procedure), *r=0*.99. Factor loadings for the second and third factor are presented in Figure 2.2.

Conformity, Tradition and *Security* are at the positive pole of the second factor, they all are part *Conservation*. *Stimulation, Hedonism, Self-Direction are at* the negative pole of this factor and they all are part of *Openness to Change*. Thus, the second factor represents the value axis *Openness to Change – Conservation*, but with important clarifications: on the positive pole, besides the values of *Conservation*, there are also the values of *Self-Transcendence* with lower loadings, and on the negative pole, which mostly represents *Openness to Change, Self-Enhancement* have loadings as well.

The third factor similarly reflects the higher-order value dimension *Self-Transcendence – Self-Enhancement*. Lower but still important loadings relate the negative pole (*Self-Transcendence)* of this factor to *Openness to change*, and the positive pole *(Self-Enhancement)* to the *Conservation* items.

In such configuration, the second and third factors reflected the value dimensions proposed by Schwartz, with some modification of the secondary loadings, which in turn refers back to Schwartz's idea of continuity of value domain. It is important to note here that these additional correlations did not emerge by chance, because, for example, the *Conservation* pole (the second factor) could have *Self-Enhancement items for* secondary loadings, but instead there were the values of *Self-Transcendence* attached to *Conservation*. A substantive interpretation of this result can be expressed as a hypothesis: when the most important (terminal) are the values of *Conservation*, the auxiliary (instrumental) values tend to be those of *Self-Transcendence*; and similarly with respect to all the other poles.

Figure 2.2. Factor loadings of the second and third factors based on the 21 original value items.

The individual factor scores for the second and third factors are reflective indices in their pure form, reflecting only the structure of the data and unrelated to theoretical postulates. Let us now compare the formative (higher-order value indices) and reflective (individual factor scores) value indices. The correlation of the two indicators of the *Openness to Change – Conservation* at the individual level is 0.91, and the correlation of the two indices of the *Self-Transcendence – Self-Enhancement* axis is 0.77. At the same time, the *Openness to Change – Conservation* factor scores of also correlated significantly and negatively with the *Self-Transcendence – Self-Enhancement* scores, r=-0.56, which reflects the "secondary" loadings described above.

As we can see, the value indices of the two types did not coincide but turned out to be quite close to each other. On the one hand, this confirms the applicability of Schwartz's theory to our data, on the other hand, it raises the question of which type of indicators should be used in the analysis.

To measure the higher order value dimensions, we decided to use reflective indices, that is, individual factor scores for the second and third factors. First, these indices reflect the empirical structure of the data rather than the hypothetical one; the hypothetical one is already reflected in the seven value indices which we also plan to use. Second, these indices are orthogonal, that is, independent of each other; they already incorporate existing value relationships. To avoid confusion, we will hereafter refer to the individual factor values of the second and third factors of the described factor analysis, reflecting the values *of Openness to Change - Conservation* and *Self-Transcendence - Self-Enhancement* with the indicated secondary loadings as *value axes*.

<center>***</center>

So, in our analysis we will use three types of value indices, namely: 21 raw scores (initial respondent answers, centered), seven value indices (averages over several raw scores), and two value axes (individual factor scores of the second and third factors of the factor analysis described above).

Due to the fact that the scale presented in the questionnaire had a reverse order of categories (1 - "very similar", 6 - "not similar at all"), all indicators initially characterized "dissimilarity" with these portraits, or "non-importance" of the corresponding values. For convenience in further analysis, the scales at all levels of analysis were reversed, i.e. higher values of indices indicated greater similarity and importance of values.

Comparability of value indicators. E. Davidov (Davidov, 2008a, 2008b) tested for equivalence the value structure across different countries and rounds of ESS using multi-group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA). He pointed out the limitations of the shortened version of the Portrait Values Questionnaire to measure all ten values. Davidov discussed three levels of indicator equivalence (invariance): configural invariance indicated that individual items of the measurement instrument represent the same configuration of loadings across all countries and time points in the study; metric invariance indicates how closely the items correspond to value indices across countries allowing comparison of relationships between values and other theoretical constructs; scalar invariance indicates exact matching of the original item configurations across countries and allows comparing latent means. Using MGCFA, Davidov tested the Schwartz scale on three rounds of ESS data, finding support for configural invariance for nearly all values and all countries and metric invariance for several countries (including Russia) with aggregated value factors. We adopted the pattern by which Davidov combined value items to achieve metric invariance. Davidov also discussed the lack of scalar invariance of this scale in general. At the same time, a high degree of comparability has been shown with respect to the higher-order value dimensions.

B. Saris and D. Knoppen (2008) argued that the Davidov test was too strict and proposed another way to check the comparability of data - cognitive tests. First, they conducted a linguistic analysis of the value portraits, screening out the *Tradition* and *Power* indices on the basis of semantic inconsistency and excluding the item about caring for nature from the *Universalism* index. Then, based on MGCFA, they conducted an invariance analysis and found different levels of invariance for different values, up to metric for *Self-Transcendence*, and barely finding configural for the others. To test invariance, the authors also compared the relationships of values with other variables across countries and concluded that these relationships were the same in all countries. Nevertheless, they did not make an unambiguous conclusion about the comparability of the data on this scale, indicating a broader applicability than suggested by Davidov.

S. Schwartz also tested the ESS value scale for comparability across countries and applied multidimensional scaling for this purpose, showing that the relationships between the value indicators remain stable across countries (Schwartz, 2007).

How the value indices could be compared across countries directly depends on the approach to test the invariance, equivalence, or comparability. Our review of the literature showed that the decision to use seven value indices would, in general, satisfy various critics mentioned, similarly, the use of two value axes would not raise many questions. Therefore, in the following analysis we will use the seven value indices without abandoning the value axes and enriching our analysis with the original 21 raw scores.

2.3 General data analysis strategy

The general strategy of data analysis is based on the separation of two levels of value measurement – group and individual. The differences between the two are significant, since even the relationships between values do not coincide at the different levels (Smith & Schwartz, 1996). Since it is the differences between the countries that are the focus of our attention, *a comparison of the values of the average* representatives of different European countries is undertaken first. Value indices means reflect the kind of value priorities prevailing in each of the countries and make it possible to demonstrate between-country differences and interpret them in connection with country characteristics. Comparisons at the level of averages can be very convenient as most of the economic, social, and demographic indicators are available at the country level. For example, country averages of value indicators can be compared with the level of GDP per capita or with the level of democratization. This is something that cannot be done at the individual level.

Most of the analysis, however, should be conducted at the individual level. First, the value measures used in the ESS are primarily aimed at capturing individual-level values. As we noted above, Schwartz has developed specific measures to examine values at the country level that do not coincide with individual-level measures (Schwartz, 2008), although other work notes that

country averages of different values *can* act as a characteristic of culture (Schwartz, 1992). Second, country averages mask the heterogeneity of values among residents of each country, reflecting either the most general trend, i.e. the values of the majority, and ignoring significant minorities ("mean temperature of patients in a hospital"), where different values of several groups in the same society add up to a non-existent and meaningless average. To avoid such averaging and, on the other hand, to capture the very heterogeneity and its magnitude across countries, the values of the population should be analyzed at the individual level within each country. Third, given the close ties between European countries and their cultural proximity, the development of communications, etc., we refuse to accept the assumption of the leading role of residence in a particular country for the formation of values. In this connection, we propose to consider the attribute of residence in a given country as one of the individual characteristics (similar to, e.g., occupation, education and gender). Such an approach provides additional information about the strength of the influence of residence in a particular country. In other words, we test the strength of this influence using empirical data instead of taking this assumption.

The main direction of our analysis is the search for similarities and differences in the basic human values of Russians and other Europeans, first at the country (aggregate) level, then at the individual level. After differences and similarities are shown, we will turn to the causes of these differences.

Country as a unit of analysis. The topic of our paper indicates that it will focus on cross-country comparisons. This is true, and the analysis of values at the individual level does not contradict nor forbids cross-country comparisons. On the contrary, making comparisons at the individual level brings us back to the issue of cross-country differences every time. Even by "destroying" the country as the most important unit of analysis, we do not exclude it, but use it all the time. The difference is that we do not begin from the country's influence on values, but empirically test it. In fact, when we move to the individual level of analysis, the country ceases to be the unit of analysis for us, becoming an ordinary variable from the respondent's passport.

In one case, we abandon the country as the unit of analysis even at the aggregate - country level. In the course of the analysis we noticed that it is reasonable to divide the sample of Estonian population into Russian- and Estonian-speaking parts, due to very substantial cultural and linguistic differences. The division of Estonian population by preferred language in the analysis of values was made according to the advice of Schwartz. Our comparisons (Rudnev, 2009) showed that among the four countries with a significant Russian-speaking population the largest value gap was observed exactly in Estonia. A more detailed analysis also showed that Estonia had the largest intracountry value gap among all the multicultural European countries. Accordingly, in further analysis Estonian population will be used as two separate units: Russian-speaking and Estonian-speaking population of Estonia.

2.4 Statistical methods used for data analysis

We apply a number of statistical methods in our data analysis. One of the main ones is the **one-factor ANOVA**, analysis of variance, which allows us to correctly test the equality of averages in several groups simultaneously. This is particularly useful for comparing averages on value indices in different countries, as well as in different socio-demographic groups. Often the t-test is erroneously used for this purpose, which allows comparing averages across two groups only (Kryshtanovski, 2007; Rencher, 2002). The ANOVA procedure yields an F-statistic whose level of significance indicates the discriminant power of the independent variable (i.e., indicating rejection of the null hypothesis of equality of means in *all* groups). In order to indicate partial *pairwise* differences between the means of all groups, so-called *post-hoc* tests are used, a number of which accept the assumption of equality of variances. Tamhane's *T2* test does not require equality of variance of the dependent variable in all groups, so this test will be used for testing pairwise differences.

Value distances. The aforementioned tests only check the presence of differences, while the size of differences on the metric variables can be captured by means of squares of differences between the averages for one group and those for the other. Since the size of differences for all values are of interest simultaneously, we will use the sum of squares of differences between the averages. The point of such an indicator is that it captures the actual value distances between two groups singled out by any criterion (e.g., countries) and simultaneously demonstrates the composition of these value distances – that is, it shows which values have made the greatest contribution to the value distance of one group from the other. In order to avoid cumbersome expressions and returning to the methodology of its calculation, we will call this indicator value distance.

Correlation coefficients. Two types of correlation coefficients are used in the paper. The first is the conventional Pearson correlation coefficient, which indicates linear relationships between two variables measured at the interval level. In this case, the requirements of the interval level of measurement of the variables are met. Another type of correlation coefficient used in the paper is the *gamma* rank correlation coefficient. This coefficient is applied to rank data, it is more conservative than the Spearman coefficient and is currently the most common to describe the relationships of rank data. In our work, it is used to test the relationships between the value hierarchies of different countries.

Also, factor, cluster and multiple regression analyses, widely described in the methodological literature, will be used in this work.

We use **factor analysis** in the form of principal component analysis without rotation to obtain value axes. It is well known that the factor rotation procedure simplifies the factor structure by tending to polarize the loadings on the same variables - thus, one variable cannot obtain sufficiently high loadings on two factors simultaneously. Such simplification can distort the actual

latent structure of interrelated variables. Loadings before rotation capture this structure without much distortion, giving a richer picture of the relationships.

Cluster analysis. Two types of cluster analysis are used: hierarchical and *k-means* (Hartigan, 1975). Hierarchical cluster analysis is usually used for a small number of cases, while giving a complete clustering picture (all variants of cluster solutions) in the form of a dendrogram. In our work, this procedure is used to cluster the average representatives of European countries based on their values.

The *k-means* cluster analysis will be used to construct clusters on a large number of cases, in our work, to create groups of individuals based on their basic human values. The main advantage of this method is that it allows us to cluster a very large number of cases. The main questions it poses to the researcher are how many clusters should be found (the necessary input information for this procedure) and how robust the cluster solution is. The answer to the first question is discussed in the statistical literature (Milligan & Cooper, 1985) and is often related to the meaningful interpretation of the resulting classifications. It can be addressed, for example, by tracking changes in the cluster distance coefficient, also referred to as "screeplot" or "elbow" plot. Recently, this principle has found a mathematical implementation in the form of *gap* statistic (Tibshirani, Walther, & Hastie, 2001). Regarding the stability issue, let us clarify that the widely criticized instability of the *k-means* procedure, is related to the original sorting of the data set. This means that re-run on the same data, but sorted differently, this procedure produces different results. In order to check the stability of our results, we conducted an auxiliary methodological experiment, in which the data was subjected to sorting by random variables, a cluster analysis procedure was performed on the data sorted in various ways. The shift of cluster centers, stability of cluster size, and "migration" of respondents from cluster to cluster were recorded. Both of these problems are discussed in detail in the corresponding section.

Multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity of independent variables were tested in **multiple regression analysis**, and the standard errors were corrected for robustness. Two different models are presented to ensure that the dependent variables are not independent: first model implies certain causal relationships, while the second model includes an extended list of independent variables that potentially might have opposite causal direction but are *likely* to have none. This is discussed in detail (including all parameters of regression models) in the relevant section.

Chapter 3. Basic Values of the Average Russian Compared to the Values of Average Representatives of The Other European Countries: Analysis of Aggregate Data

This chapter presents the results of the analysis of aggregated data, more specifically, a comparison of the country average values. In the first section, we constructed within-country value hierarchies and compared them to each other. The second subsection compares the average importance of the same values in different countries, thus revealing their similarities and differences, that is, between the basic values of average Russian and average representatives of the other European countries.

3.1. Hierarchy of values of average Russian and representatives of the other European countries

First of all, let us consider the value hierarchy of the average Russian, for which we obtain the average values of value indicators in Russia and analyze their relative score. As can be seen from Figure 3.1, the first place for Russians is the value of *Security*, followed by *Self-Transcendence*, *Self-Direction,* and *Conformity-Tradition*, followed by *Self-Enhancement* and the least important values for Russians are *Hedonism* and *Stimulation*.

Russia

Security	0,75
Self-Transcendence	0,42
Self-Direction	0,16
Conformity-Tradition	0,01
Self-Enhancement	-0,18
Hedonism	-0,73
Stimulation	-0,93

Figure 3.1. Hierarchy of basic human values of the average Russian (value indices), N=2,364.

Figure 3.2. Hierarchy of basic human values of the average Russian (raw scores). N=2,364.

Positive values in this hierarchy indicate that the values of *Security, Self-Transcendence* and *Self-Transcendence* are more important than the average of all value portraits, while negative values indicate the importance of *Self-Enhancement, Hedonism* and *Stimulation* are below the average.

If we turn to the hierarchy of the raw scores presented in Figure 3.2, we can see that it overlaps with the hierarchy of value indices but does not fully repeat it. The highest values with a large "gap" were received by the item "the state must provide security", next to which also comes the value "safe environment" included in the *Security* index, as well as "nature", "friendship" and "equality" included in the *Self-Transcendence* index. Rather predictably, the last positions in the hierarchy of initial evaluations are occupied by "fun", "good time", and "novelty", corresponding to the values of *Stimulation* and *Hedonism*. "Risk" occupies the last place with a large gap from the other values.

Let us now compare the value profiles of Russians and the average representatives of other European countries. Table 3.1 shows the rank correlation coefficients of the Russian value hierarchy with the hierarchies of the average representatives of the other countries included in the study, and Figure 3.3 shows the pan-European value hierarchy (value hierarchies of some other countries are given in the Appendix, Figure 1). The first thing to note is the high degree of similarity between the value hierarchies of all countries under consideration. The value hierarchies of average representatives of most European countries correlate significantly with the Russian one. Even the most dissimilar value hierarchies of Sweden, Denmark and a few other countries, which have no significant correlations with the Russian profile, nevertheless have certain similarities. This similarity extends to the hierarchies of all countries in Europe: the values aimed at the group welfare are more important than those aimed at individual wellbeing. The differences in the hierarchies are revealed by looking at the preferences within *the pairs of value*: for example, average representatives of the Nordic countries always put *Self-Transcendence* above *Security,* and *Stimulation* above *Self-Enhancement*, whereas in East Europe the value preferences are opposite.

Europe as a whole

Value	Coefficient
Self-Transcendence	0,57
Security	0,50
Self-Direction	0,25
Conformity-Tradition	0,01
Hedonism	-0,40
Self-Enhancement	-0,51
Stimulation	-0,78

Figure 3.3. Hierarchy of basic human values of the average European. N=57,184, data weighted by country size.

As the correlations between the value profile of the average Russian and the profiles of average representatives of other countries show, they are all positively related (no negative correlations), but there are countries with which the coefficients are insignificant and very small, "value antipodes" of the average Russian – Denmark, Sweden, France, the Netherlands, Iceland and others.

Table 3.1. Rank correlation coefficients of Russia's value profile with profiles of other countries

Country	Gamma coefficient	Level of significance p≤	Country	Gamma coefficient	Level of significance p≤
Romania	1,00	0.00			
Estonia (r.)	1,00	0.00	Latvia	0.71	0.02
Cyprus	0.90	0.00	Luxembourg	0.71	0.02
Slovakia	0.90	0.00	Estonia (e.)	0.71	0.02
Turkey	0.90	0.00	Germany	0.62	0.05
Ukraine	0.90	0.00	Norway	0.62	0.05
Czech Republic	0.90	0.00	Slovenia	0.62	0.05
Greece	0.90	0.01	Finland	0.62	0.05
Bulgaria	0.81	0.01	Switzerland	0.62	0.05
Hungary	0.81	0.01	Austria	0.60	0.06
Poland	0.81	0.01	Belgium	0.52	0.10
Portugal	0.81	0.01	Iceland	0.43	0.18
Spain	0.80	0.01	Netherlands	0.43	0.18
Ireland	0.79	0.02	France	0.43	0.18
UK	0.71	0.02	Sweden	0.43	0.18
Israel	0.71	0.02	Denmark	0.40	0.22

N=7. Ranking the seven values in each country followed a threshold of two standard errors of the mean (0.02), so that the means that had a smaller difference received intermediate ranks.

Small differences in value hierarchies are important because, according to Schwartz (2007), it is the relative importance of values that influences a person's attitudes and behavior the most.

Rokeach (1974) pointed to the stability of the relative importance of values in a country, while Inglehart (1990) pointed out that the hierarchy of values is stable only at the country level, by comparison, individual preferences are highly unstable. Schwartz and Bardi (2001) noted the great similarity of value hierarchies in very different countries (excluding, however, some African countries). They concluded that this is related to the normative framework of society as a whole. This is why, in all societies, values that prioritize group interests come first – these are the values endorsed by society *as a whole*. Of course, there are individuals whose values contradict the general group values, but such individuals can be sanctioned, and usually understand that their values differ from the socially desirable ones. In essence, the average country value hierarchy is an expression of a "socially desirable normative pattern" rather than one that is desired by individuals (ibid.). It follows that for the effective existence of society homogeneity of values among individuals does not matter much (as Parsons believed). Instead, what matters is the priority

in the collective hierarchy of values oriented towards the group over those oriented towards the interests of the individual.

3.2. Comparison of average representative of Russia with average representatives of other European countries according to seven value indices

Let us compare the average Russian with the average representatives of other European countries in terms of each of seven value indices. Table 3.2 presents similarities and differences between the values of the average Russian and the average representatives of other countries in terms of the seven value indices.

This description shows that most of the differences between Russia in terms of value indices and the other European countries are statistically significant and, consequently, more often differ than coincide with the values of "average" representatives of other countries.

In five out of seven value indices Russia occupies extreme or close to extreme positions among other countries. It should, however, be kept in mind that Russia, as a rule, shares its position with other countries. For example, in terms of the average value of *Security,* Russia ranks second among other countries. In reality it is an extreme position, because Ukraine, which is formally ahead of Russia, does not statistically significantly differ from it (Tamhane's criterion, $p < 0.05$). The population of Hungary, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, and the Russian-speaking part of Estonia also do not differ significantly from Russia by this value, taking the corresponding 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th places.

Table 3.2. Averages of seven value indices in Russia and results of comparing Russia with other countries using ANOVA

Value indices	Average value indices, points Russia, N = 2,395	Russia's position in comparison with other countries based on average values*
Security	0.75	Russia **is ahead of all** countries together with Ukraine, Hungary, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece and with Russian-speaking Estonians, with whom there are no significant differences.
Conformity-Tradition	0.01	Russia occupies **a middle** position among the other countries. There are no significant differences with the Czech Republic, both parts of Estonia, Norway, Cyprus, Portugal, Slovenia, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Belgium.
Self-Direction	0.16	Russia is **at the bottom of** the range, together with Latvia, Slovakia, Romania, Poland, Portugal, and the Russian-speaking part of Estonia. Only 4 countries have lower values: Ukraine, Greece, Turkey, and Bulgaria.

Stimulation	-0.93	Russia has **extremely low values** relative to the rest of the countries, together with Ukraine, Greece, the Russian-speaking part of Estonia, Turkey, Spain, Hungary, and Romania.
Hedonism	-0.73	Russia has **extremely low** values together with Ukraine, Romania, Slovakia, and the Russian-speaking part of Estonia, ahead of only Poland.
Self-Enhancement	-0.18	Russia **is ahead of most** countries, together with Turkey, Israel, and the Russian-speaking part of Estonia. Only Romania and Latvia are ahead of Russia.
Self-Transcdendence	0.42	Russia is in the group of countries **with the lowest** values, which also includes Slovenia, the Russian-speaking part of Estonia, the Czech Republic, Israel, Turkey, Slovakia, Romania, and Latvia.

* Characterization is based on statistically significant differences by Tamhane's criterion ($p < 0.05$). Standard errors of the mean do not exceed 0.04 points in all cases.

Figures 3.4.-3.6 illustrate Table 3.2. These figures show the average values of the value indices in each of the 31 countries included in the ESS. In the graphs, countries are ranked in descending order of importance of the respective value; sample sizes range from 983 (Cyprus) to 2,889 (Germany). The coloring of the bars shows statistically significant differences from Russia.

Figure 3.4. Country-average values of the *Security* and *Conformity-Tradition* value indices related to the "Conservation" category. Countries with no statistically significant difference from the Russian average are marked in color (ANOVA, Tamhane's criterion, $p<0.05$).

Figure 3.5. Country-average values of the value indices of *Self-Transcendence*, *Stimulation* and *Hedonism* related to the Openness to Change category. Countries with no statistically significant differences from the Russian average are marked in color (ANOVA, Tamchen's criterion, p<0.05)

Figure 3.6. Country-average values of the value indices of *Commitment* and *Self-Enhancement*. Countries with no statistically significant differences from the Russian average are marked in colour (ANOVA, Tamchen's criterion, p<0.05)

Pairwise comparisons of the Russian population with the population of other countries showed that:

1) According to the values forming the *Openness to Change – Conservation* axis:

Russia is higher than most countries in terms of the *Security* value index, which is part of the *Conservation* category, but holds an average position in terms of other values from this category, that is, *Conformity-Tradition*. On the contrary, Russia is behind most countries in terms of values included in the *Openness to Change* (see Figure 3.5 with *Self-Direction*, *Hedonism*, and *Stimulation* plots). It is important to note that the average Russian is at the lower range of *Self-Direction* values but higher than four other countries.

In addition, for all values related to this axis, average Russian scores are indistinguishable from a significant number of other countries, indicating a noticeable degree of commonality with between Russians and the other Europeans.

2) According to the values included in *Self-Transcendence – Self-Enhancement* axis:

Russia occupies extreme or near-extreme positions in terms of average expression of these value indices (Figure 3.6). *Self-Enhancement* values are stronger among Russians than among residents of most other countries under consideration, while *Self-Transcendence* values are, on the contrary, much weaker than in most other countries. The conclusion that Russians strongly emdorse the value of wealth and achievement (*Self-Enhancement* index) is consistent with the fact that throughout the 1990s Russia was consistently among the world leaders according to the value indicators of "materialism" and "survival orientation" developed by R. Inglehart (Andreenkova, 1994; Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Baker 2000). It also corresponds with the conclusions about further strengthening of "materialistic" motivation of Russians in the 2000s (Magun, 2006).

It is also important to note that for all the values related to this axis, the average Russian assessments differ significantly from most of the countries under consideration, indicating the significant specificity of today's Russia in the degree of expression of these values.

3.3. Comparison of average representative of Russia with average representatives of other countries on value axes

Having described the results of pairwise comparisons of the average Russian with the average representatives of the other European countries on the basis of seven value indices, let us now move on to comparisons along the value axes, which will allow us to give a more holistic view of the Russian values.

Figure 3.7 shows the position of Russia and 30 other countries in the space of two value axes. As we move along the horizontal axis, the average values of countries on the *Openness to Change - Conservation* axis change: the more to the the right the point is on the graph, the more

important the preference *Conservation values over Openness to Change values*. When moving along the vertical axis, the values of the averages on the Self-Transcendence – *Self-Enhancement* axis change: the higher the point is on the graph, the higher the preference of *Self-Enhancement* over *Self-Transcendence* values.

Figure 3.7. Position of 31 countries in the space of two value axes, country averages

Russia occupies the middle position on horizontal axis, and almost the topmost position on the vertical axis. In other words, the population of Russia (if we compare it with the population of other European countries on average) is characterized by the middle position in the value axis *Openness to change - Conservation* and one of the highest preference of the values *of Self-Enhancement* over *Self-Transcendence.*

The average Russian is similar to representatives of a large number of other countries on the *Openness to Change - Conservation* axis: the Russian average on this value axis does not have statistically significant differences from the average scores of 12 other countries. In terms of *Openness to Change - Conservation* values, Russians fall into the same category as very different

countries: Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Estonia (including both Russian- and Estonian-speaking parts), Cyprus, Portugal, Ireland, France, Finland, and Luxembourg.

As for the values of *Self-Transcendence - Self-Enhancement*, the average Russian is much less typical - Russia does not have statistically significant differences only with Russian-speaking residents of Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, and Turkey.[26]

In general, the value characteristic of Russia's population, obtained based on cross-country comparison of value axes, agrees with the one given above on the basis of the comparison of seven value indices and is its integral expression. Like the comparison of indices, the comparison of axes has shown that one group of values (*Self-Transcendence - Self-Enhancement*) distinguishes Russia differs from most European countries. As for the other group of values (*Openness to change - Conservation),* the analysis at the level of value axes slightly "smoothed" significant differences in the values of Russians: the analysis of five value indices related to this group of values showed lower importance of *Openness to change* and higher importance of *Security.*

Note that the relative importance of one value relative to other values within a country often does not coincide with its relative importance as compared to the same value in other countries*.* In other words, the hierarchy of values within a country has nothing to do with separate values' realtive importance as compared with other countries (in the first case values of different values are compared with each other but within the same country, in the second case values of the same value but in different countries are compared). As can be seen from the Russian value hierarchy (Figure 3.1), for the average Russian the value *of Self-Transcendence* is more important than the value of *Self-Enhancement*, but in comparison with other countries the value of *Self-Transcendence* is endorsed in Russia, on the contrary, much less than in other countries, while the value of *Self-Enhancement* is stronger than in other countries.

3.4. Comparison of average representative of Russia with values of average representatives of other countries according to the raw scores

A comparison of 21 baseline assessments also demonstrates a number of significant differences between the values of the average Russian and most other Europeans and helps to draw a detailed value portrait of the average Russian. Thus, the average Russian is characterized by extremely high (as compared to the average representatives of all countries under consideration) values of wealth, respect from others and the importance of the state ensuring their safety, as well as extremely low values of novelty and care for others. Relative to other average representatives of European countries, the average Russian attaches medium-high importance to the values of safe

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[26] All described comparisons of averages on value axes were made using ANOVA procedure, Tamhane's criterion, $p < 0.05$.

environment and demonstration of abilities, while the values of equality, understanding, creativity, good time and fun are of medium-low importance. The values of obedience, modesty, respect for rules, friendship, tradition, as well as risk, success and independence are medium, i.e. not tending to the margins of the European range.

In general, these characteristics reflect common perceptions of the typical Russian as a person largely oriented toward hierarchical relations in which the highest hierarch is the patronizing state; the latter's favor can be achieved by demonstrating one's abilities and causing respect among others through this or something else; and the average Russian is not interested in risk and innovation as well as in what happens near and with other people.

<center>* * *</center>

All the value comparisons described in this section suggest that the average Russian today is more cautious (or even fearful) and more in need of protection by a strong state than is the case in most other European countries included in the study. They have weaker values of novelty, creativity, freedom and autonomy and are less inclined to risk, fun and pleasure. The average Russian demonstrates a high degree of striving for personal achievements; in their mind there is less room than in the minds of representatives of most other countries for concern for equality and justice in the country and the world, for tolerance, concern for nature and the environment, and even for concern and care for those who directly surround them. Such a person is likely to be selfish and suspicious of those around them, eager to succeed, but not ready for change and not very concerned about the interests of those around them. Such characteristics allow individuals to succeed but have a negative impact on the development of society and economy.

It is worth noting that these features have, of course, their origins. For example, the strategy of saving works well when economic and social life is in the process of stagnation. However, even after the end (or slowdown) of stagnation, values are always lagging behind the actual situation, so in the situation of a stable economy may act as a "barrier" preventing further development. At the same time, we assume that values can change, and one of the most important directions of further research is the empirical study of the dynamics of values in a comparative perspective, which is beyond the scope of this paper, but is a priority for future work.

3.5. Value typology of average representatives of different countries and distances between average Russian and average representatives of European countries

The previous subsections have demonstrated the peculiarities of the values of the average Russian in comparison with the average representatives of other European countries. At the same time, similar expressions of many values are characteristic many other European countries, and not

only post-socialist ones. In other words, Russians have both differences and similarities with other countries in terms of values. For example, according to one value axis, an average Russian does not differ from an average representative of four countries, according to another - from 12 countries; according to different value indices Russia does not differ from a number of countries - from three to 12 depending on the index; using 21 indicators, the number of differing countries ranges from three to 16. If we consider all these differences and similarities simultaneously, we can obtain a typology of countries and trace into which groups and subgroups an average Russian fall into; which countries are closer by their values. For this purpose, we will use the procedure of hierarchical cluster analysis, which allows us to trace all the stages of combining units (countries) into groups. We will use the average of 21 raw scores for 31 countries as inputs. Raw scores (rather than, say, value indices) are chosen as the basis for clustering, as they have more information on similarities and differences than more integral indicators. The results of the cluster analysis are presented in Figure 3.8, while Figure 3.9 shows the clustering of countries in the space of two value axes.

The figures show that Russia's values are closer to post-Soviet cultures (Ukraine and the Russian-speaking part of Estonia), less so – to the East European countries (Romania, Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Bulgaria), as well as with Mediterranean countries (Greece, Turkey, and Portugal). These countries formed one of the two largest clusters which is distinguished by high importance of the values *of Self-Enhancement* and *Conservation.* The second cluster consists of all other European countries, among which Latvia, Israel, and Austria occupy a special position with higher *Self-Enhancement* and *Openness to changes* values (such combination, as we see, is atypical for the countries under consideration). The remaining countries also have a clear value profile – a North European cluster including the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, is characterized by high values of *Self-Transcendence* and *Openness to Change*; a special cluster of two countries - Iceland and France, characterized by the highest values of *Self-Transcendence* and *Openness to Change*; another group of countries combining relatively high values of *Self-Transcendence* and average importance of *Conservation* values, it includes Spain, Luxembourg, and Estonian population of Estonia, as well as Finland. Finally, the largest cluster, characterized by medium-high values of *Self-Transcendence* and *Openness to Change*, comprises eight countries: UK, Ireland, Cyprus, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland as well as Slovenia and Hungary.

So, the average Russian falls into the cluster of countries, depending on the level of generalization containing 3, 4, 10 or 11 countries, characterized by the highest values of *Conservation* and *Self-Enhancement* in the range.

Figure 3.8. Dendrogram of hierarchical cluster analysis of average representatives of different countries (based on 21 baseline estimates, Ward's method)

Figure 3.9. Location of countries combined in value clusters in the space of two value axes

The next stage of the analysis of average values across countries, aimed at identifying value differences, is largely similar to the above-described comparison of averages and clustering. Now we recorded *magnitude* of value differences rather its mere presence and direction. To find out the magnitude of differences, we calculated the value distances between the average Russian and the average representatives of other countries. The sum of the squares of the differences between the Russian average and the average of other countries is used as an indicator of distance (see section 2.4). Figure 3.10 presents value distances calculated on the basis of the three sets of indicators we use: raw scores, value indices, and value axes.

The figure shows that the distances measured at different levels of value indices are somewhat different, and for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Spain, Switzerland, Finland, and the Estonian-speaking part of Estonia these indices diverge significantly. This is due to the different levels of measurement and the different influence of the raw scores on the more integral indices and value axes. On the whole, however, the sequence of countries in terms of value distances to Russia is very similar at different levels of measurement.

Figure 3.10. Value distances between the average Russian and representatives of 31 countries, calculated for different sets of value indices. Arranged according to the value distance calculated on the basis of 7 value indices (centered scores).

The closest to Russians by their values are the Russian-speaking population of Estonia, the population of Romania, Ukraine, Slovakia, and so on, and the most distant from the average Russian are representatives of Iceland, France, Denmark, Sweden, etc. If we group the countries geographically, we can see that the East European countries (Romania, Ukraine, Slovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Latvia) are the closest to the average Russian in their values; the Mediterranean countries (Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, Portugal, Israel, Spain) are not too far from Russia too; the Central and West Europe are very far from Russians; and France and the North European countries are the most distant from Russians in their values.

In general, this data coincides with the results of the cluster analysis, but this approach has one important advantage - it allows us to see the meaning of the distances. Above, we used the total value distance for all indicators (21, 7, or 2), but now we will decompose these distances into components and see which values are responsible for large value distances and which values are responsible for small value distances. See Appendix Tables 5-6 for complete value distance matrices.

In terms of the 21 baseline estimates, cumulatively across the 30 countries, it is their high value of *wealth* that most distances Russians from all others. In the case of value distance to each individual country, the situation looks different, but it is mainly the value of *wealth* that alienates Russians from most average representatives of other European countries. Second, the values of *fun* and *good time* (their low importance) are responsible for high value distance of an average Russian, and then - the values of *state protection* and *respect from others* (high importance). The most similar - or most common - values among Russians and other Europeans are the values of *care for nature, compliance with rules, equality,* and *self-direction.*

In terms of the 7 value indices, the most "distant" value is *Hedonism*, followed by *Self-Enhancement*, the most "converging" value here is *Conformity-Tradition.*

An interesting result was obtained by comparing the contributions of the two value axes to the value distances calculated on their basis: the *Self-Transcendence-Self-Enhancement* axis contributes many times more than the other axis to cross-country distances. The sum of the distances to Russia for the 30 countries on the first axis, *Commitment to Self-Enhancement,* is 18.7, while the *Openness to Change-Conservation* axis yields a mere 1.8. Thus, it is the values described by the *Self-Transcendence–Self-Enhancement* axis that most distinguish the average Russian from the average representatives of other European countries, in particular due to the high value of *wealth*, as well as the low value of *Hedonism.*

Chapter 4. Comparison of Basic Values of the Population of Russia and Other Countries at the Individual Level: Cluster Analysis

In the comparisons and classifications described in the previous section, the units of analysis were aggregated entities, entire countries. We took for granted that the values of individual respondents were determined by the country in which they live. What would happen if, in classifying people on the basis of their values, we ingored this assumption and treated individual respondents as primary units, without linking them to their country? We expect that, with this approach, people are not necessarily grouped together on a country-by-country basis. We have attempted just such a classification using cluster analysis (*k-means*).

4.1 Cluster construction

An individual respondent was taken as the unit of analysis. The *k-means* procedure was used, as it is suitable for dealing with a large number of cases. A total of 21 raw scores were taken as the basis for clustering the respondents. We used this particular set of indicators (rather than, say, seven value indices) because a greater number of value indicators provides more information for classification. As a result, all respondents were allocated into clusters based only on their scores on the 21 value portraits, ignoring their country of residence.

Determining the number of clusters. The *k-means* procedure requires a prior specification of the number of clusters. The optimal number of clusters is the minimum number of groups of objects with minimum variance within these groups and maximum variance between these groups. The relationship between these three parameters in our data and under the described clustering conditions is shown in Figure 4.1. The most common way of determining the number of clusters is the "chair back" or "scree plot", where the number of clusters is determined by visually estimating plots like 4.1. Formalization of this method with statistical criteria has been done several times and one of the most reliable methods is the "gap method" (Tibshirani, Walther, & Hastie, 2001). Gap statistic maps the distance reduction function within a cluster to a predicted distribution based on the random data of a similar shape. The optimal number of clusters is one in which the empirical curve deviates from the theoretical distribution. According to this criterion, the optimal number of clusters for our data is 4.[27] This decision can also be made based on visual analysis of the curves of increasing variance between clusters and decreasing variance within clusters with increasing number of clusters, from Figure 4.1 we can see that it is not reasonable to allocate more than 4 clusters.

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[27] The Cluster Size Estimation R package (by Edward Susco) was used.

Figure 4.1. Dependence of variance within and between clusters on the number of allocated clusters

a. Within-cluster variance (mean standard deviation across all indicators of all clusters for each of the cluster solutions, the unit of calculation is an individual);

b. Between-cluster variance (mean standard deviation across all indicators of all clusters, unit of calculation - cluster).

Testing the cluster solution for robustness to sorting. The *k-means* procedure is often criticized as unstable and dependent on the data sorting. Such dependence arises because the procedure uses the first points in the array as the initial cluster centers, and then corrects them at each next step (i.e., for each new respondent) and at each iteration (i.e., passing the whole array anew). To test the stability of the cluster solution, the array was sorted by a random variable and the cluster analysis was performed again. This procedure was repeated 30 times using random variables having different distributions (normal, beta, gamma, chi-square, logistic, uniform). The results of the cluster solutions obtained with different sortings were compared according to three parameters: coincidence of cluster centers, "migration" of respondents from cluster to cluster, and cluster size.

Cluster centers refer to the mean values of the 21 variables in each cluster, on the basis of which the clusters were constructed. The centers are the basis for the classification of respondents,

so their displacement in different sortings poses the greatest threat to the stability of the cluster solution. The coincidence of cluster centers at different sortings of the data means the stability of the basis for grouping individuals. For all sorts, the configuration of cluster centers (i.e., relative magnitude and sign) remains the same. The absolute values of the centers in four of the six sorts were exactly the same. When sorted by random variables from the normal and beta distributions, individual centers did not match, but the differences did not exceed one standard deviation and lied within the overall configuration of cluster centers. The stability of the cluster configuration was also indicated by the correlations of the cluster centers across solutions with different sortings, the smallest coefficient was 0.94 (n=21).

Migration of respondents from cluster to cluster means the proportion of respondents who, when clustered on a differently sorted array, end up in another cluster. In our experiment, such migration reached 9% of the entire sample in some sortings. Statistics indicated that it is possible to achieve a stable solution simply by increasing the number of clustering attempts, and this was confirmed on our data as well. By bringing the number of attempts to 50, we found that only two types of clustering emerged, the migration within each of which did not exceed 0.2% of the entire sample, and the centers were exactly the same. In other words, two very stable clustering solutions with stable cluster sizes, very low "migration", and similar centers emerged under different sortings. And even in these two solutions, the cluster centers were very close, so it does not make sense to consider both solutions. Having compared the results of the first and second cluster solutions (they are reported in Appendix, Table 7), we came to the conclusion that the first solution better reflected the structure of values according to Schwartz - so, each of the four clusters differed from all the others by the pronounced importance of one of the value indices, such as *Self-Enhancement*, *Openness to changes*, etc. In the second cluster solution, this division was not as obvious, so we will use the first solution. Again, despite the need to choose between the two, both solutions are very similar and the probability of losing some information by choosing one of them is very low.

Cleaning from intermediate cases. Any classification is a reduction of a broad set of extended characteristics to a single attribute; there is always the temptation to exaggerate the importance of that attribute. Classification is a great oversimplification, whereas objects that fall into the same group may be different not only because they have other features, but also because of the magnitude of the main feature. For example, respondents in the first value cluster have different *distances* to the center of the cluster, and the centers, let us recall, express the meaning, the basis of classification. The *k-means* procedure does not create missing values; it assigns *each* respondent with values on the value variables to a cluster. Thus, one cluster can include people whose values are very close to the values of the cluster center, as well as those who are assigned

to this cluster only formally. Such intermediate cases should be excluded from the classification, as they, in fact, do not fit into it. We cut off the 5% of respondents who had the largest distances from the cluster centers. This did not significantly affect either the centers or the size of clusters but made them clearer. In all further calculations, these 5% cases are not taken into account.

Also considered as missing values were 3% of respondents who did not answer most of the value questions (i.e., those who answered 11 or more of the 21). In sum, the characteristics of these 8% of missing respondents were randomly distributed; they were not skewed by either values, socio-demographic characteristics, or country affiliation. For the other missing values, the pair-wise deletion method was applied.

4.2 Description of clusters

As a result of clustering and all the procedures described above, four pan-European value clusters were identified, each of which included respondents with similar values from all European countries. The centers of the clusters are presented in Table 4.1. and Figure 4.2.

Table 4.1 Centers of Pan-European Value Clusters

	Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 4
Creativity	-0.42	**0.62**	0.04	0.33
Wealth	-1,63	-0.79	**-0.52**	-2,05
Equality	**0.98**	0.61	0.26	**0.98**
Abilities	-0.71	**0.15**	0.03	-0.95
Secure environment	**1,05**	-0.24	0.39	0.35
Novelty	-1,07	**0.55**	-0.19	-0.02
Obedience	**0.54**	-1,42	-0.15	-0.61
Understanding	0.54	0.21	-0.03	**0.73**
Modesty	**0.72**	-1,03	-0.30	0.40
Recreation	-1,27	**0.59**	-0.14	0.08
Independence	0.28	**0.91**	0.27	0.69
Care	**0.73**	0.29	0.13	**0.76**
Success	-0.73	**0.17**	0.09	-0.87
State protection	**1,07**	-0.08	0.33	0.38
Risk	-2,30	**0.17**	-0.93	-1,42
Rules	**0.89**	-0.89	0.10	0.13
Respect	-0.10	-0.47	**0.04**	-1,00
Friendship	**1,02**	0.78	0.41	**1,04**
Nature	**0.98**	0.28	0.28	**0.93**
Tradition	**0.93**	-0.94	0.11	0.12
Fun	-1,52	**0.52**	-0.24	-0.01
Average by value indices				
Security	**1,06**	-0.17	0.36	0.37
Conformity-Tradition	**0.77**	-1,07	-0.06	0.01
Self-Transcendence	**0.85**	0.43	0.21	**0.89**
Self-Direction	-0.07	**0.77**	0.15	0.51
Stimulation	-1,69	**0.36**	-0.56	-0.72
Hedonism	-1,40	**0.55**	-0.19	0.03
Self-Enhancement	-0.80	-0.23	**-0.09**	-1,22
Cluster size	**22%**	**17%**	**36%**	**24%**

The sample size is 54,503 respondents, the respondents who did not evaluate more than 10 value portraits of 21 were cut off as missing.

The first cluster accounted for 22% of the entire sample; members of the first cluster emphasized *Conservation* values, more than all other respondents, and put less emphasis on *Openness to Change*. As of Figure 4.2, they gravitate towards the *Conservation* pole on a horizontal axis, whereas being in the middle of the vertical axis, slightly tending towards *Self-Transcendence*. In terms of the raw scores on which this clustering is based, respondents in this cluster reported their similarity to people for whom *safe environment* and *state protection*, *obedience*, *rules*, *modesty*, *caring*, *equality, friendship, nature,* and *tradition* were highly

significant, and *risk, fun, leisure, independence, success,* and *creativity* were less significant than for all others. In terms of other raw scores, the differences among members of this cluster were small. Overall, it consists of people who share conservative and traditional values.

The second cluster was the smallest – 17% of the sample, it consisted of people who share the highest preference for *Openness to Change*. Most important for them are the values of *Self-Direction* and *Hedonism*, and the least important are the values of *Security* and *Conformity-Tradition*. In terms of the raw scores, this cluster is characterized by high importance of *self-direction, creativity, novelty, demonstration of abilities, risk, success, good time,* and *fun*. Less than the other clusters, they value *rules, modesty, obedience, safety*, *tradition*, and *nature*.

The third cluster was the largest - 36% and the vaguest in value terms. Among the members of this cluster one can quite clearly see the tendency to give high importance to the values of *Self-Enhancement* (in particular - *wealth* and *respect*), to the detriment of the values of *Self-Transcendence* (the lowest values of *equality, friendship, nature,* and *self-direction*). The uncertainty lies in the fact that this cluster has an average, unremarkable position for the majority of all the other raw scores. This is reflected in the fact that on the *Openness to Change - Conservation* axis it has average, close to zero values.

The fourth cluster includes almost a quarter of the sample - 24% and is characterized by the highest importance of *Self-Transcendence* (namely, *equality, caring, friendship,* and *nature*), whereas *Self-Enhancement* (*wealth, respect, success, abilities*) has the lowest importance, and it has average scores on all other dimensions.

Thus, the first and second clusters divide respondents according to the first value axis *Openness to Change - Conservation*, and the third and fourth clusters divide respondents according to the second value axis *Self-Transcendence - Self-Enhancement*. It is important to note that in this case the axes are not considered as orthogonal dimensions, but as equal scales. For example, we can say that for the members of the first cluster the values of *Conservation* are more important than the values *of Self-Enhancement*.

Figure 4.2. Position of the four clusters identified through the classification of respondents, in the space of value axes. (The position of a cluster is determined by the average scores of the respondents included in it; the size of the bubbles is proportional to the number of respondents in each cluster).

4.3. Distribution of representatives of different countries by value clusters

All respondents were allocated to the 4 clusters on the basis of their values only, without regard to any other attributes, in particular, abstracted from the country affiliation. Now we can go back to the country attribute and see how the population of each country is distributed across these clusters. As Table 4.2 shows, each value cluster had representatives of all countries and, conversely, each country had representatives of all value clusters. In addition, we can see that the population of different countries is distributed differently across the clusters. This rather obvious fact indicates that the values of the average representative of a country is, in fact, an average of the values of several population groups sharing different values: in case one of these groups prevails, the average country value indicators correspond most to it, hiding from the researcher the

104

minorities possessing other values. In other words, in order to have a more complete picture of the value characteristics of a country, it is very important to pay attention to the value homogeneity of its population. For example, Latvia has a high degree of value homogeneity among the population - this is indicated by the fact that more than half (58%) of its population fell into one value cluster whose characteristics coincide with the description of the average Latvian. At the same time there are over 40% of people in Latvia who do not fit with this description of the average Latvian. In this case, consideration of the value composition of the population helps to identify minorities. And in the case of a less homogeneous country, such as Belgium, where the average is in fact absent, consideration of the distribution by clusters may completely replace the national average. Thus, looking at distributions is crucial for studying values across countries.

Individuals included in different clusters are very different from each other in terms of their values, while within the clusters individuals have quite large similarities (especially after the cleaning from intermediate cases). Therefore, the distribution of the country's population across these clusters may indicate a value homogeneity of the population, or a value consensus. Thus, for example, we can say that the consensus in Latvia is very high and quite low in Belgium. Schwartz, in examining value consensus, discovered that it is positively correlated to the level of economic prosperity and negatively correlated to the level of democracy in the country. These findings can be supplemented by the fact that in post-socialist countries the level of consensus is significantly higher than in the countries of "old" capitalism (the only exception is France, with 55% of its population in the fourth cluster). Russia in these terms falls into the group of countries with high consensus.

Let us return to consideration of the distribution of the population of different countries in the four highlighted clusters. In the first cluster, characterized by high values of *Conservation*, such countries as Ukraine, Poland, Russia, Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Russian-speaking Estonia contribute the largest shares of their population; and Iceland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and Austria contribute the smallest shares. In the second cluster, with a high importance of *Openness to Change*, Austria, Iceland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Israel "lead the way", while Turkey, Greece, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine contribute the least. The shares of population contributed by different countries in the third cluster, highlighted by the values of *Self-Enhancement*, differ the most: while Romania, Latvia, Turkey, and Slovakia contribute more than half of their population (Russia contributes 45%), in France, Iceland, and Switzerland this share does not exceed 20%. Finally, the countries with the most representatives of the fourth cluster (emphasizing the values of *Self-Transcendence*) are France, Switzerland, Iceland, Sweden, Finland, and Spain; while in Romania, Russia, Latvia, Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia, and Turkey share of such people was the smallest.

Table 4.2. Distribution of the population of each of the 31 countries into clusters, constructed by classifying respondents on the basis of their values, % per row

	Cluster 1 "Conservation."	Cluster 2 "Openness to change."	Cluster 3 "Self-Enhancement"	Cluster 4 "Self-Transcendence"	Number of respondents
Austria	12	**33**	30	24	2296
Belgium	15	20	28	**37**	1739
Bulgaria	**32**	14	38	17	1289
UK	20	22	27	31	2270
Hungary	13	16	36	**34**	1337
Germany	18	22	29	32	2796
Greece	**33**	6	**47**	15	2350
Denmark	15	**26**	26	**34**	1390
Israel	14	**25**	**45**	16	2094
Ireland	24	18	32	26	1565
Iceland	9	**31**	19	**40**	499
Spain	30	9	22	**39**	1835
Cyprus	25	13	37	25	982
Latvia	13	22	**58**	8	1820
Luxembourg	19	18	28	**35**	1492
Netherlands	10	**26**	33	**32**	1815
Norway	25	21	29	24	1517
Poland	**39**	7	42	11	1679
Portugal	24	13	**46**	17	2195
Russia	**36**	**14**	**45**	**6**	**2258**
Romania	29	8	**59**	4	1975
Slovakia	31	9	**51**	10	1725
Slovenia	16	20	37	27	1400
Turkey	**31**	4	**53**	11	1705
Ukraine	**40**	8	42	9	1871
Finland	20	20	21	**39**	1587
France	13	17	16	**55**	1704
Czech Republic	25	16	**44**	15	2602
Switzerland	12	22	20	**46**	1731
Sweden	10	**25**	26	**39**	1553
Estonia (r.)	**31**	13	**45**	12	516
Estonia (e.)	21	17	25	**37**	908
Total	**22**	**17**	**36**	**24**	**54503**

Pan-European clusters in Russia. In Russia, the pan-European clusters are unevenly distributed: the majority, whose values reflect the national average values, consists of two parts: 45% in the third cluster and 36% in the first. And in addition to the majority there were two minorities, amounting to 20% in total. It is important to emphasize here that a significant value minority (one in five) is found in Russia, which is not reflected in any way in the average indicators. And even the value majority of Russians consists of two parts. The largest share of the Russian population (45%) are members of the third cluster, characterized by a importance of of *Self-Enhancement*. Russian representatives of this cluster are almost indistinguishable from the average Russian not only in values, but also in most socio-demographic characteristics. The second half of the value majority are the members of the first cluster, comprising 36% of the sample, who place the value of *Conservation* above all others. It consists of older people (average age is 56 years), among whom there are more women (70%), residents of small towns and villages (35%), pensioners (41%), representatives of ethnic minorities (11%), and lower education levels (86% do not have higher education). The share of members of the first, conservative cluster is also high in a number of post-socialist countries, while the values shared by the members of the second and fourth clusters are more typical for the average representatives of West and North Europe – the values of *Openness to Change* and *Self-Transcendence* are more important than in other parts of Europe. In Russia the share of people sharing such "Western" values is 20%. It means that for every fifth citizen of Russia values which are more typical for representatives of Western Europe are more important than values shared by the majority. Who are these people? The second cluster, which includes 14% of the Russian sample, is made up of younger people (average age 28) and more wealthy (32% have an income of EUR 500 or more); it includes more students (27%) than all the other clusters. The second minority, members of cluster 4, comprise 6% of the sample. They can probably be attributed to the old "intelligentsia" - this is the most educated group, with more engineers and teachers among them than in the other clusters. Due to the small size of this group, there is not much more to say about it.[28] No regional differences were found for any of the clusters within Russia.

So, in Russia there is one majority, its socio-demographic characteristics are quite vague, but they reflect a portrait of an average resident of Russian. There is also a second majority, which describes the values of the older generation (which is associated with both belonging to another generation and with the stage of life, i.e. old age itself). In addition to the majority, there is a significant minority represented by the second cluster and consiting of the younger generation, as

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[28] A detailed description of the influence of socio-demographic indicators on basic human values is given in Chapter 5.

well as more successful and wealthy people. There are also those 6% of "intellectuals" who directly opposed the values of the majority.

One part of the Russian majority is similar in value terms to the majority of the population of a number of other countries: Romania, Latvia, Slovakia, Turkey; the second majority is close to the residents of Greece, Turkey, Poland, and Ukraine.

Russia is also similar to a number of East European and Mediterranean countries in terms of the level of value consensus. Due to the high level of consensus, Russia has a value majority, whose values are reflected by the national average values of the indices. However, this does not mean that there are no significant minorities. In other, more heterogeneous countries in terms of values, the national averages reflect the real situation very poorly.

In this section, we refused to represent the values of the population of an entire country in the form of averaged indicators and took into account the value heterogeneity of the population of each country. It provides a more accurate answer to the question about the similarities and differences between the Russians and the other Europeans. It turned out that each of the value groups of the Russian population has "analogues" in every other European country, and the differences between the countries arise due to the unequal distribution of these groups across countries.

Chapter 5. Influence of country of residence and socio-demographic composition of population on basic values: regression analysis

The previous sections have described in detail the similarities and differences between the values of Russia's population and the values of the population of 30 other European countries. The first question that arises when looking for explanations of the value differences between Russia and other countries described above is whether these differences are caused by differences in the socio-demographic composition of the populations of different countries. For example, in some countries the population is older and more educated than in Russia. To address this concern, we used multiple regression analysis and controlled for socio-demographic variables. Then we compared country-specific and socio-demographic effects in terms of their strength. The influence of socio-demographic variables on respondents' values within Russia was analyzed separately. All these comparisons help to understand the specifics of the influence of the country (residence in Russia) on various values and reveal the meaning of this attribute.

5.1. Regression model

The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the relationships of basic human values with various individual characteristics of the respondent, in order to determine the most complete list of variables to include in the regression model. First, we demonstrate the dependence of values on basic demographic characteristics – respondent's gender and age. Next, we look at the effects of parental family; then the relationship of respondent's values with their education, profession, main occupation, and income level will be shown. Finally, all these variables as well as country affiliation will be entered into one general regression model, with values as the dependent variable.

5.1.1 Variables that can only be causes of basic human values

Gender and age. It is obvious that respondent's gender as one of the basic defining parameters of a person influences their values. According to V. A. Geodakyan's evolutionary theory of gender (Geodakyan, 1991), men are more open to new things and *Self-Enhancement* oriented, while women are more conservative and altruistic ("decentered"). Turning to the terms of basic values, men tend towards the values of *Openness to changes* (in particular, *Self-Direction*, *Stimulation,* and *Hedonism*), and to the values of *Self-Enhancement*, while women are higher on the values of *Self-Transcendence* and *Conservation* (*Security* and *Conformity-Tradition*). Differences between men and women by value axes and by individual indices were significant at the 0.001 level according to the *t-test* for equality of means.

Figure 5.1 shows the location of men and women and representatives of different ages in the space of the two value axes.[29]

Age is one of the most important variables affecting people's basic values. Age has the greatest influence on the expression of *Openness to Change - Conservation* values - *all* age groups (divided by the 5-year interval) are significantly different from each other. This means that *Openness to Change* is more important for the younger the respondent, in particular *Self-Direction*, *Stimulation* and *Hedonism*; older respondents emphasized *Conservation*, in particular *Security* and *Conformity-Tradition*. The relationship between age and *Openness-Conservation* value axis is linear and very strong (correlation at the individual level is 0.40. significant at the 0.001 level, n=58,684).

The relationship between age and the second value axis *Self-Transcendence - Self-Enhancement* is not so obvious, which is also confirmed by the low insignificant correlations of these variables. At the same time, if we turn to the relationship between age and value indices (Figure 5.2), the relationship becomes clear: with age the importance of *Self-Transcendence* increases and importance of *Self-Enhancement* decreases (correlation coefficients respectively 0.22 and -0.25, significant at 0.001, n=56,944). This discrepancy between value axes and value indices is associated with different ways of constructing value axes and value indices - factor analysis, by which value axes are obtained, reflected the structure of real data, and indices represented theoretical constructs imposed on these data. The first axis entirely captured the age effect, "freeing" the second axis from it. Perhaps it is because the value axes are based on real data, thus their associations may show clearer relationships with other variables. On the other hand, such a discrepancy between the axes and indices creates certain difficulties in the meaningful interpretation of data. However, these difficulties can be easily overcome if both axes and indices are analyzed simultaneously.

Thus, the older a person is, the stronger are the values of *Conservation* and *Self-Transcendence*, and the weaker are the values of *Openness to Change* and *Self-Enhancement.*

There are two ways of interpreting the effect of age.

The first one is more often used by psychologists and is related to the life cycle. For example, Schwartz (2007) pointed out that with age people become more involved in social networks, more inclined to keep their habits, less fond of new things and various challenges, which explains the high importance of *Conservation* values among them; also, with age people become involved in family life and gain more stable positions in professional life, which is reflected in

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[29] The exact values of the value axes and indices are not given in the text and graphs, as they are conventional units and do not carry any meaningful meaning.

higher importance of *Self-Transcendence* values for them and lower importance of *Self-Enhancement* values.

The second way of interpretation is more often used by social scientists and is related to the peculiarities of generational cohorts. Thus, Inglehart (1990) argued that the global shift in values from materialist to postmaterialist can only take place through generational replacement. This is due to the different conditions of socialization among different generations. Determining the generational factor, separating it from lifecycle influences, can only be done through repeated studies over a long period of time - this is how the characteristics of different cohorts can be traced.

In our case, it is not possible to separate the effect of age on the impact of lifecycle and membership in a particular age cohort, as there are currently only 3 time points within 6 years in ESS, and this is too short a period to be able to capture generational shifts. Therefore, we will interpret the age factor as including both generational and lifecycle components simultaneously.

Figure 5.1. Gender and age groups in the space of value axes

Figure 5.2. Age dynamics of seven basic values

Parental Family Resources. Parental family characteristics are independent variables, in the sense that values cannot influence them, and a causal relationship is only possible in one direction, just as for gender and age. For Inglehart, the parental family's ability to meet the child's basic needs and provide economic security is a determinant of their children's values (Inglehart, 1990; 1997). The more resources a family has, the more postmaterialist the values of the child. Speaking in terms of Schwartz's values, resources of parental family lead to lower importance of *Self-Enhancement* values (*Power, wealth, Achievement*) and higher importance of *Self-Transcendence* (*care for people* and *nature, equality, tolerance*); as well as higher importance of *Openness to Change (self-direction, independence, novelty, etc.)* as opposed to the value of *Conservation.* ESS data did not allow direct assessment of the respondent's family resources through measurement of their material well-being; however, there were indirect indicators, such as family composition, professional and educational status of parents, belonging to the ethnic majority or immigration history.

Family composition. First of all, the family composition can be considered a resource, as two parents have more resources than one parent, all other things equal. In the questionnaire, this item was "Father/mother died/did not live with the respondent when he/she was 14 years old". Figure 5.3 shows the values of respondents who had two parents, one parent, and those whose parents were absent at the time the respondents were socialized. As expected, presence of two parents when the respondent was 14 was associated with higher importance of *Self-Transcendence* and *Openness to Change* (mainly due to high values of *Self-Direction* and *Hedonism*, and low values of *Security*; no differences between these groups by *Conformity-Tradition* and *Stimulation*).

Figure 5.3. Location of respondents from families with different resource characteristics in the space of two value axes

Parental education. On the one hand, parents' education is a good proxy indicator of their income indicating material resources of the family, on the other hand, educated parents themselves represent a resource for the child, predetermining their education and influencing their upbringing. The six-point scale combining the level of education of both parents turned out to be the most efficient predictor (the scale items are shown in Figure 5.4). Figure 5.3 shows that the more educated the respondent's parents were, the more important were the values of *Openness to Change*. However, there was no clear trend on the second axis *Self-Transcendence – Self-Enhancement*. Turning to the value indices (Figure 5.4), we find that there were no differences between respondents from families with different levels of education in terms of the value of *Self-Transcendence*, but in terms of the value *of Self-Enhancement* there is, but in the opposite direction than one could expect – higher level of parents' education is associated with higher importance of *Self-Enhancement*. Perhaps, this is related to a higher level of ambitions, which is typical for people from higher status groups.

Figure 5.4. Values of respondents from families with different levels of parental education

Professional status of parents. By professional status in the context of the family's resources we mean parents' status as supervisors. We assume that supervisors have more resources than non-supervisors. By comparing the groups of respondents who had both parents who were leaders, those who had only one parent who was a leader, and those who had neither parent who was a leader when the respondents were 14 years old, we found confirmation of our hypotheses. As shown in Figure 5.3, higher status of parents is associated with higher importance of *Openness to Change* and *Self-Transcendence* values in their children. The differences on the *Self-Enhancemen–Self-Transcendence* axis less evident: higher status of at least one parent increased values of *Self-Transcendence* at the expense of *Self-Enhancement*.

Parental immigration. If the respondent's parents did not immigrate, if they were born in the same country where the respondent lives, they probably had more resources compared to recent immigrants, which can be expressed both in social capital accumulated throughout their lives and in the lack of the need to spend resources on migration. A 3-point scale was used to capture parental immigration status: 0 - neither parent was an immigrant (both were born in the country), 1 - one parent was an immigrant, 2 - both parents were immigrants. As can be seen from the figure 5.3, those respondents whose (one) parent was was immigrant differ from those whose parents were born in the country or residence and those whose both parents were immigrants. Children of the former shared higher importance of *Openness to Change* and *Self-Transcendence*. It is likely that children from mixed marriages in which one parent is an immigrant had more tolerant attitudes and corresponding values, they are more open to change and share universalism values.

Belonging to the ethnic majority. The respondent's belonging to the ethnic majority can also be considered as a certain resource, and is also related to the parental family, as it is "inherited" (though, of course, to a great extent related to personal identity). Representatives of the ethnic

majority are in a better economic situation and differ from the representatives of ethnic minorities in the greater importance of *Openness to changes* and *Self-Transcendence*.

5.1.2 Variables that can be both causes and consequences of basic human values.

The characteristics of the respondent and their parental family considered so far can only have one causal direction – they act as causes and values are consequences (or, in a more complex configuration, values are consequences of consequences). After all, age and gender as well as parental family are not chosen.[30] Now let's move on to the variables that can be both causes and consequences of values - education, activity, and occupation of the respondent.

Education. Education is one of the basic variables in explaining social and socio-psychological phenomena, but it depends on the subject's own decisions and can therefore be both a cause and a consequence of various subjective variables, including values. Two methods were used to capture education in the ESS. The first is a special scale that unifies the educational systems of different countries according to three stages: the first of which (primary) corresponds to Russian primary education, the second stage (secondary) corresponds to general or professional secondary education, the intermediate between the second and third stage corresponds to Russian secondary special education, and the tertiary corresponds to higher education. Since this scale combines different educational systems, it is inevitably too crude, so we preferred to use the second way of measuring education - the number of years of education. Although such a scale also seems rather abstract and depends on each particular educational system (like any other international classification of educational stages), it turns out to be preferable in several respects - it is more precise, more detailed, and has greater explanatory power.

Education provides intellectual openness, flexibility, and breadth of perception, which is a part of *Openness to Change* value content (Schwartz, 2007), on the other hand, intellectual development inevitably raises doubts about unconditional acceptance of tradition, and the skills that education provides help to cope with challenges and therefore provide life security. In addition, the grading and competition system in the educational system constantly challenges and increases values of *Achievement* and *Self-Enhancement*, but on the other hand, the higher the level of education, the more resources one has and thus more likely to possess altruistic values, that is, values of *Self-Transcendence* (Ibid).

The reverse causality is also quite possible. A person for whom the values of *Openness to Change* are important, and who refuses to accept tradition unconditionally, to be conformist and has some resources to feel secure - they may aspire to a higher level of education; and the high

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[30] Hypothetically, some values could cause a person to change their gender, but the frequency of such a phenomenon is probably quite low.

importance of the values of achievement and *Self-Enhancement* only reinforces this aspiration. Rather, the causal relationship between values and educational attainment operates in both directions: education creates values, and certain values lead to educational attainment. The study of the correlation between these two variables is the subject of further research, for our work it is important to point their *interrelation*.

Figure 5.5 shows the location of groups of respondents with different levels of education in the space of value axes. As expected, higher level of education is associated with higher importance of *Openness to Change* and lower importance of *Conservation*. This relationship can be divided into two parts: among those with 10-12 years of education (or second level) or higher, where higher education is already very weakly associated with the values *of Openness to Change*, as opposed to the second part - among respondents with less than 10 years of education each new year of education was associated with a significantly higher importance of *Openness to Change* values.

As the level of education increases, the values of *Self-Transcendence* become more important. It follows from the logic of the axes that, accordingly, the values *of Self-Enhancement* should fall, but the test with the value indices suggested that the values *of Self-Enhancement* were not related to the level of education. In this point our hypotheses were not confirmed, while the link of higher level of education with values of *Self-Transcendence* proposed in the hypothesis was confirmed.

Figure 5.5. Location of respondents with different levels of education in the space of value axes. Numbers denote groups aggregated by the number of years of education.

Occupation. Reciprocal association between occupation and basic values is self-evident. The choice of profession depends on a person's basic human values (in combination with social conditions), and work in a certain occupation is very likely to affect people's values. In ESS, respondents' occupations were classified using the international ISCO-88 scale, a shortened 10-item version of which we used. This classification of occupations was built on similarity of skills required for a given group of occupations and the qualification level. Therefore, this occupational scale partially overlaps with the educational scale, which means that occupations requiring higher qualifications will correlate with high importance of the values *of Openness to Change* and *Self-Transcendence*.

Figure 5.6 shows that this assumption is correct - employees of "mental" labor (managers, professionals of higher and medium qualifications, clerks, as well as service workers) differ from other occupations by higher value of *Openness to Change* and *Self-Transcendence*, while less qualified manual workers tended towards the opposite poles of *Self-Enhancement* and *Conservation*. In the Figure 5.6, the size of the "bubbles" corresponds to the average level of education of respondents in this group (in years of training), and they can be used to separate the impact of qualification level from the actual affiliation with an occupational group. For example, the qualification level of service workers and skilled workers is very similar, but the values differ very much - the former tend towards *Self-Transcendence*, and *Openness to Change* while the latter gravitate to the values of *Self-Enhancement* and *Conservation*, hence these differences are not related to the level of qualification, but to the nature of the work performed, specifics of the professional subculture, income level in this professional group and other characteristics associated with occupation.

In sum, occupation is related to values and its association does not coincide with the influence of qualification level, which means that it should be included in the general model describing the determinants of and associations with of basic human values.

Figure 5.6. Location of groups of respondents of different professions in the space of value axes. The size of "bubbles" corresponds to the average number of years of education of respondents in a given occupational group

Activity. One of the most important characteristics that determine people's everyday life is their activity. As one can see from Figure 5.7, basic human values are correlated with the main activities mainly on the *Openness to Change – Conservation* values. Correlations between indicators of each of the activities and the *Self-Transcendence – Self-Enhancement* axis were very weak, and when controlling for age and level of education, they became insignificant at all. Respondents engaged in education attribute more importance to the values of *Openness to change*, i.e. *Self-Direction*, *Stimulation,* and *Hedonism* (however, a reference to the value indices shows that there are no differences in the values of the category of *Conservation*, i.e. *Security* and *Conformity-Tradition*). Those who do not work, retired, and/or disabled, are distinguished by the high importance of *Conservation.* It is important to note that even with partial correlations controlling for the age, these patterns remained. That is, for example, the high importance of

Openness to Change values for those who are studying was associated not only with their younger age but specifically with the specifics of this activity; the same applies to retirees and non-working disabled people. Thus, the importance and relative independence of this variable for the of the regression model was confirmed.

Figure 5.7. Location of respondents with different types of activities in the space of two value axes.

Income. ESS included a question on the approximate net income of the entire household. There are several problems with this indicator. First, it captures the income of the entire household and not the respondent, which complicates the analysis. Second, income is not recorded in monetary units but in categories that are not equal and differ in some countries. It turns out that the income scale is nominal rather than ordinal and is not comparable in several countries (including Russia). This leads to the fact that it is impossible to weigh the income scale per household size in order to find out the level of wealth of the respondents themselves. Therefore, the income scale turns out to be inextricably linked to household size, and income, therefore, can only be analyzed in conjunction with this variable. In the analysis of the relationship between income and values, we will use five groups distinguished on the basis of household size. Household members under the age of 15 will be counted as 0.5 adult household members, as this is the income distribution. This weight is introduced due to the fact that in common households there are savings effects, e.g. due to the use of the same rooms, especially for children (Onozuka & Bennett, 2009).

The problem of comparability of different income scales in different countries can be solved by identifying some intracountry "norms" of poverty and wealth, for example, by dividing the population by percentiles. Such a method is also acceptable because among the countries under consideration there are both very wealthy (Norway, Luxembourg) and quite poor countries (Ukraine, Russia, and Bulgaria) and it is impossible to compare, say, residents of Ukraine and Luxembourg by the same income scale. Therefore, we will compare the relatively poor with the relatively rich. Therefore, we divided all households by country-specific feature of income: we found within each country 5, 25, 50, 75, 95 percentiles and got a 6-point (the 6th category includes the richest 5%) variable of income scale from "poorest" to "the richest in their country".[31]

Figure 5.8 shows the location in the value space of groups with different levels of income and living in households of different sizes. The numbers in the figure mean the level of poverty ("*3*" - median level, "*6*" - highest) and the letters - household size (*e* - largest, more than 5 "members"). Ukraine had to be excluded from the calculations, as mistakenly the pan-European scale was used in the questionnaire and 98% of the population fell into the first three categories, which means it is impossible to distribute them into the 6 percentile categories we employed. The samples in each point vary from 61 respondents in point "*a6*" to 4,655 respondents in point "*b3*".

First, we can note that regardless of income level, the larger the size of the household in which the respondent lives, the more they share the values *of Self-Enhancement* and to a lesser extent the values of *Self-Transcendence*. This is an interesting result as the reverse would be equally likely. On the other hand, it could be due to the fact that larger households are more typical of poorer countries where *Self-Enhancement* values are more prevalent. It is important to note that household size is not associated with *Openness to Change - Conservation* values, which also seems to be a rather unexpected result.[32]

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[31] For the details on how the income groups were formed in each country see Appendix, Table 8.

[32] A more detailed analysis shows that each country has its own pattern of interdependencies of values, income and household size, but we will not dwell on this, reporting only general trends.

Figure 5.8. Location of respondents from households of different size and income in the space of two value axes. Lines connect the points of groups with the same household size. Letters denote household size: *a* = 1-1.5; *b* = 2-2.5; *c* = 3-3.5; *d* = 4-4.5; *e* = 5 or more (1=one adult over 15; 0.5 = one child under 15). The numbers indicate household income: 1 - 5% with the lowest income for their country; 2 - medium-low-income group, between 5 and 25 percentiles; 3 - between 25 and 50 percentiles (middle income); 4 - between 50 and 75 percentiles, 5 - between 75 and 95 percentiles, 6 - above 95 percentile (the richest 5% in their country).

Second, Figure 5.8 also shows that higher-income groups, regardless of household size, are associated with higher values of *Openness to Change* and lower values of *Conservation*. This confirms the hypothesis that higher income is positively associated with the values of *Openness to Change*.

Third, the relationship between income level and the values of *Self-Transcendence – Self-Enhancement* depends on the size of the household. For respondents living in large and very large households, high income is strongly associated with a greater importance of the values of *Self-Transcendence*. Among the respondents living in small and medium households, the income level higher than the median (for a given country) is, on the contrary, associated with a higher value of

Self-Enhancement. Taking into account that respondents from more affluent but also more crowded households have the same or even less material means than respondents from the same income groups but from small households (for example, the real per capita income of respondents in groups "*a1*" and "*e6*" may be the same), then the described trends form a single conclusion that supports our hypothesis of a positive link between income and *Self-Transcendence* values.

Type of settlement. Living in a big city or in a rural area can have a strong influence on basic human values due to different population densities, different lifestyles, concentration of resources, and so on. Obviously, living in a settlement of a certain type is associated with dozens of other variables, but our hypothesis is that the type of settlement has, in addition to the above, its own independent influence arising from the specific living conditions. ANOVA shows that the values of respondents living in settlements of different types differed significantly on both value axes (Tamhane's criterion is significant at the $p < 0.001$ level; the differences are non-significant only between the groups "big city" and "outskirts of big city" on the *Openness to Change - Conservation* axis). Figure 5.9 shows that settlement size is positively associated with *Openness to Change* values: for villagers, *Conservation* values are more important than for others, and for residents of big cities and their outskirts, *Openness to Change* values are more important than for the others. Differences in values between inhabitants of large cities and their outskirts are interesting - they represent two extreme poles. Residents of big cities tend to endorse values of *Self-Enhancement*, while residents of the suburbs emphasize *Self-Transcendence.* Living in a big city is associated with high competition, which may explain the high level of achievement values (part of *Self-Enhancement*). And suburban dwellers have the highest level of *Self-Transcendence* and, if we refer to the value indices, the highest value of the *Self-Direction* and *Hedonism* among these groups. The correlations between the value indices and the settlement types turn out to be significant even when controlling for age and education, which means that these attributes can have an independent influence on the values and will be included in the overall model.

Figure 5.9. Location of respondents living in different types of settlements in the space of value axes

Again, we should note that this variable may be a consequence rather than a cause: traditional, conservative values may well make a person move (or stay, if they already live there) to the countryside, while the drive for *Self-Enhancement* may lead them to a big city. Given the high level of mobility among Europeans, this direction of causality is very likely.

Religious affiliation. The relationship between religious affiliation and basic human values is a classic topic for sociological research. From the studies of M. Weber (Weber, 1990) to the studies of M. Rokeach (1970, 1974) and modern ones of S. Schwartz (2007; see also Billiet & Meuleman, 2008) and others, the topic of influence of religion on the basic human values of people remains one of the central for sociology in general. We will not dwell on a detailed study of this association, but only illustrate the existence of a relationship between religious affiliation and basic human values, in order to include this variable in the overall model.

Religious affiliation in most cases is not chosen consciously, based on one's own decision, most often it is either "inherited" from parents or adopted from the nearest social environment. However, the opposite option of choosing or rejecting a confession or religiosity in general based on one's own basic values is also quite probable. It is more likely that belonging to one of the

confessions is a predictor of basic human values rather than a consequence, but the direction of the connection with the degree of religiosity is difficult to assume.

Let us consider the values of different religious denominations, which are presented in Figure 5.10. Orthodox respondents are distinguished by the highest importance of the values *of Self-Enhancement* and *Conservation*; only Muslims do not differ from Orthodox Christians in the values of *Self-Enhancement.* The adherents of Eastern religions are the value antipodes of the Orthodox, with the corresponding point closest to the poles of *Self-Transcendence* and *Openness to change*. Judaists are characterized by a combination of high levels of significance of *Openness to Change* and *Self-Enhancement*. Catholics are characterized by a medium-high level of *Conservation* values and a medium level on the second axis. For Protestants, the values *of Openness to Change* were more significant.

Figure 5.10. Location of respondents belonging to different religious confessions in the space of two value axes

Such a statement of value differences between religious groups provides very little information, as it unites everyone who identifies with a given religion - from clergymen to completely non-religious people. In addition, all the patterns described are one-dimensional, that is, they only take into account the connections between two attributes, while the third attribute - absent here - can explain them both. For example, it may turn out that the described features of

Protestants are related only to the fact that most Protestants live in more affluent countries, while most Orthodox live in post-Soviet countries. In order to more fully reveal the content of the connection between religious affiliation and basic human values, it is necessary to analyze the degree of religiosity of respondents within each of the confessions as well.

Since the degree of religiosity is expressed differently in different confessions, and is associated with values in different ways, it is worth using both indicators simultaneously to analyze this relationship. We combined the religiosity scale with an indicator of affiliation with one of the religions, obtaining 9 variables corresponding to 9 confessional groups. Each of the 9 variables included a scale from 0 to 11, where 0 indicates no affiliation with a given denomination and the remaining points refer to affiliation with a given denomination and simultaneously to the degree of religiosity (1 - not at all religious and 11 - very religious).

Table 5.1 and Appendix Figure 2 reflect the relationship between the level of religiosity in different confessions and basic human values. In general, the values of *Conservation* and *Self-Transcendence* increase with increasing religiosity in the sample, but it is interesting that this dependence is not the same in different denominations. For example, among Orthodox Christians, Muslims, and Jewish, a higher level of religiosity was associated with higher values of *Self-Enhancement*, while among Catholics, Protestants, and members of other Christian denominations, a higher level of religiosity was associated, by contrast, with lower importance of *Self-Enhancement* and higher importance of *Self-Transcendence*.

Let us also pay special attention to the features of Protestants: this is a confessional group in which the increase in religiosity is most strongly associated with an higher importance of *Self-Transcendence* and lower importance of *Self-Enhancement* (both coefficients exceeded those in other groups by more than 2 times!). Besides, it is the only European religious group in which religiosity positively correlates with the values *of Self-Direction*. This is consistent with the "Protestant ethic" described by M. Weber, in which "moral condemnation is deserved by *complacency* and contentment with achieved, *enjoyment* of wealth and its consequences - inaction and carnal pleasures" and encouragement is deserved by "individualistic impulses of rational legal entrepreneurship, based on personal qualities, on initiative" (Weber, 1990. p.204).

Table 5.1. Correlation coefficients between the degree of religiosity of respondents of different confessions and their basic human values

The degree of religiosity in a group of…	Openness to change - Conservation	Self-Transcendence - Self-Enhancement	Security	Conformity-Tradition	Self-Transcendence	Self-Direction	Stimulation	Hedonism	Self-Enhancement
Catholicism	0.14	0.02	0.07	0.14	0.04	-0.06	-0.10	-0.08	-0.07
Protestantism	0.06	-0.10	-0.04	0.06	0.11	0.04	-0.04		-0.13
Orthodoxy	0.11	0.19	0.11	0.11	-0.06	-0.12	-0.10	-0.15	0.10
Other Christians	0.03	-0.02		0.02	0.02			-0.02	-0.03
Judaism		0.03	0.01		-0.05		-0.04	0.02	0.05
Islam	0.05	0.10	0.02	0.08	-0.06	-0.08	-0.04	-0.05	0.08
Eastern Religions	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02		
Other non-Christians		-0.01	-0.01		0.01				
Does not belong to a denomination	-0.13	-0.10	-0.09	0.13		0.08	0.11	0.11	
Degree of religiosity without division into denominations	0.26	0.10	0.11	0.26	0.04	-0.14	-0.18	-0.19	-0.05

Minimum N=56,563. Only significant correlations are reported (p<0.01)

5.1.3 Variables that are more likely a consequence of basic human values.

In this section, we describe the relationships of values with attributes that are more likely, according to our assumption, to be consequences rather than determinants of basic human values (although there is no guarantee of this). These variables will not be included in the explanatory model, so we will limit ourselves to a brief overview of their relationships with values presented in Table 5.2.

The table reflects many different relationships of values with other variables, and we can see that values are correlated with almost all types of external and internal characteristics of individuals. The importance of *Conservation* values (at the cost of lower *Openness to Change*) is positively related to being married, the presence and number of children, negative emotional state, participation in national elections, and paternalistic attitudes; the values of *Openness to Change* are stronger among those respondents who live with their partner outside marriage, are more satisfied, happy and healthy, participate more actively in political and social life, and have more inclusive attitudes. The values described by the other axis also correlate significantly with these variables: higher importance of *Self-Enhancement* is associated with lower satisfaction (with financial situation, work, life in general), worse health and lower happiness, less positive

emotional state, low level of social and political participation, less inclusive attitudes regarding cohabitation without marriage, regarding homosexuals and immigrants, less trust in people.

Table 5.2. Correlations between value axes and some other variables

	Openness to change - Conservation	Self-Transcendence - Self-Enhancement
Marriages/children		
is married*	0.15	
lives with a partner*	-0.09	-0.08
divorced*		-0.06
not married for other reasons*	-0.17	-0.04
number of children	0.13	-0.03
have children*	0.31	0.04
Subjective wellbeing		
satisfaction with income	-0.10	-0.22
job satisfaction		-0.11
life satisfaction in general	-0.09	-0.19
subjective health status	-0.26	-0.13
subjective level of happiness	-0.09	-0.19
emotional state: sad last week	0.11	0.14
Social and political participation		
participation in social activities (compared to their peers)	-0.17	-0.13
meetings with colleagues/friends/relatives	-0.21	-0.15
political interest	-0.01	-0.15
voted in the last election*	0.19	-0.03
signed a petition over the last year*	-0.08	-0.21
Other		
Marriage standards: approving the cohabitation of a man and a woman without marriage	-0.24	-0.24
Attitude towards homosexuals: should have the right to live a lifestyle that is consistent with their views	-0.18	-0.30
Attitude towards immigrants: allow many to come	-0.11	-0.17
Paternalism: the state should be responsible for providing people with a decent life in old age	0.15	0.07
Social trust: most people will try to behave honestly (rather than "take advantage of me")	-0.03	-0.20

Only coefficients that are significant at the $p<0.01$ level are reported.
* Dichotomous variable

5.1.4 Regression model explaining basic human values

Previous sections have described in detail the influence and relationship of individual characteristics with their values. At the same time, many of these indicators are correlated with

each other and/or the relationship between them and the values can be explained by some third variables. In order to estimate specific contribution of each of the variables, free of the confounding influence of the others, and to compare them with the effects of the country of residence, it is necessary to include all these attributes in one overall model. The main hypotheses about the direction of influence were derived from a preliminary literature review and from the bivariate distributions described in the previous section. Figure 5.11 summarizes them.

Theoretical model. The upper part of Figure 5.11 contains determinants of basic values, those characteristics that the respondent themselves could not influence and, therefore, the connection between them and values can be interpreted only in one direction – these are characteristics of the parental family, as well as gender and age.

In the lower part of the chart there are characteristics that may have resulted from the actualization of values but may also have influenced the emergence or actualization of values, i.e. the relationship between them and values is indeterminate. Among them, there are variables whose probability of "causality" in relation to values varies greatly - for example, educational level is more likely to cause certain values, while income level or occupation at the given moment is not so likely. In our model, these variables are in the second group and are included in the regression in the second step.

Key interest to us in this model is the impact country of residence. We regard country of living to be predictor of values (although values can make a person to move to a particular country), as each country is a unique combination of social, economic, political, and cultural conditions of an individual's life. This model treats a country as a holistic attribute, in the form of 32 dummy-variables (dichotomous variables corresponding to the number of countries.

The chart also includes a block of indicators that are consequences of values (certainly not just values) rather than causes; they will not be included in the model. Consideration of the influence of basic values on social attitudes, variables characterizing emotional state, various satisfaction, as well as the behavior of individuals - such as social and political participation - represent an extremely broad field of research and should be considered outside the scope of this paper.

General logic of the theoretical model. Basic values are one of the most important subjective structures regulating the content of motivational sphere of an individual. Values are formed at the beginning of life, in the process of socialization through parents, the surrounding cultural and social environment. Values are quite stable, but can change over the course of life. These changes are associated, on the one hand, with the stage of life course, with the degree of socialization, with individual resources and belonging to a socio-professional group, and, on the other hand, with macro-factors, such as changes in the characteristics of the country of residence.

Based on these assumptions, we expect that values are mainly influenced by variables describing the conditions of primary socialization of an individual: parental family parameters, gender, age, country of residence. Less influence will be exerted by variables arising during the further life of the individual, they are related to individual choice, these are education, profession, income, type of settlement, religious affiliation. We also expect that the emergence of different social attitudes, levels of trust, satisfaction and many other subjective variables are a consequence of basic values (not *only* basic values).

Figure 5.11. Theoretical model of determination of basic values. Rectangles with rounded corners show determinants. Rectangles show empirical indicators.

Empirical model. The advantage of a large model is that it makes it possible to capture the impact of individual variables while controlling for as many other variables as possible. The disadvantage is that such an aggregate analysis adds up all missing values. By including all the variables, the dataset was reduced by 44%, which is unacceptable.[33] Therefore, instead of creating one general model, three models including different sets of indicators were built.

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[33] Analysis of missing values showed that the values of individuals not included in this model (14% of the entire sample) have a normal distribution and have no significant differences from the average value indicators among the respondents included in the model.

The first model included a minimum number of indicators - only gender, age, parental family parameters, and country of origin of the individual. This model is the main because it includes variables that do not depend on the respondent. The second model - extended - includes, in addition to those listed above, education, religiosity, and the type of settlement where the respondent lives; and the third model - complete - in addition to those mentioned above, includes the activity, occupation, and income of the respondent, i.e. all the attributes mentioned above. These models are needed to assess the impact of variables that may or may not be predictors of values. The second and third models are separated according to the principle of reducing the sample size: the second model does not include attributes with a large number of missing values, while the third model includes them. Thus, three models with different sets of indicators were built for each value indicator as a dependent variable. The quality measures of these models are shown in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3. Quality measures (R^2) of the three types of regression models with two value axes and seven value indices as dependent variables.

Dependent variable	Model 1. Gender, age, parental resources, countries		Model 2. +education, religion, type of settlement		Model 3. +occupation, profession, income	
	R^2	N	R^2	N	R^2	N
The "Openness to Change - Conservation" axis	0.27	51050	0.29	47766	0.28	32836
The "Self-Transcendence - Self-Enhancement" axis	0.20	51050	0.22	47766	0.23	32835
Security	0.15	49577	0.16	46388	0.18	31908
Conformity-Tradition	0.23	49636	0.28	46442	0.27	31941
Self-Transcendence	0.15	49665	0.16	46467	0.15	31954
Self-Direction	0.07	49497	0.10	46316	0.10	31880
Stimulation	0.17	49546	0.18	46366	0.16	31901
Hedonism	0.21	49546	0.22	46368	0.23	31896
Self-Enhancement	0.19	49663	0.19	46466	0.20	31951

The quality of the models does not exceed 0.3; this means that the variables introduced into the model explain no more than 30% of the variance of each value index. Theoretically, this is a very small level of explanatory power, but practice shows that on very large and cross-cultural

datasets the measurement error becomes very large and reaching the R^2 value equal to 0.3 at the *individual* level is an indicator of quite satisfactory model quality[34] .

5.2 Results of regression analysis

Let us consider the first model as the main one, using results from models 2 and 3 as additional. Regression coefficients for the main model are given in Table 5.4.

The influence of gender and age was confirmed: being male (compared to being female) reinforces the values of *Openness to Change* and *Self-Enhancement,* and conversely, makes the values of *Conservation* and *Self-Transcendence* less important. Older age makes the values of *Conservation* and *Self-Transcendence* more significant. In the more complete models (second and third, a full list of coefficients is given in the Appendix, Tables 8-10), the coefficients for gender and age for the *Openness to Change - Conservation* axis decreased slightly, but retained their sign and significance; for the *Self-Transcendence - Self-Enhancement* axis, the coefficient for age became insignificant when the respondent's educational level and religious affiliation were added to the model. This indicates that **the value axis of Self-Transcendence – Self-Enhancement characterizes cultural differences in higher degree but is weakly related to primary socialization and demographic characteristics.**

The influence of parental family characteristics was only partially confirmed. As hypothesized, higher parental education increased the importance of *Openness to Change* values (*Stimulation, Hedonism*), decreased importance of *Conservation* values (*Security and Conformity-Tradition*), and increases the importance of *Self-Enhancement* values, but does not affect the value of *Self-Transcendence*. Higher professional status of parents, as expected, increased the importance of *Openness to Change* in expense of *Conservation*, as well as strengthened the value *of Self-Transcendence* and weakened *Self-Enhancement* (but only on the value axis, the effect of this indicator was not significant for *Self-Transcendence* and *Self-Enhancement* measured independently). The results supported our hypothesis that stated the belonging to an ethnic minority and parents' immigrant background limited the respondent's resources, which is reflected in the greater importance of *Conservation* and *Self-Enhancement*. On the index level, only the higher *Conservation* and lower *Openness to changes* were associated significantly with immigration and ethnic minority statuses, yet the latter two predictors had no effect on the values of *Self-Transcendence* and *Self-Enhancement*. Finally, the most unexpected result was what we considered the main resource of the parental family – Family composition. The regression

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[34] If we reduce the array to a small and monocultural one, say, Russian, then the quality index of this model grows to 0.38 for the value axis *Openness to Change - Conservation*.

coefficients were not significant when controlling for other family characteristics.[35] In the extended models, the significance and signs of the coefficients for the described attributes were the same (only in the third model, which included respondent's income, occupation and profession, the coefficient for the "parents-immigrants" became insignificant). Overall, we can say that parental family resources do increase the importance of *Openness to changes* and *Self-Transcendence* and decrease *Conservation* and *Self-Enhancement*. At the same time, the composition of family did not seem to be a resource for the value change.

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[35] This result is not related to the problem of multicollinearity of parental family characteristics: the correlation of the family composition with other parameters did not exceed 0.07, VIF did not exceed 1.007.

Table 5.4. Standardized beta coefficients of the main regression models with two value axes and seven value indices as dependent variables. Only coefficients that are significant at the 0.01 level are reported.

	Openness to change - Conservation	Self-Transcendence - Self-Enhancement	Security	Conformity-Tradition	Self-Transcendence	Self-Direction	Stimulation	Hedonism	Self-Enhancement
Gender (male)	-0.13	0.08	-0.09	-0.05	-0.14	0.05	0.08	0.05	0.12
Age of respondent	0.42	0.03	0.21	0.38	0.20	-0.07	-0.36	-0.31	-0.21
Parental education	-0.07	-0.03	-0.08	-0.08		0.06	0.04	0.01	0.05
Parents supervisors	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.06		0.07	0.03	0.03	
Immigrant parents	0.02		0.03			-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.02
Ethnic minority	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.05		-0.04	-0.02	-0.03	
Family composition									
Russia - control group									
Austria	-0.09	-0.15	-0.11	-0.10	0.06	0.08	0.05	0.17	-0.08
Belgium	-0.02	-0.17	-0.12		0.08		0.05	0.16	-0.14
Bulgaria		-0.06		0.03	0.02	-0.05	0.05	0.04	-0.08
UK	-0.04	-0.17	-0.09	-0.03	0.08	0.04	0.09	0.10	-0.14
Hungary	-0.03	-0.11	-0.01	-0.06	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.16	-0.08
Germany	-0.05	-0.20	-0.12	-0.05	0.10	0.10	0.04	0.15	-0.13
Greece	0.05	-0.06	-0.03	0.05	0.02	-0.04	0.02	0.06	-0.08
Denmark	-0.06	-0.18	-0.19	-0.04	0.10	0.07	0.06	0.15	-0.13
Israel	-0.05	-0.09	-0.06	-0.04		0.04	0.02	0.12	-0.04
Ireland		-0.12	-0.06		0.06	0.05	0.06	0.02	-0.11
Iceland	-0.03	-0.12	-0.08	-0.03	0.08	0.03	0.05	0.08	-0.09
Spain	0.06	-0.18	-0.03	0.02	0.12	0.03		0.07	-0.19
Cyprus		-0.08			0.02	0.03	0.03	0.06	-0.09
Latvia	-0.09		-0.05	-0.04	-0.08		0.09	0.09	
Luxembourg		-0.16	-0.06	0.02	0.09	0.03	0.05	0.09	-0.17
Netherlands	-0.08	-0.17	-0.16	-0.04	0.06	0.08	0.1	0.15	-0.13
Norway	-0.02	-0.13	-0.12		0.08	0.05	0.07	0.05	-0.12
Poland	0.04	-0.04	-0.04	0.07	0.04		0.03	-0.03	-0.07
Portugal	-0.03	-0.10	-0.08	-0.02	0.04		0.05	0.09	-0.06
Romania	-0.02	0.04	-0.06	0.02	-0.03		0.03		0.03
Slovakia		-0.02	-0.03	0.05			0.04		-0.06
Slovenia	-0.03	-0.10	-0.10			0.02	0.07	0.11	-0.08
Turkey	0.06	-0.01	-0.05	0.09		-0.04	-0.02		-0.04
Ukraine			-0.02	0.03	0.03	-0.02			-0.04
Finland		-0.18	-0.07		0.11	0.06	0.08	0.08	-0.18
France		-0.27	-0.12	-0.02	0.16	0.02	0.06	0.18	-0.22
Czech Republic	-0.03	-0.08	-0.06	0.02		0.05	0.07	0.09	-0.11
Switzerland	-0.04	-0.23	-0.13	-0.07	0.12	0.09	0.04	0.16	-0.14
Sweden	-0.07	-0.19	-0.18	-0.03	0.09	0.07	0.08	0.15	-0.14
Estonia (r)	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02				0.01	0.03	
Estonia (er)		-0.12	-0.04		0.06	0.04	0.06	0.05	-0.12

R²			*0.27*	*0.20*	*0.15*	*0.23*	*0.15*	*0.07*	*0.17*	*0.21*	*0.19*

The influence of country affiliation on the basic values of the respondents when controlling for basic demographic characteristics and parental family resources turned out to be even more distinct than when analyzing averages across countries. Russia was the control group in this model, which means that the regression coefficients indicated the difference between the values of representatives of different countries and the values of Russians. We can say that these coefficients reflect the direction and strength of value changes that would have occurred to a person if, other things being equal, he/she had moved from Russia to one of the analyzed countries (or would not have moved, but would have been born and raised).

On the *Openness to Change - Conservation* axis, 8 countries (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Finland, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Ukraine and the Estonian-speaking population) have insignificant coefficients; only 4 countries (Greece, Poland, Turkey and Spain) differed with higher level of the *Conservation* values (that is, they have positive coefficients), while residence in any of the other countries increased the importance of *Openness to Change* relative to residence in Russia. When religious affiliation, education, and type of settlement were added to the model (extended model), significant coefficients for Greece, Poland, and Turkey disappeared, and significant coefficients for Bulgaria, Finland, France, and Ireland appeared. First, this indicates that the differences between Greece, Poland, Turkey, and Russia (in terms of *Openness-Conservation* values) are not cross-country differences, but rather differences in the level of education, urbanization, religious affiliation, and level of religiosity. Second, differences in the respondents' educational level, place of residence, and religiosity created the illusion of a unity of values between Russians and residents of Finland, France, and Ireland, and only after controlling for these variables, the adjusted difference of Russian values become apparent.

On the *Self-Transcendence - Self-Enhancement* axis, the differences also sharpened. Thus, only Latvia and Ukraine had insignificant coefficients (extended models also added the Russian-speaking population of Estonia), and only one country, Romania, had a positive coefficient. All other countries differed significantly in the direction of greater importance of *Self-Transcendence*, even when the model was expanded to control for the most important socio-demographic attributes.

Particular attention should be paid to the differences in the values of the coefficients for countries on one value axis and the other. On the *Openness-Conservation* axis, the regression coefficients were systematically lower for countries and significantly higher for other socio-demographic attributes, such as gender, age, and in the extended models also the level of

religiosity, occupation, income, and others (except for respondent education), while on the *Self-Transcendence-Self-Enhancement* axis, by contrast, coefficients were significantly higher for countries and education level. This points to the different nature of the determination of different values.

In order to more accurately assess the difference in the determination of the two value axes, we created two regression models, the first of which included only gender and age, the second one included only country of residence, and the third one included gender, age, and country affiliation. It turned out that for the value axis *Openness to Change - Conservation,* gender and age are the main determinants, and the inclusion of the country increases the quality of the model R^2 only by 0.04 (the sample size in this case does not change). At the same time, for the values of *Self-Transcendence - Self-Enhancement,* gender and age had a very weak predictive power - the quality of the model with gender and age only was extremely low ($R^2=0.004$), but country increased the quality sharply to 0.20. No other variable had such influence on the quality of the model describing the *Self-Transcendence - Self-Enhancement* axis. Thus, the values described by the *Openness-Conservation* axis are primarily related to the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondent and weakly to their country of residence, whereas the values of *Self-Transcendence - Self-Enhancement* were closely related to cross-country differences and very weakly to gender and age.

Thus, one value axis (*Openness-Conservation*) describes more fundamental differences in the basic values of respondents related to primary socialization, small groups, and other *individual* characteristics, while the other axis (*Self-Transcendence - Self-Enhancement*) describes mostly higher-order differences related to entire societies, and education appears to be significant on this axis for a reason - because it is differences in the education level of people that create differences similar to cross-country differences.

It is worth noting that the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients in the models predicting seven value indices, did not contradict and in general confirmed the conclusions drawn above.

The influence on values of other variables included only in the extended models also generally confirmed the results obtained in the bivariate analysis. The nature of the influence of respondent's education on their values remained the same; even after controlling for gender, age, country of residence, and many other individual characteristics a higher level of education was associated with a greater importance of *Self-Transcendence* (and lower importance of *Self-Enhancement*) as well as greater importance of *Openness to Change* (especially – *Self-Direction*, at the expense of the *Conservation* values).

The respondent's occupation, when controlling for their education and a dozen of other characteristics, had significant effect on the respondents' values in almost the same way as it was demonstrated above without controlling for other parameters. All professional groups as sompared

to managers (reference group) were distinguished by higher importance of *Conservation*, lower importance of *Openness to Change* values; professionals differed from managers by higher importance of *Self-Transcendence*, other groups had insignificant coefficients. All groups differed from managers by lower importance of *Self-Enhancement*, with no such differences by Self-Transcendence.

Respondent's activity, as expected, was primarily related to *Openness to Change - Conservation* dimension: compared to those in paid employment, students had greater importance of *Openness to Change*, while household workers, retired or unemployed disabled, by contrast, showed the greater importance of *Conservation*. In addition, controlling for other variables in the extended model revealed differences along the Self-Transcendence - *Self-Enhancement* axis: those students showed higher importance of *Self-Enhancement*, while household workers, pensioners and the unemployed disabled were higher on *Self-Transcendence.*

Individual income (household income when controlling for household size), as expected, was positively related to *Openness to Change*. As for the other value axis, the two types of associations were observed above were summed up in the regression model in a coefficient indicating a positive relationship of income with the values *of Self-Enhancement* and a negative one with *Self-Transcendence.* On the one hand, this result captures exactly the total tendency of the association, on the other hand, this result is free from the influence of country of residence, education, parental family resources, and other individual characteristics. Overall, the respondent's financial security consistently strengthens *Openness to Change* and *Self-Enhancement* values (at the expense of lower *Conservation* and *Self-Transcendence*).

The influence of living in a certain type of settlement had a very weak effect on values: the smaller the settlement, the more important the values *of Conservation* (and less important the values of *Openness to Change*), and when the model controlled for the activity, occupation, and income, even this weak tendency disappeared.

The religiosity of the representatives of different denominations, when controlling for other variables, turned out to be somewhat different compared to the results of a bivariate analysis. It turned out that there were no significant differences between the religiosity of people across the major European confessions (Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox, Muslims, Judaists): higher religiosity across all beliefs was related to higher *Conservation* and *Self-Enhancement*. The coefficients were similar in sign but differed in magnitude. Thus, the religiosity of Protestants and Jews was only weakly related to the values *of Self-Enhancement*, while the religiosity of Catholics was most strongly related to *Conservation* (mostly *Conformity-Tradition*).

Overall, the effects of various variables on basic values, which were outlined by bivariate analysis and corrected by regression models, have generally proved to be consistent with the

hypotheses outlined. The hypotheses regarding a strong influence of the country of residence on the individual values was confirmed. The effects of different individual differences on values were also found. However, this analysis was conducted among representatives of different European countries, which, on the one hand, helped to identify universal determinants of values, but, on the other hand, increased measurement error and, to some extent, averaged the results obtained. We repeated the regression analysis only on the Russian data in order to reduce the error level, to clarify the influence of these variables on basic values in Russia and to compare these influences with those recorded for Europe as a whole.

5.3 The Russian Model of Values Determination

To be able to compare the effects of different variables on values in Russia and in Europe as a whole, the set of independent variables for the Russian model remained the same (the country of residence, of course, was excluded), the two value axes were dependent variables.[36] Of the three regression models described above, the second (extended) model gave the best indicators of model quality. Appendix, Table 11 lists the coefficients and model quality indicators for the three models. The results are summarized below.

1. The Russian model, in which the dependent variable is the value axis *Openness to Change - Conservation*, has a greater explanatory power than the pan-European model ($R^2 =0.34$, compared to 0.27, the main model), which once again emphasizes the mostly individual determination of these values. On the contrary, in Russia, model predicting *Self-Transcendence - Self-Enhancement* had an extremely low explanatory power, lower than $R^2 =0.04$, which is associated with the absence of the "country" differences in this model and, in turn, emphasizes the country determinacy of these values.

2. Most of the regression coefficients in the Russian model turned out to be insignificant, which, apparently, is related to the reduction of the sample and the consequent reduction in the individual variance. All significant coefficients in the Russian models coincided in sign and in relative (to each other) magnitudes with those obtained in the pan-European model. In the extended model predicting *Openness to Change – Conservation* axis, the coefficients for gender, age, respondent's education, parental education, religiosity of Orthodox Christians, "other Christians", and Muslims, as well as residence in the countryside versus living in a big city proved significant. For *Self-Transcendence - Self-Enhancement*, only the coefficients of age, education of the respondent, parents' status, religiosity of Muslims and "other non-Christians" were significant.

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[36] A more detailed analysis of the intra-Russian determinants of values using the 7 value indices is not included, as this is outside the scope of this study.

The characteristics of the Russian model of values determination mostly replicated the parameters of the pan-European model, which suggests a similar influence of the above variables on basic values among both Russians and the other Europeans. This important conclusion should be recorded, although the problem of comparing the influence of respondent characteristics on values in different countries has been addressed only partially and requires further detailed elaboration.

Conclusion

As a result of the study, a number of facts and tendencies concerning the basic values of Russians and their similarities and differences from the values of the population of the other European countries were established.

1. The first group of facts is derived from the analysis of aggregated ("country") data and concerns **the values of the *average* Russian.** In ***the hierarchy of*** their values *Security* took the leading position, and was followed by *Self-Transcendence*, *Self-Direction,* and *Conformity-Tradition*, followed by *Self-Enhancement,* and the two least important values for Russians were *Hedonism* and *Stimulation.* The Russian value hierarchy was similar to that of most European countries. There are some notable differences with Denmark, Sweden, France, the Netherlands, Iceland, Belgium, and Austria. These differences are manifested, in particular, in the fact that in Russia (as well as in other post-socialist countries) *Security* is more important than *Self-Transcendence, and Self-Enhancement* is preferred over *Stimulation*, while in the countries mentioned above the preferences of these values are opposite.

If we compare the average Russian with the average representatives of other European countries ***on each of the values*** listed above, it turns out that for 5 out of 7 values Russia occupies extreme or close to extreme positions in Europe. Russia surpasses most countries in terms of the value of *Security*, which is part of *Conservation,* but occupies an average position in terms of the value of *Conformity-Tradition,* which is also part of *Conservation*. Russia lags behind most countries in the importance of the *Stimulation* and *Hedonism* values*,* and takes an average-low position in the value of *Self-Direction,* which constitute *Openness to Change. Self-Enhancement* values are stronger among Russians than among residents of most other countries under consideration, and the values of *Self-Transcendence*, on the contrary, are weaker than in most other countries. At the same time, the average Russian has no statistically significant differences in each value with the average representatives of a number of other countries, usually post-socialist countries.

These findings referred to the "second level" value indices. The "third level" indices were obtained by conducting a factor analysis of the initial items, these are integral value axes *Openness to Change – Conservation* and *Self-Transcendence – Self-Enhancement*. The average Russian is characterized by a middle position on *Openness to Change - Conservation* and takes one of the highest positions on *Self-Enhancement* (at the expense of *Self-Transcendence*). At the same time, the average Russian is similar to representatives of a large number of other countries in their preference on *Openness to Change - Conservation* axis, while the average Russian is much more special in terms of *Self-Transcendence - Self-Enhancement*: according to this dimension, average Russian does not differ only from the average representatives of Latvia, Ukraine, Turkey, and the Russian-speaking part of Estonia.

As a result, it is possible to imagine the average Russian today as a person who, *compared to residents of most other European countries*, is characterized by a higher degree of consciousness and a higher value of the state protection; who has lower values of novelty, creativity, freedom, and independence and who is less inclined to risk, look for fun and pleasures. Average Russian has a stronger desire for wealth and power, personal success, and social recognition. Compared to other European countries, their strong focus on personal *Self-Enhancement* leaves less room for concern for equality and justice in the country and the world in general, for inclusion, concern for nature and environment, and for care for close people around.

2. The second group of facts was obtained **when comparing the countries taking into account the value heterogeneity of the population of each** of them.

The clustering of all respondents participated in the study, conducted only on the basis of their values (ignoring their country), made it possible to group the respondents into four clusters.

In each of the four clusters there were representatives of all countries and *vice versa* - residents of each of the 31 countries can be found in all the clusters. Most Russians fall into the first (36%) and third (45%) clusters, whose value characteristics correspond to the value portrait of the average Russian. At the same time, we found a sizeable minority of Russians in clusters two and four (20% of the Russian sample), who shared values that are not typical for most Russians: every sixth Russian (14% of the Russian sample) falls into cluster two, where the values of *Openness to Change* are strong, and another 6% into cluster four, where the values of *Self-Transcendence* are the strongest (these clusters are dominant in Western European countries).

Thus, due to the transition from the country level to the individual level of analysis and the construction of a classification of individual respondents, it was possible, first, to split the image of the "average Russian" and show that there are two value subtypes within the *Russian majority*. And secondly, we were able to identify two *value minorities*, which are radically different in their values from the dominant value types in Russia, every fifth Russian belongs to these minorities. Such division of the population by clusters is not unique to Russia; many post-socialist countries are similar.

The Russian value minority consists of younger, better educated, and more affluent individuals, while the representatives of the first cluster (mostly committed to *Conservation* values) are older, less educated, and poorer.

3. The third group of facts refers to **the influence of country and socio-demographic indicators on the value differences.** Multiple regression analysis was used to separate ("clean") the cross-country value differences between Russia and other countries from the differences caused by socio-demographic composition of countries; and to compare the strength of the influence of country affiliation with the influence of socio-demographic characteristics.

It turned out that controlling for the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents made the differences found earlier (e.g., using ANOVA) were not only preserved, but became even more pronounced. Regarding the *Openness to Change – Conservation* axis, the regression analysis showed that differences in the socio-demographic composition of the population make the difference between the values of Russians and other Europeans significantly stronger, emphasizing the greater importance of *Conservation* values and lower importance of *Openness to Change.*

Controlling for socio-demographic characteristics of the respondent on the second value axis did not significantly affect the identified value characteristics of Russians. This test confirmed that the values of Russians are shifted relative to the population of most other European countries in the direction of greater importance *of Self-Enhancement* and lower importance of *Self-Transcendence.*

It was also found that the two value parameters, *Openness to Change - Conservation* and *Self-Transcendence - Self-Enhancement,* are fundamentally different in terms of the correlation of causes influencing them. *Openness to Change – Conservation* was primarily related to gender and especially age of the respondents, while country of residence had almost no effect. On the contrary, *Self-Transcendence - Self-Enhancement* value axis was primary determined by the respondent's country of residence and much weaker – by education, gender, and age. Thus, leaving other indicators aside, it turns out that in order to predict orientation on the *Openness-Conservation* axis, one must first know the age and gender of the respondent, while in order to predict their orientation on the *Self-Transcendence - Self-Enhancement* axis, the most important thing to know is their country of residence.

* * *

The analysis generally supported our hypotheses, but some unexpected results were also obtained, and those that were expected sometimes turned out to be more complex. For example, the hypothesis that Russians differ from most Europeans in the greater importance of material well-being and security was generally confirmed, but the analysis revealed a value minority, which, being part of the Russian population, is different even from *in the* how low the value of material wellbeing and security for them, and, conversely, is more committed to the values of caring for people and nature.

Regarding the socio-practical significance of the results, we would like to note the consonance of some of the facts found in the work to the moral criticism, which is distributed today against the mass values and "mores" of the Russians. The fact that the Russian population has weaker values of care for people and nature than people in most other European countries and, on the contrary, stronger orientation to competitive values of personal success, power and

wealth (characteristic of the "zero sum game") than in most countries, confirms the partial validity of this moral criticism.

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Appendices

Table 1: Culture dimensions of the GLOBE project

Uncertainty avoidance	The extent to which members of an organization or society seek to avoid uncertainty through social norms, rituals and bureaucratic practices in order to minimize the unpredictability of future events
Power distance	The extent to which members of an organization or society expect, and agree to, unequal distribution of power
Institutional collectivism (Institutional/societal collectivism)	The extent to which organizational and community practices initiate and encourage collective resource allocation and collective action
Intra-group collectivism (In-group/family collectivism)	The degree to which individuals express pride, loyalty and connection to their organizations or families.
Gender egalitarianism	The extent to which the organization or society minimizes gender role segregation and gender discrimination
Assertiveness	The degree to which individuals in organizations and societies are assertive, confrontational and aggressive in social interactions.
Future orientation	The extent to which individuals in organizations or societies take future-oriented actions - such as planning, investing for the future (futures) and delaying gratification of their desires.
Performance orientation	The extent to which an organization or society initiates and encourages group members to represent improvement and excellence.
Humanistic orientation	The extent to which the collective initiates and rewards individuals for their fairness, altruism, generosity, caring and kindness to others.

Compiled from: House, Javidan, Dorfman, 2001:497; Grachev, 1999; Latova, 2003.

Table 2. Schwartz value types, value axes and two variants of their operationalization
(Compiled from Schwartz, 1992, Schwartz, 2007, Schwartz, 2008

	Aggregate value categories (third level values)	value indices (second level values)	21 questionnaire items (raw scores) (first level values)
	Conservation	Security	It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that might endanger his safety
			It is important to him that the government ensures his safety against all threats. He wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens
		Conformity-Tradition	He believes that people should do what they're told . He thinks people should Follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching.
			It is important to him always to behave properly. He wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong
			It is important to him to be humble and modest. He tries not to draw attention to himself.
			Tradition is important to him. He tries to follow the customs handed down by his religion or his family
	Openness to change	Self-direction	Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes to do things in his own original way.
			It is important to him to make his own decisions about what he does. He likes to be free and not depend on others
		Stimulation	He likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. He thinks it is important to do lots of different things in life
			He looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He wants to have an exciting life

			Having a good time is important to him. He likes to "spoil" himself
	Hedonism		He seeks every chance18 he can to have fun. It is important to him to do things that give him pleasure.
	Self-Enhancement (Achievement and Power)		It's important to him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire what he does.
			Being very successful is important to him. He hopes people will recognise his achievements
			It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive things.
			It is important to him to get respect from others. He wants people to do what he says
	Self-Transcendence (Benevolence and Universalism)		It's very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to care for their well-being
			It is important to him to be loyal to his friends. He wants to devote himself to people close to him
			He thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. He believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life
			It is important to him to listen to people who are different from him. Even when he disagrees with them, he still wants to understand them.
			He strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to him.

The number in front of the statement indicates the sequence of statements as they were arranged in the questionnaire

Table 3: Characteristics of samples from the 31 countries participating in the ESS

	Sample size	Share of missing values (by value variables)	Share of women	Percentage of respondents aged 60 and over
Austria	2405	1%	54%	22%
Belgium	1798	0%	40%	20%
Bulgaria	1400	1%	36%	21%
UK	2394	1%	55%	34%
Hungary	1518	2%	37%	24%
Germany	2916	1%	61%	35%
Greece*.	2406	0%	56%	34%
Denmark	1505	1%	32%	21%
Israel**	2494	9%	56%	20%
Ireland	1749	6%	39%	19%
Iceland*	570	2%	12%	5%
Spain	1876	0%	40%	21%
Cyprus	995	0%	22%	11%
Latvia	1957	1%	49%	20%
Luxembourg*	1635	0%	33%	14%
Netherlands	1889	1%	42%	24%
Norway	1750	8%	36%	18%
Poland	1721	0%	38%	16%
Portugal	2222	0%	57%	35%
Russia	2437	1%	60%	29%
Romania	2139	1%	47%	25%
Slovakia	1737	1%	37%	15%
Slovenia	1576	0%	34%	17%
Turkey*	1855	1%	43%	10%
Ukraine	2002	1%	51%	28%
Finland	1896	10%	41%	26%
France	1986	0%	44%	24%
Czech Republic*	3026	11%	67%	36%
Switzerland	1803	0%	41%	25%
Sweden	1926	13%	41%	23%
Estonia	1517	1%	36%	19%
Total	59100			

* Countries for which data were taken from Round 2 (2004)

** Data for Israel are from Round 1 (2002-2003)

Table 4: Factor loadings derived from principal component analysis (without rotation) 21 of the original estimate

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Important to live in secure and safe surroundings	0,49	0,38	0,28
Important that government is strong and ensures safety	0,51	0,36	0,24
Important to be humble and modest, not draw attention	0,30	0,51	-0,03
Important to behave properly	0,47	0,48	0,26
Important to follow traditions and customs	0,42	0,42	0,21
Important to do what is told and follow rules	0,38	0,38	0,35
Important to seek adventures and have an exiting life	0,41	-0,61	-0,04
Important to try new and different things in life	0,55	-0,41	-0,19
Important to have a good time	0,52	-0,46	-0,13
Important to seek fun and things that give pleasure	0,49	-0,47	-0,14
Important to think new ideas and being creative	0,51	-0,30	-0,23
Important to make own decisions and be free	0,52	-0,19	-0,24
Important to understand different people	0,50	0,25	-0,39
Important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities	0,44	0,28	-0,31
Important to care for nature and environment	0,50	0,35	-0,26
Important to help people and care for others well-being	0,57	0,30	-0,34
Important to be loyal to friends and devote to people close	0,56	0,25	-0,34
Important to be successful and that people recognise achievements	0,62	-0,34	0,29
Important to get respect from others	0,53	-0,05	0,41
Important to show abilities and be admired	0,59	-0,31	0,29
Important to be rich, have money and expensive things	0,42	-0,43	0,46
Explained variance, %	*22,2*	*14,5*	*8,3*

Table 5: Matrix of Value Distances to the Average Russian by 21 Raw Scores

	Wealth	Fun	Good time	Respect	State protection	Success	Novelty	Obedience	Abilities	Care	Understanding	Secure environment	Tradition	Modesty	Friendship	Risk	Creativity	Independence	Equality	Rules	Nature	SUM
Iceland	0.87	0.06	2,37	0.20	1,45	0.51	0.19	0.00	0.28	0.31	0.49	0.04	0.31	0.09	0.56	0.36	0.08	0.12	0.12	0.37	0.11	**8,89**
France	1,80	0.50	1,51	0.51	0.33	1,17	0.40	0.20	0.14	0.15	0.40	0.24	0.35	0.27	0.18	0.00	0.10	0.00	0.45	0.00	0.03	**8,73**
Denmark	0.91	1,00	0.51	0.19	1,33	0.10	0.03	0.07	0.41	0.34	0.14	0.48	0.00	0.58	0.35	0.19	0.22	0.09	0.01	0.01	0.02	**6,96**
Switzerland	1,50	0.27	1,36	0.08	0.65	0.24	0.17	0.27	0.07	0.20	0.32	0.13	0.11	0.01	0.14	0.01	0.14	0.17	0.06	0.16	0.03	**6,10**
Sweden	0.62	1,28	0.32	0.35	0.96	0.49	0.15	0.01	0.11	0.23	0.12	0.50	0.10	0.00	0.11	0.16	0.18	0.09	0.16	0.12	0.00	**6,08**
Netherlands	0.81	1,37	0.17	0.37	0.60	0.12	0.35	0.10	0.10	0.16	0.11	0.41	0.04	0.22	0.00	0.18	0.15	0.13	0.03	0.07	0.00	**5,47**
Finland	1,05	0.21	0.19	0.96	0.16	0.32	0.32	0.22	0.46	0.15	0.30	0.05	0.11	0.01	0.11	0.06	0.07	0.11	0.13	0.01	0.03	**5,05**
Estonia (e.)	0.55	0.00	0.65	1,45	0.09	0.13	0.31	0.02	0.43	0.10	0.25	0.02	0.09	0.01	0.15	0.04	0.00	0.23	0.01	0.01	0.13	**4,68**
Bulgaria	0.56	0.06	0.01	2,93	0.00	0.08	0.11	0.16	0.19	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.03	0.06	0.07	0.05	0.00	0.02	0.00	**4,55**
Belgium	1,03	0.98	0.55	0.32	0.49	0.14	0.22	0.00	0.08	0.20	0.09	0.20	0.04	0.02	0.08	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.00	**4,52**
Norway	0.95	0.19	0.03	0.14	0.43	0.08	0.08	0.47	0.19	0.28	0.19	0.29	0.05	0.20	0.08	0.24	0.21	0.01	0.06	0.00	0.02	**4,21**
Austria	0.31	0.79	0.85	0.17	0.43	0.00	0.13	0.28	0.00	0.08	0.03	0.08	0.07	0.35	0.11	0.07	0.12	0.10	0.01	0.15	0.04	**4,18**
Hungary	0.66	1,43	0.41	0.35	0.08	0.11	0.24	0.43	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.07	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.17	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.01	**4,07**
Luxembourg	1,02	0.27	0.40	0.58	0.16	0.16	0.42	0.02	0.17	0.14	0.20	0.06	0.10	0.00	0.05	0.01	0.08	0.01	0.08	0.00	0.02	**3,95**
Slovenia	1,52	0.73	0.23	0.03	0.40	0.00	0.40	0.01	0.00	0.07	0.02	0.11	0.07	0.13	0.04	0.04	0.01	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.03	**3,88**
Spain	1,07	0.15	0.08	0.38	0.05	0.65	0.05	0.02	0.31	0.38	0.22	0.00	0.02	0.10	0.06	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.10	0.03	0.01	**3,75**
Germany	0.64	0.21	0.68	0.29	0.28	0.00	0.13	0.01	0.17	0.17	0.16	0.11	0.12	0.00	0.10	0.01	0.11	0.15	0.03	0.10	0.01	**3,48**
UK	0.88	0.62	0.03	0.29	0.18	0.23	0.23	0.02	0.01	0.25	0.15	0.08	0.07	0.00	0.04	0.14	0.04	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.01	**3,36**
Israel	0.19	0.53	0.32	0.25	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.01	0.14	0.02	0.03	0.08	0.27	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.01	0.13	0.36	**2,69**
Cyprus	0.59	0.60	0.00	0.09	0.04	0.26	0.06	0.17	0.08	0.22	0.07	0.01	0.04	0.02	0.00	0.04	0.16	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.22	**2,68**
Ireland	0.65	0.28	0.02	0.35	0.21	0.16	0.16	0.00	0.02	0.20	0.07	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.13	0.11	0.04	0.05	0.01	0.00	**2,48**
Latvia	0.01	0.37	0.30	0.00	0.15	0.05	0.31	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.04	0.02	0.00	0.19	0.05	0.36	0.00	0.03	0.11	0.16	0.15	**2,35**
Czech Republic	0.05	0.33	0.05	0.14	0.17	0.06	0.16	0.33	0.51	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	**2,00**
Romania	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.00	0.11	0.01	0.24	0.56	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.13	0.31	0.12	0.07	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.00	0.02	**1,84**
Portugal	0.71	0.09	0.20	0.00	0.25	0.02	0.05	0.01	0.00	0.14	0.05	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.10	0.03	**1,78**
Poland	0.46	0.00	0.07	0.03	0.13	0.03	0.18	0.52	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.00	0.11	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.01	**1,77**
Turkey	0.41	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.19	0.06	0.07	0.29	0.00	0.10	0.01	0.02	0.11	0.07	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.05	**1,62**
Greece	0.50	0.19	0.01	0.00	0.07	0.15	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.09	0.06	0.01	0.13	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.02	**1,43**
Ukraine	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.22	0.33	0.07	0.06	0.00	0.16	0.09	0.00	0.02	0.11	0.00	0.01	0.05	0.00	**1,19**
Slovakia	0.05	0.04	0.08	0.19	0.11	0.02	0.18	0.24	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.06	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.07	**1,17**
Estonia (r.)	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.08	0.02	0.00	0.05	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	**0.43**
SUM	**20.42**	**12,70**	**11,50**	**10,67**	**9,60**	**5,48**	**5,45**	**4,81**	**4,33**	**4,27**	**3,70**	**3,10**	**2,82**	**2,81**	**2,50**	**2,50**	**2,29**	**1,71**	**1,65**	**1,57**	**1,48**	**115,3**

Table 6: Matrix of Value Distances to the Average Russian by Seven Value Indices and Two Value Axes

	Hedonism	Self-Enhancement	Security	Stimulation	Independence	Commitment	Conformity-Tradition	SUM	Openness to change - Conservation	Self-Transcendence - Self-Enhancement	SUM
Iceland	0.83	0.43	0.47	0.27	0.10	0.16	0.14	**2,40**	0.16	1,58	**1,74**
France	0.95	0.75	0.28	0.09	0.02	0.21	0.02	**2,33**	0.00	2,20	**2,20**
Denmark	0.74	0.33	0.85	0.09	0.15	0.13	0.03	**2,32**	0.10	1,19	**1,29**
Sweden	0.74	0.35	0.71	0.16	0.14	0.09	0.02	**2,20**	0.12	1,11	**1,23**
Netherlands	0.64	0.28	0.50	0.26	0.14	0.03	0.03	**1,87**	0.15	0.86	**1,01**
Switzerland	0.73	0.31	0.34	0.03	0.16	0.13	0.09	**1,78**	0.03	1,62	**1,65**
Austria	0.83	0.06	0.22	0.10	0.11	0.02	0.20	**1,54**	0.26	0.61	**0.87**
Belgium	0.77	0.30	0.33	0.07	0.01	0.06	0.00	**1,54**	0.02	0.97	**0.98**
Finland	0.20	0.64	0.11	0.17	0.09	0.13	0.00	**1,34**	0.00	1,07	**1,07**
Hungary	0.86	0.16	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.05	**1,10**	0.01	0.44	**0.45**
Luxembourg	0.34	0.41	0.11	0.14	0.03	0.06	0.00	**1,09**	0.00	0.88	**0.89**
Germany	0.42	0.20	0.18	0.02	0.13	0.06	0.04	**1,05**	0.04	0.85	**0.89**
Estonia (e.)	0.15	0.54	0.05	0.14	0.06	0.09	0.00	**1,02**	0.00	0.88	**0.88**
Norway	0.10	0.25	0.35	0.15	0.08	0.07	0.00	**1,02**	0.03	0.58	**0.61**
Slovenia	0.46	0.13	0.23	0.17	0.02	0.00	0.00	**1,01**	0.03	0.45	**0.47**
UK	0.23	0.25	0.13	0.18	0.04	0.05	0.02	**0.91**	0.03	0.76	**0.79**
Latvia	0.34	0.01	0.07	0.34	0.01	0.07	0.06	**0.90**	0.34	0.00	**0.34**
Spain	0.11	0.55	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.12	0.01	**0.83**	0.12	0.91	**1,02**
Israel	0.43	0.00	0.08	0.04	0.04	0.00	0.08	**0.67**	0.12	0.19	**0.31**
Ireland	0.04	0.22	0.08	0.15	0.07	0.04	0.00	**0.60**	0.00	0.51	**0.51**
Czech Republic	0.17	0.13	0.06	0.09	0.03	0.00	0.01	**0.49**	0.02	0.12	**0.14**
Cyprus	0.18	0.22	0.00	0.04	0.04	0.00	0.00	**0.49**	0.00	0.35	**0.35**
Bulgaria	0.02	0.19	0.00	0.08	0.06	0.01	0.05	**0.41**	0.01	0.12	**0.14**
Portugal	0.15	0.07	0.08	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.00	**0.34**	0.01	0.22	**0.22**
Poland	0.02	0.09	0.03	0.05	0.00	0.01	0.07	**0.28**	0.05	0.05	**0.10**
Greece	0.07	0.09	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.04	**0.24**	0.10	0.08	**0.18**
Turkey	0.03	0.00	0.08	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.07	**0.21**	0.02	0.01	**0.03**
Slovakia	0.00	0.04	0.02	0.06	0.01	0.00	0.03	**0.15**	0.00	0.01	**0.01**
Ukraine	0.02	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.03	**0.13**	0.03	0.00	**0.03**
Romania	0.00	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	**0.11**	0.01	0.05	**0.05**
Estonia (r.)	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	**0.03**	0.00	0.00	**0.00**
SUM	**10.60**	**7,05**	**5,42**	**2,95**	**1,66**	**1,59**	**1,11**		**1,82**	**18,66**	

Table 7: Centers of the two stable cluster solutions

	First Solution				Second solution			
	Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 4	Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 4
21 raw scores								
Creativity	-0.41	**0.60**	0.04	0.32	-0.36	0.31	-0.06	**0.51**
Wealth	-1,63	-0.78	**-0.53**	-2,03	-1,83	**-0.23**	-1,10	-1,93
Equality	**0.98**	0.60	0.27	**0.98**	1,11	0.22	0.50	**1,04**
Abilities	-0.70	**0.14**	0.03	-0.93	-1,06	**0.15**	-0.06	-0.78
Secure environment	**1,04**	-0.21	0.38	0.35	**1,05**	0.04	0.60	0.04
Novelty	-1,05	**0.52**	-0.18	-0.02	-1,05	0.22	-0.40	**0.28**
Obedience	**0.54**	-1,37	-0.15	-0.60	**0.54**	-0.70	-0.03	-1,03
Understanding	0.53	0.19	-0.02	**0.72**	0.68	-0.10	0.15	**0.77**
Modesty	**0.71**	-1,01	-0.29	0.38	**0.90**	-0.79	-0.05	0.14
Recreation	-1,25	**0.56**	-0.14	0.08	-1,23	0.28	-0.35	**0.29**
Independence	0.28	**0.88**	0.27	0.68	0.34	0.50	0.31	**0.83**
Care	**0.72**	0.27	0.14	**0.75**	**0.82**	0.04	0.33	**0.75**
Success	-0.72	**0.17**	0.08	-0.84	-1,05	**0.23**	-0.04	-0.72
State protection	**1,06**	-0.06	0.33	0.38	**1,09**	0.07	0.54	0.14
Risk	-2,29	**0.13**	-0.91	-1,41	-2,26	**-0.04**	-1,64	-0.82
Rules	**0.88**	-0.83	0.10	0.13	**0.94**	-0.38	0.29	-0.26
Respect	-0.10	-0.45	**0.03**	-0.97	-0.41	-0.13	**0.04**	-1,07
Friendship	**1,01**	0.75	0.40	**1,02**	1,12	0.41	0.62	**1,04**
Nature	**0.96**	0.28	0.28	**0.91**	1,08	0.07	0.53	0.88
Tradition	**0.93**	-0.89	0.11	0.13	**0.96**	-0.43	0.35	-0.27
Fun	-1,52	**0.49**	-0.24	-0.02	-1,39	**0.25**	-0.53	0.16
Correlations between cluster centers of the first and second cluster solutions (N=21)					**0.99**	**0.94**	**0.96**	**0.95**
10 value indices								
Security	**1,06**	-0.17	0.36	0.37	**1,08**	0.04	0.58	0.07
Conformity-Tradition	**0.77**	-1,07	-0.06	0.01	**0.85**	-0.61	0.14	-0.38
Self-Transcendence	**0.85**	0.43	0.21	**0.89**	**0.97**	0.13	0.42	**0.91**
Self-Direction	-0.07	**0.77**	0.15	0.51	-0.02	0.42	0.13	**0.69**
Stimulation	-1,69	**0.36**	-0.56	-0.72	-1,67	**0.11**	-1,04	-0.25
Hedonism	-1,40	**0.55**	-0.19	0.03	-1,32	**0.28**	-0.45	0.24
Self-Enhancement	-0.80	-0.23	**-0.09**	-1,22	-1,11	**0.02**	-0.28	-1,14

Table 8: Household Income Groups Based on Percentiles for Each Country

	Group 1 (below the 5th percentile)	Group 2 (5 percentile to 1 quartile)	Group 3 (25th percentile to median)	Group 4 (median to 3 quartiles)	Group 5 (75 to 95 percentile)*
	Percentile 05	Percentile 25	Percentile 50	Percentile 75	Percentile 95
Austria	Less than €500	€1500	€2000	€3000	€7500
Belgium	Less than €2000	€1500	€2500	€5000	€7500
Bulgaria	*Less than 200 BGN*	*300 BGN*	*400 BGN*	*600 BGN*	*1000 BGN*
UK	Less than €500	€1500	€3000	€5000	€10000
Hungary	*Less than 56,000 HUF*	*75.000 HUF*	*125.000 HUF*	*175.000 HUF*	*300.000 HUF*
Germany	Less than €1000	€1500	€2000	€3000	€7500
Greece	Less than €300	€1000	€1500	€2000	€5000
Denmark	Less than €1000	€2000	€5000	€5000	€7500
Israel	Less than €500	€1000	€1500	€2500	€5000
Ireland	Less than €1000	€1500	€3000	€5000	€10000
Iceland	Less than €1000	€3000	€5000	€7500	€10000
Spain	Less than €500	€1500	€2000	€2500	€7500
Cyprus	Less than €500	€1500	€2000	€3000	€5000
Latvia	Less than €150	€500	€1000	€1500	€5000
Luxembourg	Less than €1500	€2500	€5000	€5000	€10000
Netherlands	Less than €1000	€1500	€2500	€5000	€7500
Norway	Less than €1000	€3000	€5000	€7500	€10000 and more**
Poland	Less than €300	€500	€500	€1000	€2000
Portugal	Less than €300	€500	€1000	€2000	€5000
Russia	*Less than 3000 rubles.*	*6000 rubles.*	*9000 rubles.*	*15000 rubles.*	*30000 rubles.*
Romania	*Less than 100 Ђ*	*Ђ200*	*Ђ300*	*Ђ400*	*Ђ700*
Slovakia	Less than €300	€500	€1000	€1000	€2500
Slovenia	Less than €500	€1000	€1500	€2000	€3000
Turkey	Less than €150	€300	€300	€1000	€1500
Ukraine			Less than €150	€300	€500
Finland	Less than €1000	€1500	€2500	€5000	€7500
France	Less than €500	€1500	€2500	€5000	€7500
Czech Republic	Less than €300	€500	€1000	€1500	€3000
Switzerland	Less than €1500	€3000	€5000	€7500	€10000
Sweden	Less than €1000	€2000	€3000	€5000	€7500
Estonia	Less than €300	€500	€1000	€1000	€2000

*Group 6 are all those whose income is above the 95th percentile. The boundaries of the groups are not inclusive of the specified values. For example, in Austria group 2 includes respondents with a household income of 500 to 1499 euro, group 5 includes 3000 to 7499 euro, and group 6 includes 7500 euro and more.

** In Norway, there is no group 6 because the category "€10000 and over" fell into group 5.

Table 9: Standardized beta coefficients of "extended" second regression models for the two value axes and seven value indices. Only coefficients that are significant at the p <0.01 level are given.

	Axis Openness to Change - Conservation	The axis Self-Transcendence - Self-Enhancement	Security	Conformity-Tradition	Self-Transcendence	Self-Direction	Stimulation	Hedonism	Power
Gender (male)	-0.10	0.10	-0.09	-0.02	-0.15	0.03	0.07	0.04	0.12
Age of respondent	0.38		0.19	0.33	0.21	-0.02	-0.33	-0.29	-0.2
Parent education	-0.05	-0.01	-0.06	-0.05		0.03	0.03		0.04
Parent leaders	-0.04	-0.03	-0.04	-0.04		0.04	0.03	0.03	
Immigrant parents	0.02		0.03		0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	0.01
Family composition									
Ethnic minority	0.02	0.02		0.02		-0.02		-0.02	
Russia - control group									
Austria	-0.11	-0.16	-0.11	-0.13	0.06	0.09	0.07	0.18	-0.07
Belgium	-0.04	-0.18	-0.13	-0.03	0.08	0.02	0.06	0.17	-0.13
Bulgaria	0.02	-0.04		0.03	0.02	-0.03	0.02		-0.05
Switzerland	-0.06	-0.23	-0.13	-0.10	0.11	0.09	0.06	0.18	-0.12
Cyprus		-0.02						0.01	-0.01
Czech Republic	-0.02	-0.07	-0.06	0.03		0.04	0.06	0.08	-0.10
Germany	-0.06	-0.20	-0.11	-0.07	0.09	0.09	0.04	0.16	-0.13
Denmark	-0.07	-0.17	-0.19	-0.05	0.10	0.07	0.07	0.16	-0.12
Spain	0.04	-0.18	-0.03		0.12	0.04	0.02	0.07	-0.18
Finland	-0.03	-0.18	-0.07	-0.03	0.10	0.06	0.09	0.09	-0.17
France	-0.02	-0.27	-0.12	-0.03	0.16	0.02	0.06	0.18	-0.22
UK	-0.04	-0.16	-0.09	-0.04	0.08	0.03	0.10	0.11	-0.13
Greece		-0.09	-0.06		0.02		0.05	0.10	-0.08
Hungary	-0.04	-0.11		-0.07	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.16	-0.08
Ireland	-0.02	-0.13	-0.06	-0.03	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.04	-0.1
Israel	-0.08	-0.1	-0.06	-0.10		0.05	0.06	0.12	-0.02
Iceland	-0.04	-0.13	-0.07	-0.05	0.08	0.03	0.05	0.09	-0.09
Luxembourg		-0.17	-0.07		0.09	0.04	0.06	0.10	-0.16
Latvia	-0.08		-0.05	-0.04	-0.08		0.09	0.08	0.02
Netherlands	-0.09	-0.16	-0.16	-0.05	0.05	0.08	0.11	0.16	-0.12
Norway	-0.02	-0.12	-0.11		0.08	0.04	0.07	0.06	-0.12
Poland		-0.06	-0.05	0.02	0.04		0.06	-0.02	-0.06
Portugal	-0.07	-0.13	-0.11	-0.08	0.06	0.03	0.08	0.10	-0.05
Romania	-0.06	0.02	-0.08	-0.02	-0.03	0.03	0.06	0.02	0.03
Sweden	-0.06	-0.19	-0.17	-0.03	0.09	0.07	0.07	0.15	-0.13
Slovenia	-0.04	-0.11	-0.1	-0.02		0.03	0.08	0.11	-0.07
Slovakia		-0.03	-0.03	0.02		0.02	0.05		-0.05
Turkey		-0.09	-0.09		0.04	0.03		0.04	-0.04
Ukraine		-0.01	-0.03		0.03		0.03		-0.03

Estonia (e)		-0.11	-0.04		0.06	0.03	0.05	0.05	-0.13
Estonia (r)	-0.02		-0.02					0.02	
Catholic religiosity	0.18	0.07	0.04	0.21		-0.11	-0.11	-0.1	-0.05
Protestant religiosity	0.12	0.02		0.15	0.03	-0.07	-0.07	-0.07	-0.05
The religiosity of the Orthodox	0.13	0.04	0.04	0.13	0.03	-0.08	-0.08	-0.1	
The religiosity of other Christians	0.06			0.07	0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.04	-0.02
Religiousness of the Judaizers	0.08	0.02		0.12		-0.04	-0.07	-0.03	-0.04
Muslim religiosity	0.10	0.07	0.02	0.13		-0.07	-0.05	-0.08	
Religiousness of Eastern religions		-0.01	-0.01					-0.01	
The religiosity of other non-Christians	0.02			0.01	0.01			-0.01	
Religiousness of non-denominational	0.05			0.07		-0.03		-0.04	-0.02
Number of years of education	-0.04	-0.12	-0.1	-0.1	0.09	0.16	0.02	-0.02	
Big City - control group									
Suburbs	0.01			0.02			-0.01		
A small town	0.02		0.02	0.02				-0.02	-0.02
Rural areas	0.05		0.02	0.06	0.03		-0.03	-0.03	-0.05
R^2	0.29	0.22	0.16	0.28	0.16	0.10	0.18	0.22	0.19

Table 10: Standardized beta coefficients of the third regression model for the two value axes and the seven value indices. Only coefficients that are significant at the $p < 0.01$ level are given.

	Axis Openness to Change - Conservation	The axis Self-Transcendence - Self-	Security	Conformity-Tradition	Self-Transcendence	Self-Direction	Stimulation	Hedonism	Power
Gender (male)	-0.10	0.08	-0.08		-0.14	0.02	0.06	0.04	0.10
Age of respondent	0.32	-0.03	0.13	0.26	0.2		-0.26	-0.26	-0.18
Parent education	-0.04		-0.05	-0.04		0.02	0.02		0.04
Parent leaders	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04		0.04	0.03	0.03	
Immigrant parents			0.03				-0.02		
Family composition									
Ethnic minority	0.02	0.02		0.02				-0.02	
Russia - control group									
Austria	-0.11	-0.14	-0.1	-0.12	0.04	0.08	0.07	0.16	-0.05
Belgium	-0.04	-0.19	-0.14	-0.03	0.08	0.02	0.07	0.18	-0.14
Bulgaria	0.02	-0.03		0.04	0.03	-0.03			-0.05
Switzerland	-0.06	-0.24	-0.14	-0.11	0.12	0.1	0.06	0.18	-0.12
Cyprus		-0.02							-0.01
Czech Republic		-0.06	-0.05	0.04		0.04	0.04	0.06	-0.10
Germany	-0.05	-0.20	-0.11	-0.07	0.10	0.09	0.03	0.15	-0.12
Denmark	-0.08	-0.19	-0.20	-0.06	0.11	0.08	0.07	0.18	-0.12
Spain	0.04	-0.18	-0.04		0.12	0.05	0.03	0.07	-0.16
Finland	-0.03	-0.20	-0.07	-0.04	0.12	0.07	0.11	0.1	-0.19
France	-0.03	-0.29	-0.13	-0.04	0.17	0.02	0.07	0.2	-0.23
UK	-0.04	-0.17	-0.08	-0.04	0.08	0.03	0.09	0.11	-0.13
Greece		-0.08	-0.06				0.05	0.08	-0.07
Hungary	-0.05	-0.12		-0.09		0.05	0.03	0.17	-0.07
Ireland	-0.02	-0.12	-0.06	-0.03	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.03	-0.10
Israel	-0.08	-0.10	-0.06	-0.10		0.06	0.05	0.12	
Iceland	-0.05	-0.14	-0.08	-0.06	0.08	0.04	0.06	0.10	-0.09
Luxembourg		-0.16	-0.06		0.09	0.03	0.06	0.09	-0.16
Latvia	-0.09		-0.04	-0.05	-0.08		0.09	0.08	0.02
Netherlands	-0.10	-0.17	-0.17	-0.06	0.05	0.08	0.12	0.18	-0.13
Norway	-0.03	-0.13	-0.13		0.09	0.05	0.08	0.06	-0.12
Poland		-0.06	-0.06		0.04	0.03	0.08		-0.06
Portugal	-0.06	-0.10	-0.09	-0.07	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.08	-0.02
Romania	-0.07	0.03	-0.08	-0.03	-0.03	0.03	0.06		0.05
Sweden	-0.08	-0.2	-0.19	-0.04	0.10	0.08	0.08	0.17	-0.14
Slovenia	-0.04	-0.10	-0.10	-0.02		0.03	0.08	0.12	-0.07
Slovakia		-0.03	-0.02			0.02	0.05		-0.04
Turkey		-0.07	-0.06		0.04	0.02		0.04	-0.03

Ukraine			-0.03		0.04		0.02		-0.02
Estonia (er)		-0.11	-0.04		0.07	0.03	0.05	0.05	-0.12
Estonia (r)	-0.02		-0.02					0.02	
Catholic religiosity	0.17	0.08	0.03	0.21		-0.10	-0.11	-0.1	-0.03
Protestant religiosity	0.12	0.03		0.16	0.02	-0.07	-0.07	-0.08	-0.05
The religiosity of the Orthodox	0.12	0.05	0.03	0.13		-0.07	-0.08	-0.09	
The religiosity of other Christians	0.05			0.06			-0.03	-0.04	-0.02
Religiousness of the Judaizers	0.06	0.03		0.10	-0.02	-0.04	-0.04	-0.02	-0.02
Muslim religiosity	0.07	0.06		0.11	-0.02	-0.05	-0.03	-0.06	
Religiousness of Eastern religions			-0.02				0.01		
The religiosity of other non-Christians	0.02			0.02				-0.02	
Religiousness of non-denominationals	0.05			0.07		-0.04		-0.03	-0.02
Number of years of education	-0.02	-0.10	-0.08	-0.06	0.09	0.10		-0.02	-0.02
Big City - control group									
- Suburb				0.02					
- A small town									
- Rural areas	0.03			0.04	0.02			-0.02	-0.04
Household size, weighted	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.03	-0.03	-0.04	-0.06	
Household income (quartiles by country)	-0.05	0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04		0.03	0.05	0.03
Activity - paid work - control group									
- education	-0.04	-0.02	-0.04	-0.04			0.04	0.02	0.01
- retired/incapacitated	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.05		-0.04	-0.03		-0.02
- housekeeping	0.04		0.03	0.03	0.03		-0.03	-0.02	-0.04
- other		-0.02				0.01	0.02		
Occupation - Legislators, senior officials and managers – control group									
- Professionals	0.03	-0.03	0.03		0.05		-0.02	-0.02	-0.03
- Technicians and associate professionals	0.04	-0.03	0.06	0.02	0.04	-0.05	-0.03		-0.06
- Clerks	0.04		0.06	0.04		-0.05	-0.02		-0.06
- Service workers and shop and market sales workers	0.06		0.07	0.05		-0.06			-0.08
- Skilled agricultural and fishery workers	0.03		0.04	0.04		-0.04	-0.04		-0.02
- Craft and related trades workers	0.05		0.07	0.05		-0.07	-0.03		-0.05
- Plant and machine operators and assemblers	0.06		0.07	0.06	0.03	-0.07	-0.04		-0.07
- Elementary occupations	0.06		0.07	0.06		-0.08	-0.04		-0.06
R^2	*0.28*	*0.23*	*0.18*	*0.27*	*0.15*	*0.10*	*0.16*	*0.23*	*0.20*

Table 11: Standardized beta coefficients of regression model obtained on Russian array. Only coefficients that are significant at 0.01 level are given.

	Axis Openness to Change - Conservation			The axis Self-Transcendence - Self-Enhancement		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Gender (male)	-0.12	-0.12	-0.14			
Age of respondent	0.50	0.46	0.36		-0.08	
Parent education	-0.10	-0.08	-0.08			
Parent supervisors				-0.08	-0.08	
Immigrant parents						
Family composition						
Ethnic minority	0.07					
Catholic religiosity	-			-		
The religiosity of the Orthodox	-	0.08		-		
The religiosity of other Christians	-	0.05	0.07	-		
Muslim religiosity	-	0.07	0.09	-	0.08	
Religiousness of Eastern religions	-			-		
The religiosity of other non-Christians	-			-	-0.13	-0.07
Religiousness of non-denominationals	-			-		
Number of years of education	-	-0.08		-	-0.06	
Big City - control group	-			-		
Suburb	-			-		
A small town	-			-		
Rural areas	-	0.08		-		
Class - paid work - control group	-	-		-	-	
Occupation - education	-	-		-	-	
Occupation - retired/unemployed	-	-		-	-	
Occupation - housekeeping	-	-		-	-	
Occupation is different.	-	-		-	-	
Occupation - managers - control group	-	-		-	-	
Specialists of the highest level of qualification	-	-		-	-	
Mid-level specialists	-	-		-	-	
Clerks engaged in the preparation of information	-	-		-	-	
Employees of the service sector, housing and utilities sector and trade	-	-		-	-	
Skilled agricultural workers	-	-		-	-	
Skilled workers in industry	-	-		-	-	
Operators, apparatus operators, machinists	-	-		-	-	
Unskilled workers	-	-		-	-	
Household size weighted	-	-	0.09	-	-	
Household income (quartiles by country)	-	-	-0.10	-	-	
R2	*0.34*	*0.37*	*0.36*	*0.01*	*0.04*	*0.04*
N	*1885*	*1801*	*1323*	*1885*	*1801*	*1323*

The attributes "religiosity of Protestants" and "religiosity of Judaists" were excluded from the model due to the absence of representatives of these confessions in the Russian massif.

Figure 1. Value hierarchies of average representatives of some European countries

Denmark

Self-Transcendence	0,78
Self-Direction	0,55
Hedonism	0,13
Conformity-Tradition	-0,16
Security	-0,17
Stimulation	-0,63
Self-Enhancement	-0,76

Hungary

Security	0,74
Self-Transcendence	0,49
Self-Direction	0,31
Hedonism	0,19
Conformity-Tradition	-0,21
Self-Enhancement	-0,58
Stimulation	-0,89

Latvia

Security	0,49
Self-Direction	0,24
Self-Transcendence	0,16
Self-Enhancement	-0,08
Hedonism	-0,15
Conformity-Tradition	-0,24
Stimulation	-0,35

-1,00 -0,50 0,00 0,50 1,00 1,50

Turkey

Security	0,47
Self-Transcendence	0,39
Conformity-Tradition	0,27
Self-Direction	-0,01
Self-Enhancement	-0,25
Hedonism	-0,57
Stimulation	-0,91

-1,00 -0,50 0,00 0,50 1,00 1,50

Figure 2: Relation of religiosity degree to values in four confessions

The number - indicates the degree of religiosity, 0 - "not at all religious", 11 - "extremely religious"